"Country rag merchants” and “octopus tentacles”: an analysis of law’s contribution to the creation of money in England and Wales, 1790-1844 by Frame, Iain
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Frame, Iain  (2012) "Country rag merchants” and “octopus tentacles”: an analysis of law’s contribution
to the creation of money in England and Wales, 1790-1844.   Other thesis, Harvard Law School.
DOI







ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS                                                                                                                                   2                                
 
I. INTRODUCTION                                                                                                                                  4 
 
II. GUINEAS, ÒPIG-ON-PORKÓ BILLS, AND ÒCOUNTRY RAG MERCHANTS,Ó  
                                   1790-1825                                                                                                                                           25                                        
 
 
III. BARGAINING WITH ÒOCTOPUS TENTACLESÓ: THE BANK OF ENGLANDÕS 
BRANCHES AND THE FIRST JOINT STOCK BANKS, 1826-1844                                   130               
 
 
IV. ÒA CURIOUS PICTURE OF LAW AND LEGISLATIONÓ: THE BANK OF ENGLAND 
AND THE FIRST JOINT STOCK BANKS IN LONDON, 1833-1844                                  215                                
 
 
V. CONCLUSION                                                                                                                                  279 
 
VI. APPENDICES                                                                                                                                    289 
 















Dissertations and money share at least one thing in common: without people 
supporting each other neither would be possible. In writing this dissertation, I have 
benefited from the support of a number of people and organizations and would like 
to record my gratitude to them.   
 
I am most fortunate to have benefited from the supervision of Christine Desan who 
gave me the space to explore ideas, and whose own scholarship sparked my interest 
in the history of money. I am grateful to Janet Halley for all of her help, and 
especially for her willingness to take part in the defense even though the 
dissertationÕs subject matter lies outside her areas of expertise. Roy Kreitner also 
read the dissertation and I am grateful for his suggestions and encouragement. For 
their support during the early years of this project, IÕd like to thank David Kennedy 
and Joel Trachtman. For keeping the legal realist tradition alive and providing the 
foundation for much that is critically engaging at HLS, IÕm grateful to Morton 
Horwitz, Duncan Kennedy, and Roberto Unger. For stimulating my interest in legal 
theory during my time at the University of Glasgow, and for all of their help in 
making graduate study in the US possible, I would like to record my thanks to 
Catriona Drew, Lindsay Farmer, Akbar Rasulov, and Scott Veitch.   
 
In all, I spent six years in Cambridge, MA. A number of people worked at the 
Graduate Program during that time and IÕd like to thank them all, especially Jeanne 
Tai and Bill Alford. For all six of those years, I lived in the Gropius dormitory 
                                                                                                                
3 
 
complex (apparently someone has lived there longer than me: whoever that person 
is, I salute you!), and I would like to express my gratitude to the staff who work 
there, as well as to Santos Osorio and the librarians at HarvardÕs various libraries. 
Those six years have been important intellectual, but even more important for the 
friendships I have made with Efrat Arbel, Vishaal Kishore, Jennifer Langlais, 
Samuli Seppanen, and Namita Wahi.  
 
I would like to take this opportunity to record my gratitude to the following 
organizations for their financial support during my time as a doctoral student at 
HLS: the European Law Research Center; Lexis-Nexis; the Clark Byse Fellowship 
Program; and the Project on Justice, Welfare, and Economics at the Weatherhead 
Center. By giving me a lighter teaching load and the space to complete this 
dissertation, I am indebted to my colleagues at Kent Law School. 
 
The support of my parents and family was essential in completing this project and I 
am immensely grateful to them. 
 
Finally, IÕve put Laura through a lot in writing this. Her generosity and tolerance 
remind me how incredibly lucky I am.  
 
September 2012 




                                                                                                                
4 
 
ÒCOUNTRY RAG MERCHANTSÓ AND ÒOCTOPUS TENTACLESÓ: AN 
ANALYSIS OF LAWÕS CONTRIBUTION TO THE CREATION OF MONEY IN 






This dissertation analyses the role of law in the creation of money in England and 
Wales during the late eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth century. Yet 
showing lawÕs role in creating money requires confronting an opposing view of law. 
To introduce this opposing view of law, this dissertation begins by considering the 
world of money and banking of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century from 
the perspective of three puzzles. It is by making sense of these puzzles that this 
dissertation will capture lawÕs contribution to a formative period in the history of 
money and banking in England and Wales.  
 
A. Three Puzzles 
 
Imagine a merchant in England in the 1820s. As the merchant travels from 
Newcastle in the northeast to Cornwall in the southwest, passing through 
Birmingham in the Midlands as he makes his way, he buys and sells goods using 
distinct country bankersÕ notes. All of these notes are promises to pay in gold coin 
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on demand, issued by a lone banker, or small partnership of bankers, each with close 
ties to their local community. 
 
Occasionally on his route, the merchant uses bills of exchange to pay some of his 
debts. Bills are not as convenient as country bankersÕ notes Ð for instance, they are 
not convertible into gold coin on demand (instead they are a promise to pay at some 
future date) Ð but in busy commercial ports, such as Liverpool and Bristol, they 
nonetheless serve as a means of payment.  
 
The merchant almost certainly does business in London, a key centre of commerce 
and government then just as it is now. In London, he presents to the CityÕs bankers 
in Lombard Street the country bankersÕ notes and bills of exchange he receives on 
his travels through England and Wales.
1
 In return, he expects gold coin or, just as 
often, the notes of the Bank of England, which together dominate the paper 
circulation of the capital.  
 
The merchant then uses not just one type of paper money but three: Bank of England 
notes, country bankersÕ notes, and bills of exchange. All three are convertible, either 
on demand or at some future date, into a fourth type of money Ð gold coin. 
 
Country bankersÕ notes and bills of exchange too in their role as currency throw up a 
puzzle, however. Money, of whatever type, typically derives its credibility from 
public backing, such as support from the state. For instance, around 1800, the state 
                                                
1
 The notes issued by country bankers were frequently payable Ð convertible into gold coin or Bank 
of England notes Ð either in the place of issue or in London. As is explained in detail later, the 
London banker would act as an agent for the country banker. Country bankersÕ notes payable in 
London were usually more attractive and hence circulated more widely.  
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stamped and issued gold coins via the Royal Mint, and the state backed Bank of 
England notes through its tax revenues. Country bankersÕ notes and bills of 
exchange present a puzzle because the state did not support or issue them.  
 
Despite this absence of state support, both country bankersÕ notes and bills of 
exchange as currency flourished between 1790 and 1825. On occasions, they also 
faced the whirlwind of crisis. A merchant holding a batch of country bankersÕ notes 
in the winter of 1825 had good reason to share in the Òindescribable gloom É 
diffused through the City [of London].Ó
2
 Given that the state did not issue or support 
country bankersÕ notes, when a country banker failed, those left with bankersÕ notes 
held merely worthless pieces of paper. Hence, the pejorative name given to bankers 
outside of London Ð Òcountry rag merchants.Ó
3
    
 
Through the 1830s and into the 1840s, merchants travelling outside of London 
increasingly encountered Bank of England notes. Wealthy merchants even 
conducted their banking business in the provinces directly with the Bank of England 
through the latterÕs network of branches that, according to one contemporary, helped 
to stretch its Òoctopus tentaclesÓ beyond London.
4
 With the spread of Bank of 
England notes, bills of exchange served less as currency. The same was true of 
country bankersÕ notes, which, by the 1830s, were increasingly unlikely to carry the 
                                                
2
 THE TIMES, 13 December 1825. 
3
 The phrase was used by William Cobbett, the radical and widely read journalist (as well as farmer, 
soldier and, in the 1830s, Member of Parliament), who at every opportunity attacked paper money. 
See CobbettÕs famous pamphlet PAPER AGAINST GOLD 41 (1815). Others refer to banking as the Òrag 
trade,Ó see, for example, ANON [WILLIAM REID]., THE LIFE AND ADVENTURES OF THE OLD LADY OF 
THREADNEEDLE STREET, 8 (1832). 
 
4
 The Birmingham banker and radical MP, Thomas Attwood coined the phrase. See THOMAS. 
ATTWOOD AND JOHN SINCLAIR, THE LATE PROSPERITY AND THE PRESENT ADVERSITY OF THE 
COUNTRY EXPLAINED 55-58 (1826). 
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name of a lone banker or small partnership of bankers owing to the rise of large and 
ambitious provincial joint stock banks.   
 
The rise of joint stock banking outside of London brings a second puzzle into view. 
In the 1830s, especially in large towns like Liverpool and Birmingham, many of the 
new joint stock banks opted not to issue their own notes. Instead, these banks 
circulated the notes of the Bank of England after striking a ÒbargainÓ with the Bank. 
Following the turmoil of the crisis of the winter of 1825, the Bank of England 
concluded that country bankersÕ notes were a factor contributing to speculative 
booms. To persuade joint stock banks to decide against issuing their own notes, the 
Bank of England offered them a Òbargain.Ó In return for ceasing to issue their own 
notes, the Bank of England guaranteed these banks access to cheap credit in the form 
of the Bank of EnglandÕs own notes.  
 
This ÒbargainÓ made sense for a joint stock bank as a means of boosting its profits. 
But in 1837 another financial crisis struck and the Bank of EnglandÕs arrangement 
with select provincial bankers came under scrutiny.
5
 What concerned 
contemporaries was the Bank of EnglandÕs decision to offer joint stock banks access 
to Bank of England loans at a low rate of interest. Was the Bank of England not 
merely replacing one source of cheap credit with another?  
 
                                                
5
 SAMUEL JONES LOYD, REFLECTIONS ON THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF PRESSURE ON THE 
MONEY MARKET 22-26 (1837), SAMUEL JONES LOYD, FURTHER REFLECTIONS ON THE STATE OF THE 
CURRENCY (1837), FRANCIS C. KNOWLES, THE MONETARY CRISIS CONSIDERED 28-29 (1837),  Robert 
Torrens, A Letter to the Right Honourable Viscount Melbourne, On the Causes of the Recent 
Derangement in the Money Market 65 EDINBURGH REVIEW 61, 68-69 (1837), A MERCHANT, 
OBSERVATIONS ON THE CRISIS, 1836-37, 20-21 (1837), THE CIRCULAR TO BANKERS, 9 September 
1836, at 58-59. 
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Running parallel to the second puzzle is a third puzzle concerning joint stock banks 
in London. For much of the 1820s, no one seriously doubted that the Bank of 
England was the only joint stock bank permitted to operate in London. Yet by 1833, 
it was commonplace to question whether it is possible to form other joint stock 
banks in and around London. And by the end of 1833, the Bank of England no 
longer had a monopoly in joint stock banking in London. Hence, the third puzzle. 
While in 1830, the Bank of EnglandÕs monopoly over joint stock banking in London 
looked secure, a mere three years later it was widely doubted. Making sense of this 
third puzzle calls for an account of this transformation.  
 
This dissertation treats these three puzzles as vantage points from which it will view 
a formative period in the history of money and banking in England and Wales. 
These puzzles touch on the commitments underpinning money and credit, the 
conflicts and compromises shaping the consolidation of national money, and the 
tensions and contradictions influencing the emergence of central banking, all against 
the backdrop of a gold standard monetary regime. Yet addressing the conundrums 
thrown up by these puzzles is challenging because of the inadequate view of law 
running through the economic histories of the period. To address these three puzzles, 
this dissertation will remedy this inadequate view of law.   
 
B. The Limits of Functionalism 
 
What then is inadequate about the view of law that undercuts the economic histories 
of money and banking covering the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries? The 
problem is the dominance in these histories of what legal historian Robert Gordon 





 A functionalist view of law holds that the economy 
has needs, and the function of law is to respond to these needs. Matters get more 
complex when law fails to respond to these needs thereby placing a fetter in the way 
of economic change. Further complexity follows when ÒneedsÓ turn into the 
ÒinterestsÓ pursued by different groups and individuals. These groups and 
individuals then lobby and campaign to have law respond to their interests, while 
placing fetters around the interests of their rivals.  
 
The standard twentieth century accounts of the history of money and banking in 
England and Wales covering the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, despite their 
often vast differences, serve as examples of functionalist accounts of the relationship 
between law and the economy because they see law either as responding to or as 
fettering economic needs or interests. Simpler accounts present the English and 
Welsh banking system as evolving through stages of development, starting with its 
defective and Òtroubled childhoodÓ before recounting the emergence of a Òcohesive 
and orderly system.Ó
7
 In their history of joint stock banking, Crick and Wadsworth 
write, for instance, that  
 
The history of banking in England until recent years is largely concerned with 
an effort to keep abreast of rapid economic progress, a task made all the 
harder by misguided legislation. In banking the old system of monopoly under 
Government patronage, which dominated the commercial world in the reign of 
                                                
6
 Robert Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984). See also Robert Gordon, 
Critical Legal Histories Revisited: A Response 37 LAW AND SOC. INQUIRY 200 (2012) and MARK 
KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES, 213-241, 242-268 (1987). 
 
7
 W. F. CRICK AND J. E. WADSWORTH, A HUNDRED YEARS OF JOINT STOCK BANKING 36 (1936). 
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Elizabeth [1558-1603], took stronger and more lasting hold than in trade, and 
competitive enterprise was forced into channels that could not but lead to 
periodic disaster. Not until the third decade of the nineteenth century did the 
long struggle bring a partial escape from the fetters of law, and even after that 
time the development of banking in England was hesitant and slow and 
interrupted by setbacks many of which need never have occurred. [...] The 
emergence and general adoption of the joint stock form is an essential 
condition of a banking system possessing the quality of stability based upon 
diversification of risk, along with the capacity to expand in support of 
advancing trade and industry.  So long as the condition was absent, as it was 
until well on in the nineteenth century,  stability was unattainable and healthy 
growth impossible, and the efficiency of the banking system was bound to lag 





In Crick and WadsworthÕs account, the banking system is trying desperately to 
support or meet the ÒneedsÓ of the evolving and growing industrial economy. Law, 
however, through Òmisguided legislationÓ fetters and restricts the banking system, 
preventing it from offering this support until well into the nineteenth century when 
monopoly and patronage are at last replaced by Òwiser and more liberal legislation.Ó
9
 
Crick and WadsworthÕs account is not unique. Thomas, for example, suggests the 
choice facing policy makers in the 1820s and 1830s was one of Òfree bankingÓ 
                                                
8
 Id., 9-10. 
 
9
 Id., 42. 
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versus Òregulated bankingÓ: either law fettered and constrained the pre-legal activity 
of banking, or it freed banking from these fetters.
10
   
 
Accounts that are more complex replace universal needs with interest groups, with 
law fettering the interests of some through restrictive legislation and responding to 
the interests of others courtesy of permissive or liberalizing legislation. As an 
example, consider first the account of banking in the 1820s and 1830s offered by P. 
L. Cottrell and Lucy Newton. According to Cottrell and Newton, Òthe rising 
circulation of bank-notes beyond London after 1750 was predominately due to the 
activities of the increasing number of largely small, private banks. These were 
unfettered by state-imposed restrictions except with regard to the number of 
individuals that constituted banking partnerships.Ó
11
 Cottrell and NewtonÕs focus is 
on the Òliberalizing legislationÓ
12
 of 1826 that removed this fetter, and they show a 
keen awareness of the importance of interest group contestation over the formation 
and impact of this legislation. But other than through discrete pieces of legislation, 
law is not central to their account. It either fetters or it liberalizes, but outside of 
these two options, the legal regime disappears from view.  
 
Michael CollinsÕs contribution to the nineteenth century history of money and 
banking holds a similar view of law to that offered by Cottrell and Newton. 
According to Collins,  
                                                
10
 S. E. THOMAS, THE RISE AND GROWTH OF JOINT STOCK BANKING 101 (1934). 
 
11
 P. L. Cottrell and Lucy Newton, Banking Liberalization in England and Wales, in THE STATE, THE 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION 75, 78 (Richard Sylla, Richard Tilly and 
Gabriel Tortella eds., 1999). 
 
12
 Id., 76. 
 




Since 1708 the Bank of England had been the only English bank able to raise 
capital from a large body of proprietors, all other banks in England and Wales 
being restricted by Act of Parliament to a maximum of six partners. The Joint-
Stock Bank Act [of 1826] attacked this legislative monopoly and permitted the 
formation of banks with an unlimited number of partners, or shareholders, 




The Ògrowth in scale, and the increase in stabilityÓ
14
 that then followed for these 
joint stock banks was not, Collins continues, predominately due to law or the legal 
system,  
 
Legislation also played some part, yet it rarely took a leading role. Obviously 
the legal framework was one of the broader parameters governing bank 
operations but, on the whole, the law was permissive and, with the exception 





Collins is more explicit about changes in the banking system responding to changes 
in the Òpace of economic developmentÓ than Cottrell and Newton.
16
 Consequently, 
his narrative of nineteenth century banking has hints of inevitability about it, which 
                                                
13
 MICHAEL COLLINS, MONEY AND BANKING IN THE UK: A HISTORY 10 (1988). 
 
14
 Id., 64. 
 
15
 Id., 65. 
 
16
 Id., 12. On the same page, Collins continues, ÒThe pervasive rise in the scale of economic activity 
made specialisation, including financial specialisation, more feasible and economic development 
called for more advanced mercantile and financial arrangements.Ó 
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Cottrell and Newton largely avoid through their focus on interest group 
contestation.
17
 Yet what Collins shares with Cottrell and Newton is an understanding 
of law that sees law as either fettering people through restrictions or as liberating 
people through pieces of permissive legislation. In CollinsÕs account, however, such 
legislation is only sometimes important, with the real action occurring elsewhere.  
 
Crick and Wadsworth differ from Cottrell and Newton, and perhaps Collins, over the 
evolutionary developmental path of banking. What they all have in common, 
however, is a view of law as either restricting economic development or as freeing 
economic actors from these fetters through liberalizing legislation. All of these 
accounts present a functionalist understanding of the relationship between law and 
the economy because they see economic actors as having needs, and law changing to 
accommodate or frustrate these needs. In the more sophisticated accounts, interests 
replace needs. Law then either responds to or fetters competing interest groups 
through either restrictive or liberalizing legislation.
18
 Law in all of these accounts 
usually refers to legislation. Outside of this legislation, law is a marginal force. 
                                                
17
 Cottrell and Newton are not sympathetic to an evolutionary account of banking in the nineteenth 
century, explicitly ruling out this understanding early in their article. See Cottrell and Newton, supra 
note 11, at 75-6. 
 
18
 In some of the older accounts, where needs are stressed more than interest group conflict, an 
evolutionary dimension is added to this functionalism. Yet it is inaccurate to suppose that 
evolutionary functionalism is a relic of the early twentieth century. It is (regrettably) alive in accounts 
of the history of money and banking today. For an example of this, see NEILL FERGUSON, THE 
ASCENT OF MONEY (2008), especially the Afterword, in which Ferguson presents an evolutionary 
understanding of the development of finance through analogy to the insights of Darwin. According to 
Ferguson,  
 
market selection is the main driver [of financial history]. Financial organisms are in 
competition with one another for finite resources. At certain times and in certain places, 
certain species may become dominant. But innovations by competitor species, or the 
emergence of all together new species, prevent any permanent hierarchy or monoculture from 
emerging. Broadly speaking, the law of survival of the fittest applies. Institutions with a 
Ôselfish geneÕ that is good at self-replication and self-perpetuation will tend to proliferate and 
endure (350-51, footnote omitted).  
 




Functionalism, then, dominates the economic histories of money and banking. It also 
exerts influence over many legal histories that deal with economic change. Recent 
accounts of lawÕs relationship to economic change tend to divide the legal 
historiography covering the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries into three camps.
19
 
One camp sees law as a functional reflection of economic change, in much the same 
way as economic historians. The second camp, by contrast, sees law as possessing a 
high degree of autonomy that allows the legal system to develop through its own 
doctrines and theories independent of economic changes. The third camp offers a 
compromise, where law is autonomous with respect to the development of legal 
doctrine but is functionalist in the ÒrealÓ world when businessmen use the legal 
system.
20
 Many legal histories, then, fail to escape from functionalism. And those 
that do, ignore lawÕs role in economic change altogether.
21
  
                                                                                                                                    
Significantly, however, Ferguson does acknowledge one important feature of finance that does not sit 
easily with his analogy to evolution Ð regulation. Yet law in the guise of regulation is for Ferguson a 
force that restricts or permits at the margins of economic change. As I hope to make clear in this 
dissertation, the form taken by financial institutions does not follow a natural and necessary course as 
dictated by the survival of the fittest. The institutions that come to dominate do so largely because of 
the choices made, and conflicts contested, by individuals against and through the background legal 
regime.    
 
19
 See RON HARRIS, INDUSTRIALIZING ENGLISH LAW: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATION, 1720-1844, 3-11 (2000). Joshua Getzler identifies the first two camps in A HISTORY 
OF WATER RIGHTS AT COMMON LAW, 3-6 (2004).    
 
20
 For references to examples of legal history scholarship that fit into these three camps, see HARRIS, 
supra note 19, at 3-11. According to one review of HarrisÕs book, HarrisÕs own position flip-flops 
between camps one and two, see Paddy Ireland, History, Critical Legal Studies and the Mysterious 
Disappearance of Capitalism, 65(1) MOD. L. REV. 120, 122 (2002). The best overviews of English 
legal history covering the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries tend to reject the second camp by 
considering legal developments within the context of wider social, economic, and political changes. 
Yet in doing so, they also tend to see law as responding to social, economic, and political prompts 
rather than as a force shaping the economy, society, or politics. Examples of this legal history 
include, W. R. CORNISH AND D DE N. CLARK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN ENGLAND, 1750-1950 (1989); 
and PATRICK ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979). A more doctrinally 
focused history is A. H. MANCHESTER, A MODERN LEGAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND AND WALES, 1750-
1950 (1980).    
 
21
 Approaches to legal history that assert lawÕs importance but eschew functionalism include Gordon 
supra note 6; KELMAN supra note 6; and, G. R. RUBIN AND D. SUGARMAN, D, LAW, ECONOMY AND 
SOCIETY, 1750-1914: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1984).  




Given the prevalence of functionalism in the work of legal historians and in the 
standard accounts of the history of money and banking in England and Wales, how 
do functionalist accounts of lawÕs relationship to the economy explain the three 
puzzles presented in the previous section? Consider the first puzzle. From a 
functionalist perspective, it is possible to argue that both country bankersÕ notes and 
bills of exchange as currency represented a failure of law to respond to an economic 
need felt by an emerging commercial class. Coins issued by the Royal Mint failed to 
meet the populationÕs currency needs because there were too few of them. The 
problem with Bank of England notes was that prior to the late 1820s they did not 
circulate extensively outside of the greater London area. Legislation only helped to 
perpetuate this situation by preventing men of commerce from forming joint stock 
banks that might issue credible notes. Yet there was a demand for a medium of 
exchange not met by scarce Royal Mint coins and notes issued by the Bank of 
England in London, as captured by the emergence of both country bankersÕ notes 
and bills of exchange as currency. On one reading then, legislation before 1826 
served as a fetter forcing people outside of London to respond to the absence of an 
adequate means of exchange by spontaneously creating their own money.
22
 
                                                
22
 According to one economic historian,  
 
In 1770 no merchant could remember the time when the country had been blessed with an 
adequate currency. It was something they accepted. Sometimes money was said to be too dear, 
sometimes too cheap, but always there had been too little. Disputes over who should control 
the currency and how this could be achieved were traditional. No solution had been found, but 
merchants from time immemorial had adapted themselves to the needs of their situation and 
devised ways and means of paying for goods to be carried from their place of origin to their 
place of consumption. It had not been easy and the risks were high; but in 1770 it was 
becoming much easier and the volume of trade was expanding steadily. This growing trade 
demanded a satisfactory currency. What had always been desirable was becoming a necessity. 
If the government would not, or could not, meet this demand, there were growing number of 
persons in the provinces who were willing to respond to it. These were the country bankers 
whose numbers increased so rapidly in this period. F. Stuart Jones, Government, Currency 
and Country Bank in England, 1770-1797, 44 SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 252, 
253 (1976).   




Consider next a functionalist account of lawÕs relationship to the economy that turns 
to the legislation of 1826. This legislation allowed the formation of joint stock banks 
outside of London. By doing so, it removed the fetters preventing law from 
adequately responding to the need of the growing commercial class for stable banks 
and an adequate supply of national money. This legislation then, serves as an 
example for economic historians of a triumph for those seeking reform by 
challenging monopoly and privilege. The legislation of 1833 permitting joint stock 
banking in London is a similar triumph. Yet those whose interests favoured reform 
did not always get their way. The legislation of 1826 and 1833 was ÒpermissiveÓ and 
Òliberalizing,Ó but on occasions the Bank of England and the interests supporting it 
fought back by preserving, for example, the BankÕs privileges over the issue of 
paper money in London.  
 
The view of some scholars that both country bankersÕ notes and bills of exchange as 
currency thrived as a response to the scarcity of both Royal Mint coins and Bank of 
England notes outside of the greater London area is highly plausible. Likewise, 
ÒliberalizingÓ is a plausible description of the legislation of 1826 and 1833 since 
both pieces of legislation allowed people to form joint stock banks when before they 
could not, and helped to unleash a period of conflict in the 1830s between the 
interests behind the Bank of England and those supportive of the new banks.  
Nevertheless, functionalist accounts also oversimplify, evidenced by their failure to 
help resolve the three puzzles. Although it is possible to see the proliferation of both 
country bankersÕ notes and bills of exchange as currency as a response to legal 
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fetters on the development of money and banking, viewing these notes and bills in 
this way does not tell us what made them credible in the absence of state backing. 
Moreover, although the legislation of 1826 ÒfreedÓ banks from restrictions and 
helped to create a period of conflict between different banking interest groups, 
neither ÒliberalizingÓ legislation nor interest group conflict explains why the Bank of 
England came to offer its rivals access to cheap credit. Similarly, although the 
legislation of 1833 ÒfreedÓ banking in London from the Bank of EnglandÕs 
monopoly in joint stock banking, the appearance of this legislation does not explain 
why people came to doubt the legal basis of the BankÕs monopoly in London in the 
first place. 
 
Making sense of these puzzles requires calling into question functionalist 
explanations of the relationship between law and the economy. Functionalist 
accounts do not resolve these three puzzles because they see law as distinct from the 
economy, with the latter serving as the driving force behind change, and the former 
either adapting to or fettering such change. A functionalist account sees law and the 
legal system either responding to the ÒneedsÓ of the economy, as defined through 
interest group conflict, or creating fetters preventing the fulfilment of these needs. 
Either law is a fetter, prohibiting and restricting people and groups, or it is a 
liberalizing and permissive force, freeing people and groups from these fetters. 
Either way, law is detached from the real action: it prohibits and permits but always 
at a distance.   
 
This dissertation argues that viewing law through a functionalist lens, as a force 
detached from the real action, leaves little room for addressing the questions raised 
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by the puzzles introduced earlier. To make sense of these puzzles, this dissertation 
adopts the starting point of dropping the distinction between law and the economy. 
An economy is a legal creation.  Whenever historians discuss markets, commodities, 
merchants, money, creditors, debtors, or bills of exchange, they are discussing the 
role of law in defining and constructing, sometimes creatively, the social relations 
that lie behind each of these categories. It is by bringing this constitutive role of law 
Ð and lawÕs capacity for creativity made possible by this role Ð to the surface that 
this dissertation will make sense of the puzzles affecting money and banking in 
England and Wales in the period 1790-1844.   
 
C. The Structure of the Dissertation 
 
The dissertation has three main chapters. Each of these chapters is an attempt to 
come to terms with one of the three puzzles introduced earlier. After this 
Introduction, Chapter II takes up both the country bankersÕ notes and bills of 
exchange that played such a prominent role in the English and Welsh economy in 
the late eighteenth and first quarter of the nineteenth century. These notes and bills 
are puzzling because for a form of currency to circulate it usually needs some kind 
of state backing. Yet the British state of this period did not back or issue country 
bankersÕ notes or bills of exchange. In reality, the opposite was closer to the truth, 
for rather than backing these notes and bills, the framework provided by the 
government meant only banks of six partners or less issued notes or endorsed bills. 
The absence of direct state backing explains why both country bankersÕ notes and 
bills of exchange as currency were on occasions unsustainable. But more often these 
notes and bills did weather the onset of crisis. Chapter II explains why both country 
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bankersÕ notes and bills of exchange frequently flourished even without the direct 
backing of the state. The key element to the explanation offered in Chapter II is the 
role the legal regime played in constructing the institutions that provided these notes 
and bills with an alternative form of public backing, one that drew not on the support 
of the central government, but on the support of local communities across England 
and Wales. 
 
The classic account of country banking, which includes a wealth of information on 
both country bankersÕ notes and bills of exchange as currency, is Leslie PressnellÕs 
Country Banking in the Industrial Revolution.
23
 Pressnell notes the support local 
communities gave to their banker during moments of crisis to support the bankersÕ 
notes. So do a number of other historians of banking.
24
 Yet these accounts either 
confine the phenomenon whereby local communities backed the notes of their 
banker to their footnotes or they limit their description of what happened to a 
regurgitation of the reports found in contemporary local newspapers. As the 
footnotes to Chapter II testify, these accounts provide valuable information. But they 
all fail to analyze the contribution these pledges make towards understanding the 
nature of money. Moreover, there is no mention of the role of law in enabling local 
communities to support the notes of their local banker. Chapter II analyzes these 
notes and the legal regime that made them possible. In doing so, it describes local 
rather than national money, as well as a monetary system without a central bank of 
the type we know today.  
                                                
23
 L. S. PRESSNELL, COUNTRY BANKING IN THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION (1956). 
24
 See, for example, Pat Hudson, The Role of Banks in the Finance of the West Yorkshire Wool Textile 
Industry, c. 1780-1850, 55(3) BUSINESS HISTORY REVIEW 379, 382 (1981). For other examples, see 
references in sections D and E in Chapter II.  
 




Following the legislative changes of 1826, and the emergence of both joint stock 
banking and a regional network of Bank of England branches, country bankersÕ 
notes played a less prominent role in the economy of England and Wales. 
Consequently, in Chapter III, the focus of the dissertation shifts from country 
bankersÕ notes to the new joint stock banks and the Bank of EnglandÕs branches. 
Chapter III explains why a select group of these new joint stock banks got 
favourable access to credit from the Bank of England, despite the Bank of EnglandÕs 
efforts at curtailing the capacity of provincial banks to contribute towards 
speculative credit creation. To explain the Bank of EnglandÕs contradictory policy, 
Chapter III focuses again on the role of the legal regime. The legislation of 1826 was 
one discrete enactment replacing monopoly privileges with freedom to form joint 
stock banks. To understand why the Bank of England in the 1830s ended up 
conferring benefits on its rivals, Chapter III goes beyond this discrete piece of 
legislation by bringing into view all of the other rights, duties, powers, and 
immunities conferred onto the Bank of England and the ÒliberalizedÓ joint stock 
banks by the legal regime. These entitlements, supplied in particular by property and 
contract and brought into play by the legislation of 1826, allowed the Bank of 
England and the joint stock banks to then bargain with each other. To explain why a 
select group of joint stock banks received favourable terms from the Bank of 
England, Chapter III considers the bargaining power of the joint stock banks and the 
Bank of England, as defined and constructed by this legal regime.  
 
By focusing on the bargaining between the Bank of England and joint stock banks 
outside of London, Chapter III takes up the centralization of paper money against the 
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backdrop of a Bank of England ever more conscious of its wider responsibilities. 
Fortunately, there is a decent sized literature on the Bank of EnglandÕs branches and 
an even larger literature on nineteenth century joint stock banking. Unfortunately, 
the literature on the Bank of EnglandÕs branches presents the joint stock banks that 
borrowed from these branches as largely identical to each other,
25
 while accounts of 
joint stock banking only briefly consider, if they consider at all, the Bank of 
EnglandÕs branches.
26
 Chapter III fills this gap by exploring the relations between 
the Bank of EnglandÕs branches and two joint stock banks from Lancashire, the 
Manchester and Liverpool District Bank and the Northern and Central Bank of 




                                                
25
 For information on the Bank of EnglandÕs network of branches after their creation in 1826, see M. 
Collins, The Bank of England at Liverpool, 1827-1844, 14(2) BUSINESS HISTORY 144 (1972); DIETER 
ZIEGLER, CENTRAL BANK, PERIPHERAL INDUSTRY: THE BANK OF ENGLAND IN THE PROVINCES, 1826-
1913 (1990); R. O. Roberts, Bank of England Branch Discounting, 1826-1859, 25 ECONOMICA 230 
(1958); David J. Moss, Central banking and the Provincial System: the Bank of England and the 3% 
discount account, 1832-1837, 2 FINANCIAL HISTORY REVIEW 5, 12 (1995); David J. Moss, The Bank 
of England and the Establishment of a Branch System, 1826-1829, 27(1) CANADIAN JOURNAL OF 
HISTORY/ANNALES CANADIENNES D'HISTOIRE, 47 (1992);  David J. Moss, The Bank of England and 
the Country Banks: Birmingham, 1827-33, 34(4) THE ECONOMIC HISTORY REVIEW 540 (1981);  R. 
O. Roberts, Financial Crisis and the Swansea ÔBranch BankÕ of England, 11 NATIONAL LIBRARY OF 
WALES JOURNAL/CYLCHGRAWN LLYFRGELL GENEDLAETHOL CYMRU 76 (1959-60); F. Stuart Jones, 
The Bank of England in Manchester, 11(1) BANKHISTORISCHES ARCHIV 28 (1985). 
 
26
 The chapters in COLLINS, supra note 13 on commercial banking in the nineteenth century (64-91) 
make no mention of the Bank of EnglandÕs branches. Cottrell and Newton, supra note 11, at 76 
explicitly rule out a discussion on the BankÕs branches in their work on banking liberalization in the 
1830s. In their history of joint stock banking in England and Wales, CRICK AND WADSWORTH, supra 
note 7, do not provide any detailed discussion of the BankÕs branches. THOMAS, supra note 10, by 
contrast, does discuss the BankÕs branches in his history of joint stock banking, but only provides 
brief accounts of their origin (84-87), early years (160-164), and role in rediscounting bills of 
exchange (303-304).  P. W. MATTHEWS AND A. W. TUKE, A HISTORY OF BARCLAYS BANK LIMITED 
(1926) does not contain a chapter on the BankÕs branches. By contrast, R. S. SAYERS, LLOYDS BANK 
IN THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH BANKING (1957) does contain a very informative chapter on the BankÕs 
branches (139-156).  
 
27
 There is no book detailing the history of either bank. Valuable information on both banks is 
nonetheless in FRANK STUART JONES, THE DEVELOPMENT OF BANKING INSTITUTIONS IN 
MANCHESTER, 1770-1850 (PhD Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1975), chapters III and VI, 
where Jones details the history of early joint stock banks in Manchester. Further information on the 
Northern is in THOMAS, supra note 10, at chapter VII. This dissertation draws on both of these 
accounts in Chapter III.  
 




Chapter IV, like Chapter III, is about the conflict between the Bank of England and 
the new joint stock banks. Distinguishing Chapter IV is its focus on the new joint 
stock banks formed in London. The puzzle that Chapter IV addresses is how forming 
joint stock banks in London became possible given that the legislation of 1826 
referred only to banks outside of London. Whereas in the late 1820s it was widely 
agreed that the Bank of England retained its monopoly in joint stock banking in 
London, by the early 1830s there was no longer such general agreement. To account 
for this transformation, Chapter IV explains the transformation in what people 
understood by the term Òbanking.Ó Lawyers took centre stage in the battles over the 
definition of Òbanking.Ó Those in favour of a ÒliberalÓ interpretation of ÒbankingÓ 
won the argument and joint stock banking became possible in London after 1833. 
Yet the role of the legal regime in defining and constructing joint stock banking in 
London did not end with this further piece of discrete legislation, but remained 
pivotal throughout the 1830s as LondonÕs first joint stock bank, the London and 
Westminster, fought to survive against a hostile Bank of England. As Cottrell and 
Newton observe, the only account of early joint stock banking in London is T. E. 
GregoryÕs excellent history of the Westminster Bank.
28
 Chapter IV borrows from 
GregoryÕs account to document the conflict between the Bank of England and the 
London and Westminster, but in far more detail than Gregory explores the legal 
arguments developed by both sides before Parliament and the courts.      
 
                                                
28
 T. E. GREGORY, THE WESTMINSTER BANK 66-7 (1936). Cottrell and Newton, supra note 11, at 
footnote 2. The London and Westminster Bank changed its name to The Westminster Bank in 1923. 
Cottrell and Newton at 85-87 provide a very brief account of joint stock banking in London during 
the 1830s. CRICK AND WADSWORTH supra note 7, at 276-326 cover joint stock banking in London 
from the 1830s through until the end of the nineteenth century. Their discussion of the 1830s is short 
but a good complement to GregoryÕs book.   
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Uniting these three puzzles is a story about a formative period in the history of 
money and banking in England and Wales. The central transformation tying these 
three chapters together is the shift towards a single national paper money supported 
by an emerging central bank. The analysis of country bankersÕ notes in Chapter II 
covers a period when all paper money was local rather than national and where the 
countryÕs largest bank, the Bank of England, was reluctant to fund other banks 
during a period of crisis.
29
 Distinguishing the post-1826 period from the pre-1826 
period analysed in Chapter II, is the consolidation of national paper money and the 
emergence of central banking. This dissertation will pinpoint the role played by law 
in shaping this transformation. Law in the period 1790-1844 did not merely respond 
to economic ÒneedsÓ or interest group politics. Rather it was through law that the 
economy of England and Wales in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
was constructed and the needs of interest groups within that economy defined.  
 
By arguing for lawÕs constitutive role, this dissertation will add complexity to the 
largely functionalist accounts that dominate the economic history of the period. But 
the dissertation will also add more than the insight that history is complex. Stressing 
the role of law in economic change does make history complex, because a legal 
analysis gets at important nitty-gritty details. These details help us to make sense of, 
for example, the processes behind making money credible, changes in the cost of 
credit, and re-conceptualizations in the meaning of ÒbankingÓ Ð that is, these details 
help with understanding those parts of history that can leave us puzzled. Yet the 
nitty-gritty details are important, not only because they add complexity, but also 
                                                
29
 Although the Bank of England was reluctant to fund other banks during a crisis, there were 
exceptions. See Michael C. Lovell, The Role of the Bank of England as a Lender of Last Resort in the 
Crises of the Eighteenth Century, 10 (1) EXPLORATIONS IN ENTREPRENEURIAL HISTORY 8 (1957).   
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because they highlight the autonomy that humans possess to shape and re-shape their 
relations with one another.  
 
In the process of creating money, credit, banking, and central banking during the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the people of England and Wales used law 
and the legal regime in creative and imaginative ways. While arguing for the 
constitutive role played by law during this period, this dissertation also argues for a 
perspective that sees law and the institutions that law makes possible as malleable 
and open to reinvention. What makes the study of history so captivating is its 
capacity to surprise us. History is surprising because events are not inevitable and 
necessary. People act collectively, sometimes in conflict, other times by 
compromising. By doing so, they make use of law and the legal regime, not as a 


















GUINEAS, ÒPIG-ON-PORKÓ BILLS, AND ÒCOUNTRY RAG MERCHANTS,Ó 
1790-1825 
 
This chapterÕs task is to make sense of the first of the three puzzles introduced 
earlier. This first puzzle centres on country bankersÕ notes and bills of exchange as 
currency. To circulate widely as a means of exchange, money of whatever type 
usually requires state backing. The puzzle is that these local currencies
30
 did 
circulate widely even though they did not receive state backing during the eighteenth 
and first half of the nineteenth century. How then are we to account for the relative 
success of these alternative forms of currency from the late eighteenth century until 
the 1820s?   
 
Functionalist accounts claim that the rise of local currencies was a response to an 
economic need that the government and the Bank of England were unable or 
unwilling to meet.  Indeed, by restricting the size of country banks to a maximum of 
six partners, the state was fettering the capacity of a growing commercial class to fill 
the currency void left by the scarcity of gold coins and Bank of England notes. 
These fetters on economic change then led individuals to improvise spontaneously 
their own local currencies as an alternative.  
 
                                                
30
 The remainder of this chapter refers to country bankersÕ notes and bills of exchange as Òlocal 
currenciesÓ or Òalternative currencies.Ó  
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In this chapter, I accept as largely accurate the claim made by some economic 
historians that the emergence of these local currencies was a consequence of 
inadequacies affecting the coinage and Bank of England notes. But viewing the rise 
of alternative forms of currency solely as a response to fettering legislation fails to 
answer the first puzzle. To work out the source of the credibility that enabled local 
currencies to circulate in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, this 
chapter approaches this first puzzle without falling into the trap of seeing law as 
separate from the economy. Separating law from the economy encourages the 
functionalist view that lawÕs role in relation to alternative currencies was either one 
of fettering the smooth functioning of the monetary system, or one where legislation 
liberated the monetary system from these fetters. As an alternative, this chapter 
argues that law and the economy are inseparable, for the former constitutes the 
latter. Viewing the relationship between law and the economy in this way opens up 
the possibility that the role of the legal regime is not limited to placing fetters around 
the currency or freeing that currency from these fetters. The further possibility 
pursued in this chapter is that the legal regime made these currencies possible. To 
solve the puzzle affecting these local currencies, this chapter analyses the role 
played by law in defining and creating country bankersÕ notes and bills of exchange.  
  
A. AlternativeÕs to Barter: Currencies and their Foundations 
 
Part A offers a defense of a claim made, but not justified, in the Introduction: for a 
form of currency to circulate widely, it needs some kind of state, or public, backing.  
To justify this claim, Part A begins by presenting two contrasting understandings of 
                                                                                                                
27 
 
money, the commodity approach and the credit approach. By describing these two 
approaches, Part A substantiates the claim that money typically derives its credibility 
from public backing that might come from the state but might also take other forms. 
After considering these two approaches, Part A then explores a legal rule situated at 
the background rather than at the forefront of thinking about money, but which takes 
centre stage when untangling the mysteries wrapped around the local currencies of 
the period 1790-1825. That legal rule, which is the essence of a gold standard 
monetary regime, is the contractual promise to pay in gold coin found in writing on 
eighteenth and nineteenth century bank notes and bills of exchange. 
 
1. The Commodity Approach 
 
When I go to buy a chocolate bar from a corner store, I owe a debt to the owner of 
the store. Imagine that the elaborate monetary institutions of today are absent. How 
then might I pay for the chocolate bar? One option is barter: in exchange for the 
chocolate bar, I give the owner of the store some of the beer I have taken to brewing. 
We might imagine a whole economy made up of transactions similar to a chocolate 
bar in exchange for beer. My apples for your oranges, his jam donuts for her wooden 
table, and so on. Assuming the parties can negotiate a shared sense of equivalence 
(so many apples is equivalent to so many oranges), the people who make up this 
type of economy are largely equal.
31
 Nevertheless, barter turns out to be quite 
inefficient. How am I to get hold of that chocolate bar if the shopkeeper is not 
                                                
31
 To see the sense of equality I am getting at, we might think of the contract doctrine of 
consideration. Consideration depends on a sense of a reciprocal quid pro quo. Both parties get 
something from the exchange, presumably something they want otherwise why consent to the deal. 
 
                                                                                                                
28 
 
interested in my homebrew? And what happens if I canÕt find anything else to offer 
the shopkeeper? For barter to succeed there has to be a double convenience of wants, 




Theoretical solutions aimed at resolving the problems of barter have traditionally 
taken two routes. One route, known as the commodity approach to money, 
emphasizes the role particularly valuable commodities play in facilitating exchange, 
in particular precious metals like gold. Owing to goldÕs unique features Ð it is 
typically scarce, homogeneous, durable, and inherently valuable Ð it tends to be 
easily marketable, that is, others are always happy to accept it in exchange. 
According to the commodity approach, provided I possess gold IÕll be able to obtain 
the chocolate bar because I can offer the shopkeeper a commodity in exchange that 
in all likelihood sheÕll be happy to accept, in part at least because she knows others 
too will accept gold in their exchanges with her. An economy of equals entering into 
voluntary exchanges remains in place, only now it is more efficient owing to the 
intermediary role played by gold as the universal equivalent (i.e. the commodity all 
others are convertible into). 
 
According to the commodity approach, the state only enters the story when it adds 
its stamp to the gold for the sake of convenience Òto save the trouble of having to 
weigh it every time.Ó
33
 But the stateÕs stamp, so theorists of the commodity approach 
                                                
32
 For example, where A has oranges but wants apples and B has apples but wants oranges making a 
mutually satisfactory exchange is easy Ð there has been a double convenience of wants. The situation 
is less straightforward where both A and B have apples but both want oranges, or where A has 




 J. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 63 (1994). 
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claim, does not give gold coin its value. This emerges, instead, from the inherent and 
natural characteristics of the commodity serving as money. The stateÕs role is 
equally marginal when paper money or ledger entries become widespread. It is again 
owing to the interactions between individuals looking to exchange commodities that 
otherwise intrinsically worthless tokens or pieces of paper come to serve as money. 
Paper money, so argue the proponents of the commodity approach, is more efficient 
because it frees up gold for other investments. Crucially, however, the paper has 
value provided a precious metal backs it, and this is just as true, so advocates of this 
approach claim, for government issued paper money.  
  
The example from history used to add empirical support to the commodity approach 
understanding of money is the text by R. A. Radford on the fascinating case of a 
prisoner of war camp in Germany during the Second World War.
34
 On a regular 
basis, the Red Cross delivered the prisoners a parcel, containing cigarettes, biscuits, 
chocolate and the like. Initially the prisoners bartered their goods, exchanging some 
of what they did not want, but others did, for what others were willing to part with in 
exchange. Out of these barter exchanges, it became clear that the article that all other 
items were valued in relation to was the cigarette. Cigarettes then emerged as money 
without any declaration by the public authorities. Cigarettes worked well as money, 
but they had a flaw. Unscrupulous individuals removed tobacco before resealing the 
cigarette, reducing the intrinsic value of the cigarette. To overcome this flaw in the 
use of a pure commodity as money, the prisoners introduced a type of paper money 
called ÒBully-MarksÓ backed by good quality (i.e. not tampered with) cigarettes.  
                                                
34
 R. A. Radford, The Economic Organisation of a P.O.W. Camp, 12 ECONOMICA, 189 (1945). 
 




How then might the commodity approach to money help to explain the relative 
success of country bankersÕ notes in the late eighteenth century? A promise to pay 
supported each note issued by a country banker. That promise committed the banker 
to pay gold coin on demand when requested to do so by the holder of the note. 
Therefore, according to the commodity approach to money, the notes were valuable 
because a commodity of intrinsic, inherent, natural value supported them. The courts 
ensured that the banker kept his promise to pay by enforcing the contract. And the 
Royal Mint, by stamping the gold, guaranteed the gold paid out was equal to the 
amount quoted on the note.  
  
The commodity approach to understanding money has benefited from the 
endorsement of an illustrious group of figures throughout history.
35
 There is a 
problem with the theory, however, that follows from viewing money as an object in 
the natural world, which humans only need to discover.
36
 As we have seen, that 
object, whether gold or cigarettes or something else, lies dormant as a form of 
money while humans grow frustrated with the inefficiencies of barter. Out of these 
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 These include Aristotle and John Locke, see Charles Goodhart, The Two Concepts of Money 14 
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 407 (1998). Probably the most famous proponent of a 
commodity approach to understanding money is Karl Menger, in large part thanks to his essay On the 
Origins of Money, 2(6) ECONOMIC JOURNAL 293 (1892). MengerÕs work has attracted a number of 
followers, including Kevin Dowd, The Invisible Hand and the Evolution of the Monetary System in 
WHAT IS MONEY? 139 (John Smithin ed., 2000), and Peter G. Klein and George Selgin, MengerÕs 
Theory of Money: Some Experimental Evidence in WHAT IS MONEY? 217 (John Smithin ed., 2000). 
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 Influencing my thoughts on the problems that follow from a commodity approach to understanding 
money are the following texts. Alexander James Field, One the Explanation of Rules Using Rational 
Choice Models, 13(1) JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ISSUES 49 (1979); Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Carl 
MengerÕs Theory of the Evolution of Money: Some Problems 4(4) REVIEW OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
396 (1992); Gerald P. OÕ Driscoll, Jr. Money: MengerÕs Evolutionary Theory 18(4) HISTORY OF 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 601 (1986); Malcolm Rutherford, Institutional Economics: Then and Now, 
15(3) JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 173 (2001); and Viktor Vanberg, Carl MengerÕs 
Evolutionary and John R. CommonsÕ Collective Action Approach to Institutions: A Comparison, 1 
REVIEW OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 334 (1989). 
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frustrations, according to the commodity approach, the previously dormant qualities 
that lie within specific objects come to the fore, and do so without the need for any 
declaration from the public authorities.  
  
The problem with focusing on the physical object that serves as money, however, is 
that commodity theorists then assume as natural and given the institution of the 
market, the existence of a stock of goods, and that individuals trade these goods, 
which in turn depends upon assuming legal institutions such as property and 
contract. RadfordÕs text fits the mould. He takes for granted the background role 
played by the POW camp, the Red Cross delivery of food parcels, and that all of the 
prisoners in the camp were well versed in the use of money in their lives as civilians 
before the war. An alternative approach to understanding money is to have all of 
these institutions, and a multitude of others besides, take centre stage, with the result 
of shifting the analysis of money away from the physical object serving as the 
medium of exchange and towards instead interactions between humans.   
  
2. The Credit Approach 
 
How then might our understanding of money, including the alternative currencies of 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, be refined if we emphasize less the 
object that serves as money by concentrating more on the relations behind the 
exchange? A second approach, called the credit approach,
37
 has attracted scholarly 
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 As I hope becomes clear in this section, the credit approach to money shares much with another 
approach, known as Òstate theoryÓ or ÒChartalism.Ó By emphasizing the overlap between credit 
theorists and state theorists, this dissertation follows the suggestion of L. Randell Wray in his 
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support as an alternative to the commodity approach that has social relations at its 
core. Imagine, when I go to buy that chocolate bar, instead of bartering with the 
shopkeeper, I write her an IOU or a promissory note of my own, promising to 
perform some service equivalent in value to the chocolate bar at some future date. 
The shopkeeper might then decide to become my creditor by agreeing to hold this 
note representing my debt to her. If people think my promise to make good the debt 
is credible Ð aided by the tendency of the courts to enforce the contract created by 
the promise Ð they too might accept the note in payment for a debt owed by the 
shopkeeper to them. The note starts to circulate as a means of payment. 
  
In contrast to the commodity approach considered earlier, no commodities with 
intrinsic value are involved. Instead, the emphasis is on relations between creditors 
and debtors and the promise that binds them. Yet the credit approach comes up 
against a problem: unless the corner-store owner knows and trusts me personally, 
they run the risk that I will decide not to make good the debt. It is difficult for 
individuals to create a means of payment that circulates widely because it is difficult 
to get other people to agree to hold the debt: how do they know that the debtor will 
make good their debt? One answer, of course, is enforcement of the promise by the 
courts. Yet if all it takes is enforcement by the courts to get our promises to pay to 
circulate, why then do we not see many more such promises circulating as means of 
payment?  
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Proponents of the credit approach typically offer a response by pointing to the 
standing, or credibility, of the debtor whose promise supports the IOU. The 
historical example lending authority to this perspective is the Irish economy of 
around 1800, where the IOUs of shopkeepers and other prominent figures supported 
trade.
38
 And perhaps this focus on circulating IOUs helps to explain the rise of local 
currencies in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century England and Wales too. 
These currencies did not represent the credit of merely anyone: they were a promise 
to pay Ð not at a future date, but on demand Ð by an individual of wealth and 
standing, such as a local banker or merchant.   
  
As part of the credit approach tradition to understanding money, one scholar, 
Stephanie Bell, has introduced what she calls the Òhierarchy of money,Ó which we 
might also call a hierarchy of credit and debt.
39
 All money is a debt that another 
accepts. But not all debts are the same because some debtors are more creditworthy 
than other debtors. The IOU that I write to the shopkeeper for the chocolate bar 
probably finds its place toward the bottom of the hierarchy, though much depends on 
my actual or perceived wealth. Nobody would accept an IOU written by a random 
stranger on the street, but we treat one written by the Coca Cola Corporation quite 
differently. Between the extremes of the state and a random stranger, is a vast array 
                                                
38
 See J. FULLARTON, ON THE REGULATION OF CURRENCIES 53-5 (1845) and T. TOOKE, AN INQUIRY 
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of intermediate debt. To simplify as Bell does, we can imagine four tiers to the 
hierarchy moving from least to most credible. On the bottom tier sits the debt of 
households, such as mortgages and credit cards. On the third tier sits the debts of 
businesses, like commercial paper today or bills of exchange in the nineteenth 
century. And on the second tier sit the liabilities created by commercial banks when 
they make loans. Banks occupy a privileged position in the hierarchy owing to their 
relationship with the issuer of the most credible money in the hierarchy, the 
government or the central bank.  
 
Compared to the commodity approach to barter, where gold facilitates exchange, the 
credit approach focuses on a hierarchy of credit and debt. Moreover, the credit 
approach also holds a radically different view of the role of government. The 
government issues its own money when it buys goods and procures services. People 
and businesses accept this money because they know the government will accept it 
as payment for taxes owed. Because everyone shares this common tax obligation, 
businesses and households are constantly in debt to the government and so will need 
a constant stream of the governmentÕs money to cancel their obligations. Because 
households and businesses need the governmentÕs money, they both tend to write up 
their own IOUs in terms of the governmentÕs money (promises to pay accounted for 
in Pounds Sterling or US Dollars). The crucial point is this: when a household or a 
corporation seeks to pay off a debt, it needs to acquire the money that everyone else 
will accept, i.e. the governmentÕs money. But when the government seeks to pay off 
a debt, it does not need to obtain the money or widely accepted IOUs of any other 
entity. Instead, the government can create more of its own money, subject to self-
imposed restraints, such as a gold standard.   




Recall that country bankers promised to pay on demand in the money of the state. In 
the eighteenth century that meant gold coins. As this chapter described earlier, 
proponents of the commodity approach argue that the value of gold coins stems from 
goldÕs inherent and natural characteristics. The state merely adds its stamp for the 
sake of convenience, so that people using the coins do not need to weigh them 
constantly in order to ascertain their value. By bringing into the discussion the power 
of the state to levy taxes, credit theorists offer an alternative perspective on the value 
attached to gold coins in the eighteenth century, centering on the willingness of the 
state to accept these coins as a means of cancelling taxes owed.   
  
Does the concept of a hierarchy of money help us to resolve this chapterÕs puzzle? 
Recall that the alternative currencies considered in this chapter present a puzzle 
because the state did not back them with tax revenues. The local currencies of the 
period 1790-1825 were, however, convertible into gold coin Ð state issued and 
verified money accepted in payment of taxes Ð on demand in the case of country 
bankersÕ notes, and at a set date in the case of bills of exchange. Is this promise to 
pay, backed by the courts, sufficient to resolve the puzzle? In this chapter, I argue 
that, although a necessary part to the story of these local currencies, their 
convertibility into gold coin does not sufficiently explain their source of the 
credibility. To see why, this chapter now turns to the contractual commitment 
underpinning the promise to pay. 
 
3. ÒI promise to pay the bearer on demand ÉÓ  




The stateÕs money in eighteenth century England took the form of gold coin and 
Bank of England notes. Yet although the promises to pay of the state are generally 
highly credible that does not mean they are always problem free. Both the coinage 
and the circulation of Bank of England notes undoubtedly had problems during the 
eighteenth century. When it was profitable to do so, people melted down and 
exported gold guinea coins and silver and copper coins, coins seldom issued in 
sufficient quantities in the first place.
40
 Bank of England notes proved inadequate in 
their own way, for they only circulated in large quantities in and around London, 
Little wonder, then that contemporaries pejoratively labelled the Bank of England 
the ÒBank of LondonÓ during the eighteenth century.
41
 Due to the failure of the state 
to provide a medium of exchange, economic historians point to the role of local 
currencies in filling the void.
42
 To these economic historians, the economy needed a 
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circulating medium, yet Parliament placed fetters in the way of fulfilling this need. 
Consequently, individuals responded to economic imperatives by finding a way 
around this fetter.
43
 Perhaps this perspective holds some truth. But pointing to the 
role played by individual spontaneity does not solve the puzzle affecting these 
alternative currencies because such spontaneity fails to explain what made these 
notes and bills credible.  
 
As explored earlier in this chapter, for an IOU or a promise to pay Ð such as 
underpinned alternative currencies in the eighteenth century Ð to circulate 
extensively, it needed users to recognize it as credible. A connection to the tax 
system provided gold coin and Bank of England notes with this credibility, 
notwithstanding their other problems.
44
 Locating the source of public backing that 
made alternative currencies credible requires looking elsewhere however, due to the 
indirect connection tying these notes and bills to the institutions of central 
government and the tax system, though there were nonetheless such connections, 
which this chapter explores later.  
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The courts provided one alternative source of public backing. Enforcement by the 
courts could and did make such promises to pay credible by holding bankers and 
merchants of perceived or known wealth to their word. Recall that each bankerÕs 
note was a promise to pay in gold coin on demand, backed by the bankerÕs word that 
when the holder presented the note for payment, the banker had sufficient gold coin 
on hand to fulfil his obligation.
45
 Bankers generally got their notes into circulation 
by discounting bills of exchange presented to them by merchants. Bankers, then, 
relied on merchants fulfilling the promise to pay made on the bill, a promise the 
courts ensured the merchant met.  
 
The notion of fidelity to oneÕs word is important here. If an individual makes a 
commitment to another that she will do something in the future, that individual 
provides grounds for the other party to expect performance.
46
 The state takes on the 
role of enforcing many of these promises because by doing so it ensures individuals 
keep their word, facilitating, so the theory goes, the projects of both parties. Part of 
the story explaining why individuals used local currencies to facilitate their 
economic relations is that they could do so safe in the knowledge that each holder 
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could rely on the courts to enforce the bankers promise to pay in gold coin on 
demand. And enforcement of the merchantÕs promise to pay on each bill of 
exchange that they created or accepted made the bankerÕs promise credible. 
 
Yet, crucially, in the period 1790-1825 reality frequently made fidelity to oneÕs word 
challenging. Prices for articles transported long distance over many weeks and 
sometimes months did not tend to hold steady, while war in the eighteenth century 




Since merchantsÕ plans seldom went without disruption, one consequence was that 
promises made three months prior were often unrealistic come the agreed date of 
payment. Where an acceptor of a bill of exchange failed to pay what was due on the 
bill, the banker who had discounted the bill found he did not have the inflow of cash 
needed to cover his note circulation.
48
 A thought then spread throughout the 
community: if merchants cannot fulfil their debts, what about bankers? If the issuing 
banker failed, the promise on the note to redeem the note in gold coin on demand 
was empty. Those left with the notes held merely a worthless piece of paper, hence 
the use of the phrase Òcountry rag merchants.Ó
49
 The failure of a banker then became 
a self-fulfilling prophecy. Because the majority of those holding the notes feared for 
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the bankÕs future, there was a tendency for each note holder to demand payment in 
gold coin at the same time as everyone else Ð a classic Òrun on the bankÓ Ð creating a 
strain on the bankerÕs reserve of gold coin that could be too overwhelming a burden 
to bear.
50
   
 
Between the late 1780s and 1830 England experienced no less than seven such 
crises.
51
 In the event of such a crisis, a typical country banker tried to reinforce his 
position by attempting to obtain gold coin and/or Bank of England notes from his 
agent in London.
52
 But when all other country bankers tried to do the same 
concurrently Ð the mark of a crisis Ð the supply of the most valued forms of money 
seldom kept pace with demand. In such circumstances, the average country banker 
was only a hairÕs breadth from bankruptcy, and that is where all too many ended up 
in first few decades of the nineteenth century. Bankruptcy might result in creditors 
getting a portion of what the banker owed them.
53
 But it came too late to save the 
country bankerÕs notes as a means of payment, for bankruptcy meant the bankerÕs 
credibility was gone and his notes lost their value.  
 
Yet, as I show in this chapter, many communities across England and Wales refused 
to let the value of their means of exchange collapse. What allowed these 
communities to formulate an alternative to failure was the concentration of influence 
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and prestige in local elites before the era of large-scale central government. In parts 
of the country, as in Liverpool and Bristol, these elites owed their position to 
commercial success. Outside of commercial towns, eliteÕs rose to prominence on the 
back of their ownership of large country estates. It is towards these local elites 
across England and Wales, and away from the central government in London, that 
this chapter turns to find the source of authority lending credibility to local 
currencies during the period 1790-1825.  
  
In this chapter, I argue that the credibility of country bankers might and often did 
survive a period of falling confidence and lower prices when, led by its landowning 
and/or commercial elite, the people of the community of the town and 
neighbourhood to which the bank belonged rallied around to assist the banker. This 
assistance took a variety of forms. In the case of Liverpool in 1793, the city 
temporarily issued its own paper money, backed by the tax revenues of the local 
population, to guarantee the bills created and circulated by local merchants and 
bankers. In Newcastle at the outbreak of the Napoleonic Wars, local citizens of 
perceived or known wealth guaranteed the repayment of the local country bankersÕ 
notes in gold coin should any of the bankers collapse. These collective commitments 
Ð common throughout the period 1790-1825 Ð made the debts of bankers and 
merchants credible. They also represent an alternative institutionalization of the 
public. Not the public in the sense of the state as a whole, but the public at a local 
level, centred on towns, districts, and their elites throughout England and Wales.  
 
The contractual relations underlying such promises to pay made these alternative 
solutions possible, though on first viewing that might not appear obvious. The 
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problem is the tendency of contract scholars to present agreements based on 
promises as voluntary transactions made by self-constituting, self-reliant individuals 
pursuing their own independent ends. Viewed through this contractual prism, 
discrete transactions between the banker and a series of strangers underpinned the 
local currencies of the period 1790-1825. When this self-reliant banker found 
himself in trouble, the law of contract surely only hindered his efforts at survival, 
because others more successful at the game of self-reliance had promises from the 
banker that the courts ensured the banker kept. How then could contract, centred on 
such discrete promises, provide solutions to a collective problem? 
 
This chapter draws on a different view of contractual relations to capture the way 
communities constructed and sustained the local currencies that circulated through 
their economy.
54
 Through this alternative formulation, instead of considering 
contract in individualistic terms, dominated by discrete transactions between 
strangers, contractual relations are understood as both reliant on continuity and 
shaped by the larger community of which they are a part. Although country bankersÕ 
notes and bills of exchange depended upon a promise to pay supported by the law of 
contract, it does not follow that these notes and bills were solely the product of the 
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interactions between discrete, self-reliant individuals. The promise at their core was 
the outcome of continuous relationships embedded in community. It was this 
dependence on community, albeit community immersed in the social hierarchies of 
the time, which made these alternative currencies a public form of money capable of 
weathering the all too common eighteenth and nineteenth century experience of 
financial crisis.  
 
Solving the puzzle affecting country bankersÕ notes and bills of exchange requires 
analysing the public backing that these notes and bills received from many of the 
local communities of England and Wales as an alternative to backing from central 
government. What made this local form of collective backing possible was the role 
played by law, in particular the law of contract, in providing the institutions that 
translated the commitments of individuals into collective commitments. The relative 
success of local currencies in the period 1790-1825, then is not an example of law 
serving to fetter economic change, with individuals innovating ways round these 
legal fetters. Instead, explaining the relative success of country bankersÕ notes and 
bills of exchange requires placing law at the centre of the story, since without the 
institutions provided by the legal regime, such local currencies would not have 
survived financial crisis with the frequently that they did. 
 
In what follows, Part B begins by describing the historical context in which local 
currencies rose to prominence by outlining the structure of the social hierarchy of 
the time. As Part B describes, with prestige and influence dispersed so too was 
capital. Different regions developed distinct economic specializations. The bill of 
exchange tied this highly localized and fragmented collection of economies together. 
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By discounting bills of exchange, local bankers grew in stature, aided by the tax 
system. The second half of Part B describes the workings of this system of bill 
finance and local banking. 
 
Part B shows that alternative currencies flourished partly owing to the problems 
undermining other forms of money, partly due to the structure of the tax system, and 
partly because they complimented, and in certain areas of England were integral to, 
the system of bill finance. Yet the very mechanism Ð bill discounting Ð that at times 
allowed country bankersÕ notes and bills of exchange to flourish was at other times 
the source of their fragility.  
 
Part C takes up this fragility, emphasising the country bankerÕs dependence on his 
agent in London. Part C also considers the factors that made crises so frequent, as 
well as the difficulties experienced by bankers as they sought to fend off hordes of 
desperate creditors hoping to hold the banker to his obligations. One option for the 
banker, should his past promises to pay overwhelm him, was bankruptcy. Those who 
depended on a local alternative currency had to avoid that outcome if possible. This 
chapter considers moments when bankers avoided bankruptcy with the help of their 
local community in Part D.    
 
B. The Rise of Country BankersÕ Notes 
 
1.  The Place of the country gentry and merchant oligarchs in Eighteenth 
century social hierarchy  




Those who owned land in eighteenth century England controlled the countryÕs main 
source of wealth and influence because it gave them a stake in most raw materials, 
much of the food supply, and many employment opportunities. As was increasingly 
the case as the eighteenth century advanced, land was not the only important type of 
property since wealth also derived from commercial sources. But as Mingay points 
out, land was supreme because it was Òmore tangible than the Funds, more stable 
than merchantsÕ stock in trade, and certainly more valuable than industrialistsÕ 
machines and implements.Ó
55
 Compensating for landÕs lower profitability as an 
investment compared to these other forms of property, was the higher social status 
that it conferred onto its owner.  
 
The degree of prestige and influence that followed for the landowner depended on 
the extent of his holdings. Distinguished more or less by reference to the amount of 
land in their possession, the landed interest in eighteenth century England consisted 




The peers, sometimes referred to as the nobility, were relatively small in number,
57
 
and tended to derive the bulk of their wealth from their ownership of large estates. 
Their political function distinguished them from the other two categories. They were 
members of the upper house of Parliament, the House of Lords, and tended to fill 
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most government posts.  
 
The second category, the gentry, was far larger in number than the peers and was 
less exclusive. Although it included some small landowners who farmed their own 
land, the vast majority of its members obtained sufficient income from their land to 
allow them to live the leisurely lifestyle of a gentleman. The gentry limited their 
political ambitions, however, to the lower house of Parliament, the House of 
Commons, and to local affairs in the neighbourhood of their land holdings.  
 
The final category of people was that of the freeholders. Unlike the nobility and the 





These three groups shared a common interest in land that fostered cohesion. It was 
possible, for instance, for merchants, lawyers, and later bankers to accumulate as 
much wealth as many members of the gentry. But these groups could only obtain 
and maintain wealth through close attention to a form of business. The gentry, by 
contrast, received revenue through rents from farmland, which they used on 
educational and cultural pursuits shared with the nobility. There was some fluidity 
between the tiers of this social hierarchy. Merchants moved into the ranks of the 
gentry by first acquiring land, and, over time, educational and cultural habits. 
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Marriage confirmed a change of rank. And it was again through marriage that 
members of the gentry moved into the ranks of the nobility. But notions that this 
social hierarchy was fluid should not be pushed too far. There was hostility to the 
path of accessing the ranks of the gentry through wealth generated by mere trade.
59
 
The process for a merchant making that transition was a long one and required them 
to cast aside one identity by slowly acquiring the land and cultural traits that would 
allow them, or future generations of their family, to form another. There might, then, 
be some modest movement in terms of the individuals and families that made up 
each group, but this was qualified by the widely Ð almost uniformly Ð held belief in 
a natural and inevitable order to society ordained by providence.
60
   
 
Although land lacked the diversity of application and speed of multiplication that 
characterized many other forms of property, it compensated for this by its relative 
permanence and stability. It also gave its owner a base from which to exert power. 
Eighteenth century England was a largely agricultural society. Consequently, most 
of the population had ties more or less direct to the land. From the base of their 
country estates, the most affluent amongst the gentry represented their county in 
Parliament, often regarding their local shire as a self-regulating community.
61
 But 
Parliament and London living was too expensive for most of the gentry. As a result, 
they channelled their political ambitions into local affairs, which, in any case, 
frequently gave them far greater influence than they would ever have had sitting in 
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Westminster. The matters that concerned Parliament in the eighteenth century were 
on balance very detached from the day-to-day concerns of most of the population. 
Given the large number of people who lived and worked on, or performed services 
for the estates of the landowning interest, the political dealings of the local parish 
and county was of far more immediate concern to the majority of population. Due to 
their holdings of land, the local gentry had wealth and the social standing that 
enabled them to dominate parish and county politics.
62
   
 
With this power and influence came a sense of responsibility. Most of the landed 
interest felt a sense of commitment to their local community, a feeling of Ònoblesse 
obligeÓ requiring that they promote their understanding of the public good, and act 
as benefactors for the poor and unfortunate.
63
 On the one hand, then, the 
preeminence of the landed interest lent a sense of inevitability to their authority both 
in London and locally. On the other, this sense of responsibility induced by custom 
and patronage, though feeling like a burden to some, must have felt like a safety net 
to many more.
64
   
 
Nonetheless, the rise of new forms of wealth during the eighteenth century qualified 
the power and influence of the landed interest.
65
 Because the political system was 
based on the possession of real property (most notably, land) the growing influence 
of those whose stature depended on moveable property (money, shares, professional 
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skills, intellectual property) failed to impact significantly on Parliament until well 
into the nineteenth century.
66
 Yet the prominence of merchants, manufacturers, and 
professionals did have an impact on local politics. That impact was most apparent in 
large towns where wealth derived from overseas trade in commodities such as sugar 
and slaves, Bristol and Liverpool serving as the leading examples. As Cannon puts 
it, these towns Òwere outside the aristocratic embrace and were run by their own 
financial and commercial oligarchs.Ó
67
 The typical English and Welsh town and its 
agricultural hinterland of the eighteenth century sat somewhere between the 
extremes of land owning elites and commercial oligarchies.  
 
Regional specialization shaped the social and economic geography of these typical 
English and Welsh towns and their agricultural hinterland. In Lancashire, cotton 
textiles predominated, in the West Riding woollens and worsteds, in Coventry silks, 
in the East Midlands lace, in Birmingham the metal trades, in Sheffield cutlery, in 
North Staffordshire pottery, in Newcastle coal and ships, in the Black Country coal 
and pig iron.
68
 Local capital markets tied together by personal contacts surrounded 
each concentrated specialization.
69
 These small and localized commercial elites 
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increasingly came to exert influence on local politics across typical English and 
Welsh towns and regional communities. Yet their influence was always a matter of 
degree and seldom surpassed the landed interest in terms of wealth and prestige 
during this period. Later this chapter considers the relationships these local elites had 
with their bankers, and returns to the rise of commercial oligarchs, as well as the 
sense of responsibility many of the country gentry felt towards the population in and 
around their estates.  
 
2. Bankers as intermediaries tying the country together 
 
Though localized, the specialized economies of England and Wales were far from 
isolated. Excess capital tended to accumulate in the wealthy agricultural counties of 
East Anglia and the southwest. Without branch networks,
70
 it was difficult for 
country banks to channel this capital toward emerging industrial regions in the 
Midlands or further north generally experiencing a demand for credit far in excess of 
the savings of the local population. The task of connecting these different regions of 
England fell to the London money market. London banks and later bill brokers 
borrowed funds from agricultural regions before lending to up-and-coming 
                                                                                                                                    
1750-1800, 23(2) BUSINESS HISTORY 127 (1981). For a general account of the eighteenth century 
mortgage market, see B. L. Anderson, Provincial Aspects of the Financial Revolution of the 
Eighteenth Century, 11(1) BUSINESS HISTORY 12 (1969). 
70
 Statutes in 1707 (6 Ann. c. 59 (1707) [Bank of England Act], also referred to as 6 Ann. c. 22 
(1707)) and 1708 (7 Ann. c. 30 (1708) [Bank of England Act], also referred to as 7 Ann. c. 7 (1708)) 
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manufacturing districts. In the process they loosely tied together an otherwise highly 




The bill of exchange made it possible for London banks to tie together banks located 
across the country. Bills were especially adept in situations where people wanted to 
make payments over long distances. Imagine a situation where a manufacturer ships 
a cargo to a foreign market in search of people willing to purchase the cargo.
72
 The 
purchaser and the seller agree to a price, but a potential obstacle is the timing and 
mode of payment. The problem for the purchaser is that he needs time before 
making the payment: he must convert the goods he has received or a potion of these 
goods into money first. If forced to pay up front, the transaction will not go ahead 
because the purchaser simply lacks the ready funds. The problem for the seller is 
that he cannot wait until the money owed by the purchaser appears because the seller 
probably also owes debts to others, including shipping expenses. The bill of 
exchange offers a solution by reconciling these two positions. The purchaser 
calculates the time required to make a return on his purchase. He then draws a bill 
that he offers to the seller. The bill will order a credible person with whom the 
purchaser has a close connection, in the place where the seller normally resides, or at 
the sellerÕs next port of call, to pay the seller at some future date. The date selected 
depends on the purchaserÕs estimation as to when he will have sufficient funds to 
cancel the debt. 
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GEOGRAPHY 366, 369-376 (1989). 
 
72
 The description of how bills of exchange worked is based on WILLIAM ROSCOE, THOUGHTS ON THE 
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Typically, the usance of a bill Ð the length of time allowed before payment Ð varied 
from shorter lengths of thirty to sixty days covering transactions within Britain 
(inland or local bills), to longer bills facilitating overseas transactions like the one 
above: ninety day bills were common, though bills were also be drawn for 120 days 
or even two years. The length of time between drawing a bill and its maturity date 
was usually longer than necessary. This extra breathing space gave the Òcredible 
personÓ drawn on by the purchaser a longer span of time before payment was due, 
and it gave the purchaser drawing the bill ample time, all going well, to make a 
return on their sales to cover the cost of what he owed his creditors. By the 
eighteenth century, London had emerged as the focal point of bill finance in Britain 
and increasingly the world. The Òcredible personÓ on whom the bill was drawn was 
in early times a representative or agent of the drawer. By the eighteenth century, 
such agents had transformed into London bankers, and the bill of exchange 
executing these payments had become known as the Òbill on London.Ó 
  
The sellerÕs problem was that he had to cover his own obligations while giving the 
purchaser time to make enough money to pay for the goods.  Good quality bills of 
exchange, bearing the names of credible parties and ideally with a short usance, 
helped to solve this problem because they were easily negotiable and often taken as 
a means of payment. This was famously the case in Lancashire, where bills 
comprised the local currency during the latter period of the eighteenth century and 
first quarter of the nineteenth.
73
 It was also a common practice in other regions of 
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 Those receiving the bill might then use the bill to cover their own 
obligations.  
 
Bankers typically received bills when the holder wanted to discount the bill. The 
holder of the bill would get money up front in the form of coins, Bank of England 
notes, or country bankersÕ notes. The total was, however, less than the face value of 
the bill because a discount off set the risk that the drawee/acceptor named on the bill 
might not pay up.
75
 When they discounted a large bill of, say, £2,000, Lancashire 
bankers encouraged the circulation of bills as currency by reissuing smaller bills 
they had previously discounted as an alternative to issuing demand notes.
76
 Each 
successive holder added their endorsement to the bill, making them contingently 
liable should the party ordered to pay fail or refuse to do so at maturity.
77
 In theory 
then, the more a bill circulated and accumulated signatures, the stronger the 
guarantee of a cash payment when the bill matured.
78
 Many bills had an extensive 
                                                                                                                                    
THE NATURE AND EFFECTS OF THE PAPER CREDIT OF GREAT BRITAIN 296 (1801). In the case of 
Thompson v Giles (1824) 107 E.R. 441, the court heard that  
 
the circulation of the town of Lancaster and the county at large was conducted in a great 
measure by bills ... paid in, and afterwards paid away by the bankers; and if that had not been 
done, each bank would have required an immense unemployed capital of [Bank of England] 
notes or been obliged to draw upon their correspondents in London, and thereby considerably 
increase their expense.  
 
Bills of exchange became the customary means of payment in Lancashire in the same way as country 
bankersÕ notes served as the means of payment elsewhere. See also Lockyer v Jones (1796) 170 E.R. 




 On Yorkshire, see Hudson, supra note 24, at 380. 
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 For more on bill discounting and rediscounting, see Appendix 1 to this dissertation. 
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 Cottrell and Newton, supra note 11 at 105. 
 
77




 See Ashton, supra note 73, at 37-8 and PRESSNELL, supra note 23, at 171. 
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circulation. When the London and Manchester banker, Lewis Loyd, was asked in 
1826 whether it was common for bills drawn for £10 to have fifty to sixty signatures 
added to them, he replied that he had seen twice that number of endorsements, ÒI 
have seen slips of paper attached to a bill as long as a sheet of paper could go, and 




3. The bankerÕs promise as a source of local currency 
 
The phenomenon whereby bills circulated as currency depended on not only the 
quality of the bills, but also on the quantity of bills created by merchants and 
bankers. In areas where eighteenth century trade and manufacturing was less intense, 
the relative shortage of bills representing the credit of merchants may partly explain 
the rise of country bankersÕ notes.
80
 Until the second half of the eighteenth century, a 
prominent local shopkeeper, merchant, or manufacturer performed the banking 
function in towns and villages across England and Wales. Because of their place at 
the centre of Òthe credit ÔnexusÕ of the local communityÓ some shopkeepers morphed 
into bankers.
81
 Moreover, this shopkeeper also provided his local community with 
an outlet into inter-regional credit networks.  
 
To see the place of the shopkeeper within the credit matrix of their local community 
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Ð a community, especially if it was rural, that Ògenerally financed their own needs 
for all purposes except the sale of commodities outside the regionÓ
82
 Ð imagine the 
credit relations between a farmer, a brewer, and a shopkeeper. The farmer sells 
barley to the brewer. The brewer pays for the barely by drawing a bill on the 
shopkeeper Ð that is, the brewer writes up a bill of exchange that says, in 60 days 
time, the shopkeeper will pay the farmer a certain amount. The brewer then brews 
his beer, which he sells to the shopkeeper. Before the bill of exchange held by the 
farmer matures, the shopkeeper has to sell the beer and generate the funds to pay the 
farmer.  
 
Imagine now, another set of credit relations, this time involving a merchant, an 
innkeeper, and the same shopkeeper. The innkeeper needs beer for his inn, which he 
purchases from the shopkeeper. To pay for the beer, the innkeeper offers the 
shopkeeper a bill of exchange written up by a merchant who has recently stayed at 
the inn. The merchantÕs bill instructs his banker in London to pay the holder of the 
bill in 30 days time. Upon accepting the bill from the innkeeper as payment for the 
beer, the shopkeeper obtains credit drawn against a London banker.  
 
Notice the place of the shopkeeper at the centre of these two examples, examples 
that we might multiply into an almost endless web of interactions between creditors 
and debtors.
83
 The shopkeeper was a debtor to the many people from whom he 
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 Porter captures well the role played by the bill of exchange, and other forms of Òpaper credit,Ó in 
tying together creditors and debtors when he writes,  
 
The paper economy grew. Bills of exchange passed into circulation from clients to 
shopkeepers, from retailers to wholesalers, from manufacturers to their raw-material 
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bought produce and goods. And he was simultaneously a creditor to all who then 
bought the produce and goods he sold. The shopkeeper might pay his creditors using 
the bills of exchange given to him by his debtors, cancelling, for example, his debt to 
the farmer using the bill of exchange supplied by the merchant. Typically, a 
shopkeeper and other traders kept at their disposal a reserve of bills with different 
maturity dates. As Ashton explains the practice in the second half of the eighteenth 
century,  
 
Just as the trader to-day keeps a balance at the bank on which he can draw 
cheques when necessary, so at this period a trader kept by him a supply of 
bills, and when a payment was required he would select from his stock such 




Moreover, eighteenth century shopkeepers did not only buy goods from local 
vendors. They also bought goods from further afield and, just like the merchant in 
the above example, routinely drew bills on an agent in London instructing that agent 
to make payments on their behalf.
85
 To cover these payments the shopkeeper 
accepted bills, like the one offered by the innkeeper for the beer, which they used to 
cover debts locally, such as their debt to the farmer, or remit to London to cover 
                                                                                                                                    
suppliers. All forms of credit-worthy paper Ð even lottery tickets Ð tended to become 
negotiable and pass into circulation. In the provinces merchants, goldsmiths and attorneys 
became bill brokers and discounters (they often grumbled, yet such transactions proved 




 T. S. ASHTON, AN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY INDUSTRIALIST: PETER STUBS OF WARRINGTON, 1756-
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their debts there. Receiving bills of exchange in return for goods sold was one means 
by which shopkeepers accumulated the bills they needed to cover their debts. 
Another was by discounting bills of exchange Ð that is, by buying bills from those 





Although we might imagine an eighteenth century shopkeeper as a dealer in produce 
and other goods, he was also a dealer in bills of exchange.
87
 By necessity, he had to 
supply his own shop. But in the process of supplying his own shop, the shopkeeper 
kept records of the credit and debit balances of his customers. Sometimes, as in the 
above example, the farmer was a creditor and the innkeeper was a debtor. At other 
times, the reverse was true. In the spring, when the farmer sowed his seeds, he 
depended on having access to credit. While, during times of the year when the inn 
was busy, the innkeeper accumulated more bills than he could use to keep his inn 
running. If the shopkeeper decided to deal in bills beyond the needs of his own shop 
Ð a move in the direction of becoming a banker Ð he might discount the innkeeperÕs 
excess bills, applying the proceeds to the innkeepers credit balance at the shop. The 
shopkeeper might then allow a customer like the innkeeper to draw on the 
shopkeeperÕs agent in London. Alternatively, the shopkeeper might offer the 
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innkeeper interest on his credit balance, though only on the condition that the 
innkeeper give notice before asking for the money back. The shopkeeper might then 
use the bills he has discounted for the innkeeper as a source of funds allowing him to 




In return for offering the innkeeper interest on his credit balance, the shopkeeper 
gave the innkeeper an interest-bearing note containing the following information: (i) 
the sum lent/deposited, (ii) the rate of interest, and (iii) the terms of repayment.
89
 
These interest-bearing notes were transferable to third parties, but two factors 
limited their circulation. First, a promissory note bearing interest was less a means of 
payment than a claim to income, plus the principal.
90
 Second, many only with 
reluctance accepted the note as a means of payment if the note had some time to go 
before payment. Should the party accepting the note require cash before the notes 
maturity date, they had to take less than the notes face value to cover the risk of 
default. Notes the bearer could cash on demand circulated with greater freedom. 
Since that placed early bankers in a precarious position, the banker reduced the 
interest on demand notes over time until these notes carried no interest at all. The 
bankerÕs depositor/lender, like the innkeeper in the example, was willing to accept 
interest-free demand notes owing to the higher value such notes possessed as a 
means of payment.
91
 It benefitted the banker Ð for, once the shopkeeper has ceased 
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to buy and sell goods, dealing instead only in bills of exchange, that is what he 
becomes Ð to issue demand notes that circulated for as long as possible. Notes 
passing from hand to hand in the community did not drain the bankerÕs reserves of 
gold coin locally or in London allowing the banker to facilitate local trade by 
making loans. 
 
Shopkeepers morphed into bankers in the second half of the eighteenth century, 
then, owing to a combination of their central position within the networks of local 
creditors and debtors, and their close links to commercial centres like London. Being 
at the centre of the Òcredit ÔnexusÕ of the local communityÓ
92
 meant the banker held 
accounts for a cross section of that local community. In Nottingham, for example, 
the key local trades were knitting and hosiery. Consequently the townÕs banker, 
Smiths, held the accounts of those who supported this trade, including framesmiths, 
stocking-needle makers, threadmen, woolcombers, and dyers, not to mention the 
larger merchants like linen and woolen drapers, mercers, and clothiers. Owing to the 
success of the knitting and hosiery sectors, other trades and crafts flourished too, as 
evidenced by the accounts Smiths held for local grocers, bakers, butchers, maltsters, 
booksellers, stationers, cordwainers, fellmongers, hatters, tailors, soap-boilers, 
chandlers (dealers in sails and ropes), joiners, brickmakers, and builders.
93
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The townÕs banker brought all of these trades and crafts together. In so doing, the 
banker provided services that matched the status of his customers. Some customers, 
as described earlier, had a net credit balance. Such customers, typically a town or 
regionÕs local landowning gentry and its principal traders and manufacturers, looked 
to their local banker as an outlet for their investments. Through his agent in London, 
the country banker directed these investments towards government debt or other 
securities.
94
 The country banker also offered an investment himself, by providing 
those who left a credit balance with interest payments. The Kendal Bank, in 
Westmorland, north Lancashire, for example, allowed 4% interest where Òour 




The Kendal BankÕs ÒfriendsÓ where those customers it considered Ògentlemen,Ó 
including the gentry and those wealthy enough to leave a credit balance untouched 
for months at a time. Bankers distinguished ÒGentlemenÓ from Òtradesmen,Ó as the 
accounts of the latter tended to fluctuate over the course of a year, sometimes in 
                                                                                                                                    
merchants and traders connected to these trade routes as well as local shipbuilders. Yet this trade also 
provided the foundation for a wide range of other activities, such as millers, Òsnuff and tobacco 
manufacturers,Ó grocers, tea dealers, paper merchants and printers, mercers and linen drapers, cabinet 
makers, Òcommon brewers,Ó and even two pawn-brokers (LEIGHTON-SMITH at 215). To take one 
further example, that of Derby, the pattern repeats again. In Derby, the focal point of the local 
economy was silk. The customers of the local bank, hence, included hosiery, calico and brushes, linen 
and woolen drapers, mercers, merchants and Òcolour-men,Ó a currier, and a leather cutter. The success 
of the silk economy then supported other trades and crafts, the townÕs bank holding accounts for a 
gamekeeper and a saddler, millers, maltsters, cornfactors, bakers, butchers, grocers, cheesefactors and 
cheesemongers, liquor merchants, a taylor, a stationer, a bookseller, a printer, a jeweler, a publican, a 
Òhand-wareman,Ó and a builder; carpenters, joiners, plumbers, painters, and coal merchants; a 
wharfinger, a pottery maker, a woolstapler, a dyer, a white-lead manufacturer, tin manufacturer and 
dealers, a silk throwster, an umbrella maker and, last and most important, W. G. & J. Strutt, the 
cotton spinners (LEIGHTON-SMITH at 257-8).  
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credit, with the banker paying them interest, other times in debit, with the client 
paying interest to the banker. Tradesmen and craftsmen, such as the saddlers, 
millers, maltsters, cornfactors, bakers, butchers, grocers, and so on, sent bills they 
received in payment to their bankers and drew on the bankers to make payments 
they owed to others. As Ashton describes the relationship,  
 
Instead of keeping his own portfolio of bills, a trader could send those he 
received direct to his banker, who would discount them for him and set the 
balance to his credit. Instead of himself taking or sending a bill for acceptance 
or payment, he could leave this troublesome business to a banker.
96
   
 
In manufacturing centres country banks further aided traders, craftsmen, and 
emerging industrialists by providing them with a means of paying wages.
97
 In 
agricultural regions, country bankers played a key role in facilitating the payment of 
rent by tenants to landlords and often channeled seasonal assistance to farmers. As 
an example, consider the bank operated by Vincent Stuckey in Somersetshire. The 
grazing of cattle was central to SomersetshireÕs economy and StuckeyÕs bank 
formed close ties with the agricultural interest, in particular, landowners and tenant 
farmers. Farmers needed accommodation from May to October, for during these 
months they were out of cash. Taking the Somersetshire region as a whole, 
StuckeyÕs bank found itself committed to loans of between £40,000 and £50,000 
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between late spring and early autumn. The bank lent to farmers those deposits 
unlikely to be withdrawn at short notice. In return, Stuckey received personal 
security from the farmer, typically a promissory note. A joint note bearing two 
names in addition to the farmers was ideal, as well as a deposit of deeds to the 




On occasions, Stuckey extended assistance, often on little or no security, to tenant 
farmers who had rent to pay but lacked sufficient funds to meet their obligation.
99
 ÒIt 
may happen that one of the farmers may come possibly a day before, and say, I have 
got 500l. rent to pay to-morrow, but I have only 300l. with you, will you let me have 
200l.; in that case, we generally do.Ó
100
 On other occasions, Stuckey and his co-
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gentlemen, Lord Burlington, Lord Egremont, Mr. Portman, and othersÓ (Stuckey to Committee on 
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the country bankers are kept constantly in check by daily exchanges going on with each other; 
we have a settling every day in the week with some banker or other in our neighbourhood, so 
that the moment our notes go out of the district and go into another, we immediately pay the 
difference in London; there is a very respectable bank at Bridgeport; we exchange with them 
at Chard; they have an establishment there; every thing we receive of theirs goes to Chard, 
and what they receive of ours goes there also, and we do the same at Bristol É (Stuckey to the 
Select Committee on Banks of Issue, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1841) (410) V at 57 
(Q: 627)).  
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bankers loaned money to a farmer Ð after enquiring about what the loan was for Ð to 
allow for the purchase of more oxen at the fair, or to cover the costs incurred in the 
spring at seedtime. Such requests for assistance apparently happened every day.
101
 
The terms of the loan to the farmer, which Stuckey would Òbe sorry to refuse 
him,Ó
102





I want to use these examples to emphasize the central role that bankers played in 
their local community.
104
 The banker provided the link between the different levels 
of social hierarchy. And that meant the banker tied together with each other gentry 
and landlords, prestigious merchants and professionals, Òmiddling and small 
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 The remarks of Richard Page, written in the 1840s though equally applicable to this earlier phase 
of banking, capture the place of banks and bankers within their local community that this chapter 
attempts to capture. Page opens his book by remarking,  
 
Banking, in a commercial community, is every manÕs affair. In the present relations of society 
it not only affects us one and all, more or less directly, but is so potent and penetrating that 
there is no escaping from its influence, or getting on without direct and intimate connexion 
with it. More truly than nine out of the ten millions of things to which the quotation has been 
applied Ð ÔTis like the air we breathe - if we have it not, we die.Õ It pursues us in the streets, 
follows us to our homes, pierces each household nook and cranny, embraces our whole 
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broad and stirring land of ours that a man can begin without a Bank; and what, however well 
begun or conducted, that will not, when the Bank refuses accommodation, at once stop, sink, 
and be for ever extinguished? There is nothing of which we can treat - nothing upon which we 
can act - nothing to which we can allude - which is not closely mixed up and deeply 
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manufacturers,Ó tradesman and craftsmen (Òbricklayers, carpenters, butchers, butter 
and bacon dealers, shoemakers, cattle-jobbers),Ó
105
 farmers, and wage labourers. 
Without the role played by their banker, the cohesion of the local community 
suffered. Yet, as this chapter explores later, while the community needed their 
banker, the relationship was reciprocal because the banker could not prosper long 
without the backing of his local community. 
 
4. The role of the tax system in supporting country bankers 
 
As the last section explained, many of the original country bankers started out as 
shopkeepers, merchants, tradesmen, or manufacturers. Yet although they all relied 
on bill finance to a greater or lesser extent, very few shopkeepers, tradesmen, and 
manufacturers became bankers. What in part helps to explain the emergence of some 
prominent local figures as bankers is the relationship they had with the system of tax 
collection. It is worth describing the structure of the tax system in some detail, for it 
is through these links to taxation that we can connect country bankers to the more 
conventional story that links the credibility of money to the tax system.  
 
Until well into the nineteenth century, the administration of taxes across England 
and Wales, especially the land tax and assessed taxes,
106
 was a local matter. To the 
members of these communities, having their tax liability assessed by one of their 
peers was an arrangement offering the taxpayer protection from the arbitrary will of 
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the Crown: according to Stebbings, one of the four key principles of English taxation 
was localism.
107
 The value of local knowledge made the local nature of tax 
assessment and collection relatively effective, even though the collector/assessor 
was not salaried and was essentially an amateur. As Stebbings points outs, Ò[l]ocal 
knowledge meant acquaintance with individual traders, knowledge of their methods 
of business and their profits, of local economic conditions, of local land values, and 
of everyday matters and problems in local commercial life.Ó
108
 Such local 
knowledge was exactly what the country banker possessed. 
 
The local assessment of land taxes, assessed taxes, and duties such as those on 
stamps made the greatest use of this local knowledge. By contrast, salaried officials 
employed by central government administered Excise duties and the Customs. 
Prompt payment to the Crown by these officials was mandatory. With respect to 
land and assessed taxes, however, partly because a salary did not accompany the job, 
compensation took the form of delayed payment, that is, the tax collector got to use 
the collected revenue for a period of time before the money found its way to the 
government. These delays in payment occurred at each of the stages between the 
taxpayer and the Exchequer: upon payment of the tax locally; upon its remittance to 
London; and before payment in London to the appropriate government 
department.
109
 At each stage, a role opened up for the banker.  
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About fifty (sixty-six from 1821) Receivers-General (divided into county divisions 
and sub-divisions) assessed and collected the land and assessed taxes.
110
 The 
Receivers put up security to hold the post, which frequently meant the local 
landowning gentry filled the position. On occasions, however, the local gentry 
assigned the post to a banker: in 1780, there were seven Receivers-General 
identified as bankers, with six more appearing over the next decade. Indeed, many 
bankers emerged having previously taken on the role of Receiver for their area Ð as 
was the case in Worcester where the draper Joseph Berwick, who had been the 
Receiver for the county for a number of years, moved into banking in the early 
1780s.
111
 Bankers need not hold the position of Receiver to benefit from the 
collection of tax revenue, however. As the amount of tax collected increased towards 
the end of the eighteenth century, many Receivers needed help from others to cover 
the cost of the security deposit. Bankers were a potential source of assistance, but 
only contributed towards the cost of the security deposit if they secured the 
remittance of the revenues. Few Receivers had sufficient wealth to say no. And that 
meant many bankers came to dominate the second stage in the tax collection 
process, the remittance of funds from the country to London. 
 
The delay in payment at this stage in the process was central because it allowed 
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country bankers a period of time when they could put these deposits of money to 
work at a profit at the governmentÕs expense. The Receivers of the land and assessed 
taxes, and their bankers, ÒÉ commonly retain in their hands the whole of each 
quarterly collection for about six weeks, being equivalent to an advantage of 
retaining the whole yearÕs collection for about six weeks in the year É.Ó
112
 Large 
sums passed through the country bankersÕ accounts book. A Bristol banker who 
failed in the 1760s benefitted from holding the account of the local collector of 
Customs, who paid into an account around £3,600 a month, resulting in the 
remittance of over £132,700 over the previous few years. In Worcester and 
Cornwall, country bankers remitted similar sums after the usual delay of a year or 
more. Some local collectors retained the money for two years.
113
 In the meantime, 
these funds could be lent out locally at a profit. Indeed, ÒÉ any banker in the 
country would remit É (taxes) É to town without any charge for so doing, on 
account of the benefit which he would derive from the mere transition of the public 




We should be careful not to exaggerate the profits country bankers made from 
remitting tax revenue, however. This tax revenue did need to find its way to the 
Exchequer in London at some point, which limited its use as a fund for lending 
locally. And, in the role of Receiver-General, the banker had to account for the 
expense of collecting the taxes. A Norwich banker in 1820, who served as the 
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Deputy-Receiver for Norfolk, calculated that the cost involved in collecting land and 
assessed taxes absorbed at least 70% of his gross profit.
115
 But the value of handling 
public revenue was not solely measured in terms of how much or how little profit 
was generated. Of greater importance was the impact that the collection of such a 
large and consistent sum had on the credibility and prestige of the banker. The 
revenue gathered through taxation is consistent year in, year out. That meant a 
consistent flow of funds to the banker privileged to hold the account into which tax 
revenues flowed. Should the local Receiver-General choose to allow the payment of 
taxes in the local bankersÕ own notes, the banker found his prestige enhanced 
further. Given the wider context characterised by the scarcity Royal Mint coins and, 
outside of London, Bank of England notes, payment of taxes in other media was 
often not a choice, but a necessity. Pressnell provides examples from across England 
where revenue collectors Ð of the Land and assessed taxes but also Excise duties Ð 
willingly accepted country bankersÕ notes.
116
 They were persuaded to do so, partly 
because these notes were payable at the country bankerÕs agent in London.
 117
  
                                                
115
 Id., 386. 
 
116
 On other occasions, tax collectors refused to take the notes of a country banker, harming thereby the 
standing of the bank. As an example, consider the following notice that appeared in the North Wales 
Gazette on 27 October 1810,  
 
The Receiver-General will attend the places and on the days following between the hours of 
the and three oÕclock for the purpose of receiving the first moiety of Land Assessed Taxes for 
the year 1810 (due on the 10
th
 of October) and all outstanding Arrears of Property, Land and 
Assessed Taxes for the year 1809. He has found himself under the necessity of coming to a 
resolution not to receive any country Bank Notes whatever, in REG CHAMBERS JONES, ARIAN: 
THE STORY OF MONEY AND BANKING IN WALES 111 (1978). 
 
117
 Id., 383. Part C (1) of this chapter explores the country bankerÕs relationship with his London 
agent. When the holder of a country bankerÕs note presented that note for payment, either to the 
banker who issued the note, or to that bankerÕs agent in London, the note holder had the option of 
demanding payment in gold coin. Another option involved foregoing gold coin and accepting instead 
a credit balance with the banker. As Part B (3) of this chapter explained, that credit balance allowed 
the note holder to draw on the country bankerÕs London agent. When the holder of a country bankerÕs 
note presented that note to the banker in payment of a tax obligation, the note holder opted to forego 
gold coin to obtain instead a credit balance with the country bankers. Through the country bankerÕs 




C. Flourishing to Floundering 
 
1. The country bankerÕs dependence on his London banker   
  
As described earlier, banks across England and Wales did not have branches largely 
because of legislation limiting the size of banks to no more than six partners. The 
bond they all shared with London, made possible by the bill on London, connected 
all of these banks and the wider economy together, thereby both preventing isolated 
banking and reinforcing a national economy. Money flowed to London, the site of 
government and a trade centre. London bankers orchestrated these flows of money, 
many of whom held an account at the Bank of England. This allowed them to 
discount bills at the Bank, giving them direct access to Bank of England notes and 
Royal Mint coins. Access to the most prestigious forms of money ideally positioned 
the London bankers to complete the third and final stage of the process of 
channelling money from the taxpayer to the government. Like their country cousins, 
the London bankers benefited from their place in this system of tax collection 
because they too delayed payment of the money remitted to them. Before payment to 
the Exchequer, London bankers used this public money for private profit. 
 
A consequence following from both the volume of the funds flowing through 
London and the close links between London banks and the Bank of England was that 
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bankers from elsewhere in England and Wales turned to their London agent in 
search of investment outlets, capital, and, during a crisis, emergency finance. That 
made London bankers essential to the prosperity of their country clients, frequently 
referred to as Òcorrespondents.Ó As one contemporary described it  
 
the Business of the banker in London is to pay the notes of the country banker 
to whom he is an agent, to accept his drafts, and pay them, to execute his stock 
orders, and do any other business that he may wish to have done in London in 




To conduct this business, country bankers kept an account with their London 
bankers that formed their main reserve should an economic crisis arise. The 
arrangement for managing the account was one of the following: (i) a permanent 
deposit, on which no interest was paid, but which the agent used to cover the cost of 
managing the account; (ii) a current account, on which interest was paid by the 
country banker when the account was in debit, but on which the country banker 
earned interest when it was in credit; (iii) a commission, paid to the London banker 
for managing the account, which might be fixed or vary with turnover; (iv) or a 
combination of deposit and commission.
119
 The London banker used the funds left in 
this account to invest in stocks and bills to suit the investment needs of country 
bankers and the country bankerÕs customers. Alternatively, the London banker used 
these funds to accept bills drawn by the country banker, thereby enabling merchants 
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and early industrialists from across England and Wales to access the wealth passing 
through London. Moreover, country bankers in search of reserves in an emergency 




The influence of the London bankers stemmed from this widespread reliance upon 
their services. Although country bankers had influence within the regions across 
England and Wales where they operated, these bankers were in turn dependent on 
the bankers in London. Family connections between the agent and correspondent 
banks frequently consolidated this dependence,
121
 as did the practice of some 
London banks around the turn of the century of promoting the establishment of 
country banks.
122
 In general, however, the London agent had to negotiate the terms 
of their relationship with their correspondent.  
 
Consider the relationship between the Newcastle bank of Surtees & Co. and its 
London agent, GlynÕs Bank in the mid 1790s. The Newcastle bankers hoped to 
exploit the potential for profits brought about by wartime finance. To do so they 
intended to employ a stockbroker to hold an account for them independent of their 
account at GlynÕs. The London banker soon brought a halt to the scheme. Instead of 
allowing Surtees & Co. to use part (to the amount of £5,000) of their larger than 
expected London balance to employ an independent stockbroker, GlynÕs decided 
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that the minimum balance required of Surtees & Co. should increase by £5,000. 
GlynÕs defended this decision by noting that Surtees & Co. balance was greater than 
expected largely because the volume of transactions going through the London 
account was far higher than anticipated. GlynÕs compensation for managing this 
business remained a fixed deposit. GlynÕs had managed the additional business 
despite the inadequacy of this deposit to cover the costs of running the account: 
hence the decision to increase the size of the deposit. Surtees & Co. fell into line 
because they dared not risk jeopardizing their relationship with their link to London. 
Whilst the use of the £5,000 employed with a stockbroker would likely have brought 
them short-term profits, it would have soured their connection with GlynÕs. In times 
of strain, the one thing Surtees wanted more than anything else was a reliable link to 
the London money market, for otherwise getting gold coin and/or Bank of England 
notes was difficult. Note, however, Surtees & Co. was acting from experience. 
During the crisis of 1793, the rumour spread that their London agents at that time, 
Messrs. Smith, Payne, & Smith, was on the verge of collapse. Surtees & Co. found it 





Country bankers depended on their London agents both to access funds from across 
England and to obtain gold coins and Bank of England notes when the demand for 
such forms of currency became pressing. Country bankers, of course, were obliged 
to convert their notes into gold coin on demand. In order to honour this commitment 
they had to maintain a link to a source of gold coin, or at least Bank of England 
notes. That necessitated that they remain on cordial terms with their London agent. 
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Yet although the London banker largely thereafter determined the terms of their 
business with their country correspondents, the country bankers had a limited though 
far from insignificant set of options at their disposal when it came to countering 
prescriptions from London. Country banks sometimes switched from one London 
bank to another
124
 or, from the early nineteenth century onwards, though only 
significantly after 1825, they employed bill brokers.
125
 The tactic favoured the most 
by country banks in the last decade of the eighteenth century, however, amounted to 
establishing their own London bank. That is, a country correspondent set up an 
office in London. Thereafter, they drew bills on their London partner. Facilitating 
this approach to banking was the variation on the bill of exchange known as 
accommodation paper, informally referred to as a Òpig-on-porkÓ bill.
126
    
 
2. ÒPig-on-porkÓ bills 
 
An accommodation bill, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was a device that 
was the product not of an actual sale of goods between merchants but of an 
endeavour by these merchants to Òraise funds É even though they had not actually 
engaged in sales transactions.Ó
127
 Ensuring the wide circulation of such bills required 
that they look as much as possible like ÒrealÓ bills (bills supporting a transaction 
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with a buyer and a seller of goods). A merchant made an accommodation bill look 
more ÒrealÓ by finding a second merchant to ÒaccommodateÓ the transaction. The 
second merchant offered a helping hand by accepting the bill even though no 
exchange of goods took place.  
 
The process might take the following form. Merchant A draws a bill on Merchant B. 
The amount corresponds to the cost of a typical shipment of goods. Merchant B 
accepts the bill. Merchant A then discounts the bill, typically with a banker, for gold 
coin or Bank of England notes. When the bill is due to mature, Merchant B raises the 
funds to pay the debt by this time drawing a bill on Merchant A. Merchant A accepts 
the bill. Merchant B then discounts the bill with another banker. With gold coin or 
Bank of England notes in hand, Merchant B pays off the debt owed on the first bill. 
To solve the problem of the same names reappearing, the parties add bogus names to 
the bills.
128
 This process of accommodation worked provided Merchant A and 
Merchant B could discount the bills they had created, an outcome made possible by 
the facilities provided by bankers. Yet should Merchant A and Merchant B fail to get 
their bills discounted, they would find themselves with neither the money nor the 
tangible goods to make good even a portion of their debts. 
 
Merchant A and Merchant B need not be merchants. The process of accommodation 
Ð the creation of Òpig-on-porkÓ bills Ð worked equally well for bankers based in, say, 
Liverpool who had a partner set up a firm in London that specialized in accepting 
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bills drawn in Liverpool. The Liverpool banking house of Caldwell, Smith, Forbes 
& Gregory set up arrangements of this sort when they had Forbes and Gregory 
establish a business as merchants in London. Having agents in London who were 
partners in the banking house in Liverpool eliminated the discipline provided by an 
independent London banker. Having bills drawn in Liverpool accepted in London 
became straightforward, allowing the Liverpool bankers greater scope to access 
funds in the London money market. And, as Pressnell has noted, Òa draft on a 
London bank, albeit of a Òpig-on-porkÓ variety, might have been less unattractive in 
country payments than many ordinary mercantile bills.Ó
129
 A Òpig-on-porkÓ bill was 
still a bill on London. For those with payments due in London it represented access 
to the funds they needed to pay their debts. Indeed, such bills also carried attractions 
for the conventional London banker. The Bank of EnglandÕs policy in the late 
eighteenth century was only to discount bills carrying two London names. For a 
conventional London banker like GlynÕs to get the bills they had endorsed 
discounted, they needed the endorsement or acceptance of another London banker. 
ÒPig-on-porkÓ bills, such as the type created by Caldwell & Co., were by their nature 
designed to secure a London signature.  
 
The problem, however, was that Òpig-on-porkÓ bills were ultimately less secure than 
ordinary bills. Whereas in the latter case two banks created the bills, the credit of 
only one bank supported the former. Moreover, all types of accommodation paper 
brought risks because they lacked any tie to productive activity. Bankers like 
Caldwell & Co. nonetheless exploited Òpig-on-porkÓ bills because, though formally 
separate, the London firm expanded and contracted its operations at the command of 
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the Liverpool house. Without a London banker to check its credit advances, 
Caldwell & Co. found itself in serious financial difficulties by the spring of 1793.
130
 
Their failure had repercussions for the whole of Liverpool, a story that this chapter 
takes up shortly.
131
   
  
3. When webÕs of credit unravel 
 
According to Feaveryear, the first appearance of Òrhythmic fluctuations in business 
activity Ð punctured by periodical commercial and financial crises Ð which 
continued throughout the nineteenth centuryÓ marked the second half of the 
eighteenth century.
132
 The crisis of 1793 was one of the worst because the number of 
country banks, almost all with a note issue, increase to around 400 after ten years of 
peace.
133
 The amount of credit had correspondingly also increased far in excess of 
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As the bankers Caldwell & Co. soon found out, the expanding port of Liverpool was 
in an especially precarious position given its roles as an inlet for raw materials from 
the West Indies and the southern USA, and as an outlet for the manufacturers of 
Lancashire, West Yorkshire, and the Midlands. ÒPig on porkÓ bills undermined the 
stability of these trade relations but so too did transactions based on the sale of 




A textile manufacturer agrees to sell his product, with the purchaser promising to 
make a payment in ninety days time by drawing a bill of exchange. The textile 
manufacturer discounts the bill with a banker. With cash in hand the manufacturer 
pays off the debts he owes to others. With these debts paid and perhaps a profit 
made, the textile manufacturer commences with the purchase of raw cotton for the 
manufacture of textiles to meet orders paid for by additional bills drawn at ninety 
days. Cotton producers, seeing this demand for their product, purchase the materials 
needed for the cotton production process, drawing bills in order to accomplish their 
transactions. This same process repeats across numerous textile manufacturers in 
Lancashire and cotton producers in the southern US. Other related economic 
activities benefit and experience similar growth. In each production process, the 
materials bought on credit produce goods that the producer intends to sell later. Both 
the textile manufacturer and the cotton producer aim to use the proceeds of these 
sales to cover what they owe on the bills they have drawn.  
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Following this increase in demand for raw cotton and finished textiles, the price of 
each commodity goes up. With high prices comes a large flow of income not only 
for those who are paid what they are owed through bill discounting, but also for all 
who hold stocks of raw cotton or finished textiles. Those holding stocks of these 
goods will then see a boost to their profits. They can discount with a banker the bills 
they receive for these sales at increased prices. Flush with cash, they can pay off 
their own debts to others. They will then be in a position to invest further in their 
own economic activity, and they have every incentive to do so partly because of 
their recent profits and partly because this profitability enhances their credit 
worthiness. Spending then becomes even easier, credit expands further, and the 
feedback loop of rising prices is reinforced. 
 
A boom follows. Bills drawn on bona fide prices pay for the trade in raw cotton and 
finished textiles. With the progress of the boom, some cotton importers become 
suspicious of the trend of rising prices and import less, drawing fewer bills as a 
result. By contrast, others anticipate that the trend of rising prices will continue, and 
so further fuel the boom. Recall, however, the point from where this example 
started. The manufacturer of textiles, having reinvested in his business through the 
purchase of more raw cotton, has to ensure that he is in a position to cover what he 
owes others on the bill drawn to pay for the cotton. The textile manufacturer 
anticipates being able to do so because he invested in a production process with the 
materials purchased. Through selling the goods that are the outcome of this 
production process, the manufacturer intends to raise the funds needed to pay his 
debts. The potential, and all too often real, problem, however, is that the credit 
created by the bill of exchange is based on a promise to pay made with respect to a 
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very uncertain future. The purchaser who owes money on the bill cannot know that a 
market will exist for his goods in ninety days, and should a market exist, he cannot 
know if the price he receives will be adequate to cover what he purchased on credit 
earlier.  
 
Perhaps due to war, increased competition, ships delayed by weather, new import 
restrictions, or an array of other possibilities,
136
 at some point the textile 
manufacturer finds that he cannot sell the textiles he has manufactured. He then 
lacks the funds to cover what he owes on the bills he has agreed to pay at maturity. 
In normal times, when a merchant or manufacturer lacked the funds needed to cover 
their obligations, they turned to a banker for a loan. However, in a situation where 
the change in expectations is serious enough to affect not just any one individual 
trader or manufacturer but the economy as a whole, networks of interconnected, 
interdependent promises begin to unravel, and bankers holding discounted paper 
find many of these bills dishonoured. With their funding curtailed, bankers refuse to 
lend and a liquidity crisis ensues. The demand for cotton falls as do prices. More 
debts go unmet. Discounting accommodation paper might procure temporary aid for 
those who can obtain it, though in the longer term such debt might only serve to 
aggravate the situation by prolonging it.
137
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 Consider the situation facing John Coleman, a bread and biscuit maker from Liverpool in 1793, a 
crisis considered below, at Section D (1). After making a fortune contracting to feed French prisoners 
of war in Liverpool, he then expanded his business during the American Wars of Independence. He 
made profits initially, but then problems set in. In 1793, those who owed him money were unable to 
meet their debts. The problem for Coleman was that without the money owed to him he could not 
meet his own debts. That meant he had to fall back on his banker, Heywood. But when HeywoodÕs 




(a) The London reserve as a first line of defence 
 
In such circumstances, bankers bore the brunt of the crisis given their place at the 
centre of these credit arrangements. Following the general collapse in confidence, 
the credibility of the promise to pay on each bill of exchange was in doubt. To cover 
debts owed, creditors needed an asset on which they could rely, typically a monetary 
instrument with explicit public backing, such as gold coin and/or Bank of England 
notes, both of which had state backing. One obtained these forms of money by 
demanding the fulfilment of the promise requiring the issuer of the note to pay in 
gold coin on demand, or by withdrawing funds deposited with a banker. Either way 
the banker faced a demand from his creditors for state backed forms of currency at 
precisely the moment when the bankerÕs in flow of money from his debtors, those 
who owed money on the bills of exchange he had discounted, was drying up. The 
suggestion that the banker was unable to fulfil the obligations he owed to note 
holders and depositors only reinforced the crisis by unnerving the bankÕs remaining 
note holders and depositors, potentially setting off a run on the bank.   
 
                                                                                                                                    
refused to extend ColemanÕs overdraft, bankruptcy followed. Here is how Coleman described the 
events of 1793 in his own words, 
 
[O]ne of my principal debtorÕs stopped payment, owing me a sum of nearly two thousand 
pounds and some others owing me large sums, but could not or would not pay any money on 
account of the lost confidence É not a house of any note or consequence in town but what was 
either failÕd, or reported must soon stop payment Ð all business at a stand, the three Banks 
shut up, every morning bringing with it a declaration of new bankruptcies É Such scenes of 
alarm and distress was never before experienced in any town or city (most probably) in the 
world É I was one of the unfortunate number in the list of bankruptcies. Coleman, quoted in 
CHANDLER, supra note 95, at 190 (Vol I.). 
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It was in such situations that access to a reserve of funds in London became 
necessary. Take the reaction of the Banbury Bank, in north Oxfordshire, to the 
unfolding of events in 1825 as an example of a standard response for not only the 
1820s but for earlier moments of crisis too.
138
 Rumours that some large London 
banking houses were likely to suspend payment first reached Banbury on 11
th
 
December. As an initial response, the Banbury bankÕs partners wrote instructions for 
£10,000 worth of gold coin even though their balance at CurtisÕs, their London 
agent, was low. They managed to procure £11,000 worth of gold coin, including Òa 
Box of £6,000 that was intended for some other Bank.Ó
139
 This was merely the first 
line of defence as in all likelihood matters would get worse before they got better. 
So, the partners set to the task of mobilizing their other assets. One of the bankÕs 
partners, Joseph Gibbins, owed the partnership £27,000, and another partner, J. A. 
Gillett, urged Gibbins to present some marketable paper as security for this debt. 
Gibbins did provide bills, though some were of doubtful quality, and a collection of 
annuity deeds that could convince large depositors that all was well. 
 
A week after the Banbury partners started mobilizing their defences, their caution 
proved well founded, as the prominent London bank of Sir Peter Pole and Co. 
suspended payment. They served as agents for 43 country banks. The £11,000 from 
CurtisÕs proved invaluable at meeting the demands for cash that followed. The next 
day, however, another London bank, Williams and Co., collapsed. The Banbury 
Bank now desperately needed more hard cash. One partner headed to Birmingham, 
another to London. But nowhere could bills of exchange be turned into gold coins. 
                                                
138
 The account of the Banbury BankÕs response to the events of 1825 draws on AUDREY M. TAYLOR, 
GILLETTS: BANKERS AT BANBURY AND OXFORD 9-13 (1964). See also P. W. MATTHEWS AND A. W. 
TUKE, A HISTORY OF BARCLAYS BANK LIMITED 281 (1926).  
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 TAYLOR, supra note 138, at 9. 
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Both partners returned to Banbury without additional cash. To meet the demand for 
extra cash from their customers at Christmas, the partners procured a loan of £1,000 
from their local banking rival Cobbs. Thereafter, Gillett and Gibbins attempted a 
second time to try to find cash in London. Whilst in London, with their parcel of 
bills and other securities in tow, the two partners discovered that GibbinsÕs father 
had obtained £5,000 worth of gold coin for the bank and was on his way to Banbury. 
But hopes that these gold coins would keep the bank open until their return proved 
unfounded, the remaining partner in Banbury suspending payment the following 
day. Handbills circulated through the town carrying the announcement that the bank 
would make no payments until the following Wednesday. 
 
Gillett and Gibbins did not know about the suspension of payment and continued 
their search for gold coin through the City of LondonÕs depressed streets. 
Everywhere they turned, however, they were confronted with others doing exactly as 
they were doing, with just as little success. Eventually they reasoned that if gold coin 
was too difficult to find, Bank of England notes might be a better bet. Although the 
Bank refused to offer a loan on the bills Gillett and Gibbins offered as security, it 
was prepared to discount some of their bills if the Banbury bankers found a London 
banker with an account at the Bank, besides their agent Curtis, who was willing to 
endorse the bills. With that help forthcoming, Gillett and Gibbins secured £6,200. 
The partners quickly returned to Banbury. But the pressure remained severe, so 
severe that by the Wednesday of the following week, the bank was unable to reopen.  
 
(b) A second response: bankruptcy 
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Eventually, the bank at Banbury did reopen largely owing to the support the 
inhabitants of the town offered to their bankers. We will turn to these forms of 
community support in Part D of this chapter. The remainder of this section explores 
where many other bankers landed following a crisis during which adequate support 
from London was not forth coming Ð bankruptcy.  
 
It was better to avoid bankruptcy. Bankruptcy stained the bankerÕs notes with 
uncertain and so drastically curtailed the regions means of exchange. Whereas the 
failure of a manufacturing partnership brought distress to the partners, employees, 
and customers of the firm, this distress was at least somewhat contained. The failure 
of a banker was of a different magnitude because the bankerÕs notes circulated 
throughout the region bringing into the orbit of the bank a broader range of people. 
Moreover, without the discounting facilitates offered by bankers, manufacturers and 
merchants would find it challenging to offer credit to their customers.  
 
Where bankruptcy was the outcome,
140
 helping the situation of the debtor was the 
                                                
140
 Bankruptcy was only one amongst many methods by which creditors could deal with debtors in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Bankruptcy was common where one or more of the 
creditors believed the debtor could not pay his debts. Where the creditors believed that the debtor 
could pay his debts but was refusing to do so, the law of insolvency allowed the creditors to either 
threaten the debtor with imprisonment, or, alternatively, obtain legal judgment on the debtorÕs 
property. Bankruptcy and the law of insolvency dealt with debtors owing large sums of money. 
Pursuing those with modest debts meant taking the matter before the small debt courts (Courts of 
Request and Courts of Conscience), which were limited geographically and mainly served 
shopkeepers pursuing their customers.   
         The above three options (bankruptcy, insolvency, and the small debt courts) were formal legal 
institutions. They all involved bringing third parties into the process, such as the courts (in one form 
or another) and the Lord Chancellor. Creditors also had two further options, both of which kept the 
process of dealing with the debtor under the control of the creditors. The option pursued depended on 
whether the debtorÕs inability to meet his obligations was temporary or permanent. If the debtor was 
able to convince his creditors that his inability to meet his debts was temporary Ð most likely by 
allowing them to inspect his books Ð then the creditors might allow the debtor to continue in business 
in the expectation that the debts would eventually be met. Recognizing this state of affairs, the 
creditors issued the debtor with a letter of license. In addition, the creditors could opt to monitor the 
debtorÕs subsequent transactions closely via a deed of inspection.  
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shift in the structure of the bankruptcy regime since the early eighteenth century. 
When bankruptcy entered the statute book in 1543,
141
 the general attitude towards 
debtors was harsh and unsympathetic. Bankrupts were people who had made a 
conscious and premeditated decision to evade payment for just debts. Further 




 reinforced this attitude. Honest bankrupts 
had to wait until 1706
144





The legislative changes of 1706 became permanent in 1731.
146
 Although honest 
                                                                                                                                    
         In a scenario, however, where the creditors were convinced that the debtor was permanently 
unable to meet his obligations, a further option was to close down the debtorÕs business and realize 
the debtorÕs assets via a process known as compositions. A composition assigned the assets of the 
debtor to one of the creditors, who acted as trustee for the others. The trustee then sold these assets 
with the proceeds distributed amongst all of the creditors on a pro rata basis. Compositions had an 
advantage over formal bankruptcy proceedings because responsibility for administering the debtorÕs 
estate did not pass to a third party but remained with the creditors, often working closely with the 
debtor. The process stalled where a single creditor objected to a composition, perhaps because he felt 
the debtor was capable of paying more. It was often challenging to determine whether the debtor was 
permanently or only temporarily insolvent because many creditors saw fit to object to the 
composition and to seek the payment of the debt via bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings.  
     On the different options available to creditors pursuing debtors in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century, see JULIAN HOPPIT, RISK AND FAILURE IN ENGLISH BUSINESS IN THE EIGHTEENTH 
CENTURY (1987). For contemporary sources on compositions, see W. FORSYTH, A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW RELATING TO COMPOSITION AND ARRANGEMENTS WITH CREDITORS (3
rd
 ed.,1854) and B. 
MONTAGU, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF COMPOSITIONS WITH CREDITORS (1823).   
    
141
 On this statute, see W. J. JONES, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ENGLISH BANKRUPTCY: STATUTES AND 
COMMISSIONS IN THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD, 11-18 (1979). 
 
142
 13 Eliz. I c. 7 (1571) [Bankrupts]. 
 
143
 1 Jas. I c. 15 (1603) [Bankrupts]. 
 
144
 6 Ann. c. 22 (1706) [Bankrupts Act]. 
 
145
 Many opposed this reform, arguing that honest debtors did not need a bankruptcy regime because, 
provided debtors were honest and decent, they would win the understanding of their creditors. In 
response, those who favoured reform stressed that only a small number of bankrupts were fraudulent. 
The law should protect the majority, many of whom had taken risks in the hope of reviving their 
fortunes but without success. By offering protection to such risk takers, the new legal regime 
recognized that risk taking and a certain amount of business failure marked a vibrant economy.  
 
146
 5 Geo. II c. 30 (1731) [Bankrupts Act]. 
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bankrupts gained recognition, there remained no route for debtors to declare 
bankruptcy voluntarily, and this remained true until the 1820s.
147
 Furthermore, the 
bankruptcy regime only applied to (i) Òtraders,Ó
148
 (ii) debts of at least £100,
149
 and 
(iii) circumstances where an Òact of bankruptcyÓ had been committed.
150
 The 
starting point in the bankruptcy process was for one or more of the creditors to 
petition the Lord Chancellor,
151
 asking for the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings 
against a specific debtor. The debtor had no say in the matter at this stage, as the 




Upon receiving a petition, the Lord Chancellor opened a commission of bankruptcy, 
which first required nominating commissioners, usually lawyers, from the same 
district as the debtor and creditors. These commissioners were responsible for 
determining whether the debtor was a bankrupt in accordance with the three 
conditions outlined above. If they decided the debtor met these conditions, an 
                                                
147
 6 Geo. IV c. 16 (1825) [Bankrupts (England) Act]. 
 
148
 In the context of bankruptcy, the distinction between ÒtradersÓ and Ònon-tradersÓ originated in the 
legislation of 1571 and survived until the mid nineteenth century. A ÒtraderÓ made a living from 
buying and selling. The intention behind maintaining the distinction was to prevent landowners and 
the farming community from falling under the jurisdiction of bankruptcy.   
 
149
 The requirement that debts be of at least £100 limited bankruptcy proceedings to the likes of 
wholesalers and manufactures rather than retailers, or those who owed debts to shopkeepers, and 
artisans. More precisely, the debts had to be of at least £100 if owed to one creditor; £150 if owed to 
two creditors; and, £200 if owed to three or more creditors.  
  
150
 An act of bankruptcy involved Òan action which had sought to deny creditors the satisfaction of 
their just claimsÓ (HOPPIT, supra note 140 at 26). Such an action might include taking flight, 
remaining indoors with the doors locked, lying in jail under the insolvent debtors laws for more than 
two months, or committing a fraudulent conveyance.  
 
151
 The Lord Chancellor is a member of the Cabinet with responsibility for the functioning of the 
courts. Until 2005, the Lord Chancellor was the presiding officer of the House of Lords and head of 
the judiciary.   
 
152
 Upon presenting the petition, the creditors were additionally required to lodge a bond of £200 to 
safeguard against malicious petitions. 
 
                                                                                                                
86 
 
announcement of a declaration of bankruptcy followed in the London Gazette, and 
the bankrupt was notified, marking the first chance for the debtor to put forward 
their side of events. Each creditor then had an opportunity to prove their debts, with 
the commissioners sitting in judgment. To assist the commissioners, the Lord 
Chancellor appointed assignees to collect, value, and sell the bankruptÕs estate.  
 
While frequently in the position of creditors proving their debts before the 
commissioners,
153
 bankers, on occasions, found themselves in the position of the 
bankrupt. Consider the example of the Western Bank, in Exeter, Devonshire, in 
1810.
154
 When the Western Bank stopped payment on its notes in July of that year, 
panic spread throughout the city owing to concern over the viability of the cityÕs 
other bankers and the value of their notes. To stop the panic and prevent the break 
out of widespread banking bankruptcies, the town held public meetings, which I 
consider in detail later. The declarations of support for the townÕs bankers that 
followed from these meetings safeguarded both ExeterÕs bankers, and other bankers 
all over southwest England. The response came too late for the Western Bank, 
however, which then faced bankruptcy proceedings.  
 
After being notified of the bankruptcy proceedings, the bankÕs three partners, John 
Wilcocks, Edward Wilcocks, and Alexander Frazer, appeared before the Guildhall, 
                                                
153
 See, for example, Stephen C. Hicks and Clay Ramsay, Law, Order and the Bankruptcy 




 The details presented here concerning the bankruptcy proceedings faced by the proprietors of the 
Western Bank are from JOHN RYTON, BANKS AND BANKNOTES OF EXETER, 1769-1906, 68-71 (1984).   
 





 where an examination commenced into their property 
holdings and the extent of their debts. For local creditors, meetings followed in 
Exeter at the end of October so that the commissioners might Òreceive proofs of 
debt.Ó The situation faced by creditors seeking to prove the legitimacy of their debts 
was a difficult one,  
 
The multitude assembled on the occasion was so great and tumultuous that it 
was found necessary to have eight constables to prevent disorder. Upwards of 
six hundred persons proved their debts but many that came from distant parts 
were unable to gain admission, and were obliged to remain in the city until 
this day, and will have difficulty to effect their business, as a very large 





The commissioners stamped the word ÒprovedÓ on a debt, such as one of the 
bankerÕs notes, which they deemed genuine. While the creditors of the Western 
Bank set about proving the validity of their debts, the assignees appointed by the 
commissioners got on with the task of selling the property of the bankrupts to meet 
the payments owed to these creditors. That included the homes of each partner, and a 
life interest
157
 of Edward Wilcocks that raised almost £12,500 when sold at an 
auction. The creditors received the first dividend of eleven shillings in July 1811, 
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 E. Welbourne, Bankruptcy Before the Era of Victorian Reform, 4(1) CAMBRIDGE HISTORICAL 
JOURNAL 51 (1932). 
 
156
 WOOLMERÕS GAZETTE, describing the meeting held at the Globe Tavern on 31 October 1810. 
 
157
 A life interest confers a right onto a person (usually known as a life tenant) that allows them to 
receive an income from, typically, a trust fund for the rest of their life.  
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more or less a year after the collapse of the bank. To receive what they were owed, 
creditors had to appear in person Òat the counting house of Mr. William Lee near the 
GuildhallÓ
158
 where they presented their ÒprovedÓ notes. Upon the payment of the 
dividend, the note was stamped Òdividend paid.Ó In the lead up to a dividend 
payment, the ÒprovedÓ notes circulated again, changing hands at a discount on the 
understanding that future payments on the notes would be forthcoming. The 
creditors of the Western received two further dividend payments, in January 1812 
(eight shillings) and in June of 1812 (one shilling). In total, a creditor of the Western 
Bank received twenty shillings in the pound, almost the complete repayment of their 
debts. This was an unusual outcome. Moreover, the process of repaying the banks 
creditors took a full two years.    
 
Bankruptcy was not a desirable outcome for either the banker or the community that 
he served. Bankruptcy ruined the bankerÕs credit, the community lost its means of 
payment, and those left holding the bankerÕs notes held a potentially worthless piece 
of paper, a mere Òcountry rag.Ó Should a note issuing banker fail, nobody wanted to 
be in possession of the bankerÕs notes. Unlike bills, where the liability of each 
endorsee lasted until the acceptor of the bill, all going well, met the debt due on the 
bill, liability on bank notes ceased upon transfer. There was no contingent liability. 
If the bank failed, the holder of the note was unable to take action against anyone 
other than the failed partnership of bankers.
159
 Even if the notes might turn out to be 
                                                
158
 RYTON, supra note 154, at 71. 
 
159
 The only exception was for the note holder to try to take action against the person who had 
directly transferred the note to them. Since bearer notes were transferrable without endorsement, it 
was not possible to bring the action on the note itself. Instead, the holder would have to bring an 
action on the underlying obligation for which they had accepted the note. In the early eighteenth 
century, the courts reasoned that taking a note in payment did extinguish the underlying debt, 
provided there was a sale of goods at the same time. But where the note was taken to cancel a pre-
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worth something, even more or less their full value, the process of receiving 
payment from the bankruptÕs estate was a long one. Regrettably for the local 
community, during this time the notes of the banker ceased to serve as a means of 
payment.   
 
D. Alternatives to Failure: The Reappearance of Òthe publicÓ 
 
Bankers on the verge of collapse need not fail because there was an alternative, the 
essence of which was captured in a letter to the Newcastle Courant at the height of 
the crisis of July 1816, ÒThat we may receive credit from them [the bankers], let us 
give credit to them, and then mutual confidence É will be once more re-established 
....Ó
160
 Country bankers might and often did survive a period of falling confidence 
and lower prices when the community to which the bank belonged rallied round to 
assist the banker. The response in Newcastle was not an isolated instance. Such 
forms of community support were one of the most reoccurring responses to crisis 
                                                                                                                                    
existing debt, rather than for goods there and then, the underlying debt was not extinguished.  
        Complicating the situation further was another exception. Where the note cancelled a pre-
existing debt, but was not presented for payment within a Òreasonable time,Ó then the underlying debt 
was discharged (Williams v Smith (1819) 106 E.R. 447). Consequently, as Rogers explains,  
 
when a person who had paid a debt with a bank note or draft was sued on the underlying debt, 
he could defend by arguing that the loss was really the creditorÕs own fault. If the creditor had 
been more diligent in presenting the note or draft for payment, he would have been one of the 
lucky people who got paid just before the bank failed, rather than one of the unlucky ones left 
holding the notes of the failed bank, ROGERS, supra note 45, at 203.  
 
What constituted a Òreasonable timeÓ was left to the jury to determine throughout the eighteenth 
century, though juries were typically instructed by the court to give due regard to the practice of most 
London bankers, who considered a Òreasonable timeÓ to mean twenty-four hours. What followed was 
a version of Òpass the parcelÓ or Òmusical chairsÓ: if you are not quick enough, and are holding the 
note when the music stops, then too bad, you are out the game, left with nothing but the ÒragÓ of a 
mere Òcountry merchant.Ó Besides Rogers, see also J. K. Horsefield, British Banking Practices, 1750-
1850: Some Legal Sidelights, 19 ECONOMICA 308, 309 (1952).  
 
160
 NEWCASTLE COURANT, 27 July 1816. Emphasis in original. 
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from the 1790s until the 1820s. It is to examples of this community support during 
periods of commercial distress that this chapter now turns.  
 
1. The Liverpool Corporation and the crisis of 1793  
   
When firms from the industrial heart land of England were unable to pay what they 
owed in the early months of 1793, the Liverpool banking houses that either had 
discounted or accepted bills on behalf of these firms saw their income stream dry up. 
Confidence in the value of bills evaporated, as it did, therefore, in LancashireÕs 
medium of exchange.
161
 Consequently, people who wanted to use bills of exchange 
to pay what they owed found that they could not. Banks, some on the verge of 
collapse, refused to discount, preferring instead to use the gold coin they held to 
meet their own obligations. Those who withdrew their savings tended to hoard them. 
Writing some years later, one contemporary recalled, Ò... Those who had any money 
[gold coin], not knowing where they could place it with safety, kept it unemployed, 
and locked up in their coffers ....Ó
162
 The pressure on the banks became so severe 
that MP and banker Henry Thornton reported in a letter to Prime Minister William 
Pitt ÒI am sorry to have to add that all the banks at Liverpool or all but one have 
stopped payment.Ó
163
 One major banking house, Charles Caldwell & Co., did fail. 
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 On the role of bills of exchange as a means of payment in Lancashire, see supra Part B (2).  
 
162
 D. Macpherson, quoted in PRESSNELL, supra note 23, at 23. 
  
163
 Id., quoted at 25. The letter is dated 7 March 1793. 
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 CLAPHAM, supra note 41, at 260. 
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In times of strain, only the most credible promise to pay would cover debts, and the 
value of bills was frequently in doubt. These concerns were allayed vis--vis gold 
coins and to a lesser degree, Bank of England notes. Gold coin was legal tender and 
unequivocally regarded as money. It sat at the top of Stephanie BellÕs hierarchy of 
credit and debt
165
 primarily because a collective commitment supported its value. 
Citizens agreed to accept payment in the governmentÕs promises, whether coin or 
paper notes, and in return, the government agreed to accept gold coins and Bank of 
England notes when citizens fulfilled their tax obligations. Because of this 
arrangement, the intake of tax revenue from the population supported this debt, 
making the promises to pay of the state highly creditable. Bank of England notes 
were almost as credible, supported as they were by the credit of the Bank of 
England. The Bank of EnglandÕs biggest borrower was the British government, 
meaning that, though indirectly, the tax returns of the British government 
underpinned the notes issued by the Bank. When the pressure became unbearable, 
people turned to these ÒpublicÓ promises to pay. 
  
By contrast, bills of exchange in the 1790s varied markedly in the quality of their 
underlying commitment. In times of crisis, such as 1793, almost all merchants and 
bankers who had created these bills found their resources stretched. The creditability 
of the bill depended on the promises to pay of the drawer of the bill, the acceptor, 
and all intermediary endorsers. Periods of crisis placed these promises and the bills 
they supported in doubt. 
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In the spring of 1793, the bankers and merchants of Liverpool were fully aware of 
the gravity of their situation. One of the cityÕs most prominent bankers, Heywood, 
borrowed £40,000 from the Bank of England in late March, but this sum proved 
insufficient given the magnitude of the situation.
166
 Heywood had turned to the Bank 
because his London agent lacked the resources to help. LiverpoolÕs remaining 
bankers found that they too could not rely on their London connections in these 
extreme circumstances. Recall that CaldwellÕs London agent was essentially an 
extension of the Liverpool bank based in London.
167
 This arrangement had afforded 
CaldwellÕs greater freedom to procure funding in London in good times, but it also 
meant withdrawing a potential safety net when times turned tough. By the spring of 
1793, CaldwellÕs had failed, with the effect of deepening the crisis. To avoid the 
same fate, LiverpoolÕs remaining banking houses had to find a response in the 
absence of help from the London banks. They needed radical and coordinated action. 
Conscious of the desperate predicament of the cityÕs four remaining banks, 112 
Liverpool merchants petitioned the Mayor to ask the Liverpool Corporation to 





While the Corporation entered into negotiations with the Bank of England, 
LiverpoolÕs merchants sought to modify the promises buttressing each bill of 
exchange. They did so by declaring their short-term support for the remaining banks 
via public notice, stating that, Òwe ... do mutually pledge ourselves to each other, and 
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 Hyde et al, supra note 134, at 368. 
 
167
 See supra Part C (2).  
 
168
 Hyde et al, supra note 134, at 368. 
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to the public, that we are ready and willing to receive in payment the bills of the 
several Banking Houses of this town É at One or Two monthsÕ date, as hath been 
the usual and customary practice.Ó
169
 If a lack of confidence in the promises 
supporting bills of exchange was the problem, then a temporary show of confidence 
might provide temporary relief. Shortly after this first public declaration, in a further 
public announcement the committee appointed by the Corporation to consider 
courses of action for the city declared that they,  
 
taking into consideration the difficulties that may arise in providing for the 
bills which may be returned in the present critical state of credit, DO MOST 
EARNESTLY RECOMMEND to the holders of such bills É to make the 
payments as easy to the parties who may be called upon as shall be consistent 
with prudence to themselves: And, as in many cases, Forbearance may be a 
wise measure for the interest of the public in general, and for the bill holders 
in particular, this Committee recommend as much indulgence as the exigency 
of the times and their own discretion will admit, and as may be prudent and 




The declaration encouraged everyone due payment on a bill of exchange, and not 
just merchants, to try to support the promise to pay written on the bill. The 
committee suggested Òmaking payments easyÓ and showing ÒindulgenceÓ as two 
methods of easing the strain on hard pressed debtors, as least in the short term. Of 
                                                
169
 223 merchants and firms signed the notice. The public notice, issued on 20 March 1793, is 
reproduced in JOHN HUGHES, LIVERPOOL BANKS AND BANKERS 147-8 (1906).  
 
170
 Id., 149. Hughes reproduces this later announcement (148-9), made on 25 March 1793. Emphasis 
in original.  
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course, individual creditors in Liverpool might demand payment of debts owed. But 
the consensus of the community was that sticking to the strict letter of each 
agreement would be counterproductive. Circumstances had changed and, hence, so 
too should the terms of the promises supporting the bills of exchange that served as 
the communityÕs currency. 
  
This show of community support had its limits, however, principally because each 
creditor was also a debtor. Contrary to many of the assumptions of contract law, the 
promises underpinning bills of exchange are not the product of discrete transactions 
between self-reliant individuals. To have the debtor to the contract default or 
renegotiate the terms of the agreement did not merely affect a single detached 
creditor. The impact of changing the terms of a contractual agreement was far more 
comprehensive owing to the wider ensemble of promises that comprised and made 
possible the commercial community at the heart of Liverpool. As the committee was 
aware, a party due payment on a bill could only rework the terms of payment with 
those who owed them money to an amount Òconsistent with prudence to 
themselves.Ó Each creditor was a debtor to others, and those to whom they owed 
money had to be willing to renegotiate the terms of payment. Renegotiating a debt 
usually meant postponing payment. During the spring of 1793, few had faith in the 
capacity of others to pay what they owed at any point in the near future, and that 
made it difficult to convince widely dispersed and now risk-averse creditors to place 
the repayment of debts on hold.  
 
An alternative was to find someone else to bear the risk. If a creditor agreed to allow 
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a debtor an extra thirty days to pay the sum owed on the bill, the creditor ran the risk 
that in thirty days the debtor would still lack the funds to make the payment. But 
what if the debtor borrowed gold coin from some other party? The debtor could then 
use the coins to pay the debt owed to the first creditor. The challenge in this scenario 
was persuading the lender to agree to make the loan, a difficult task given that the 
security on offer was no better than that offered to the original creditor. For that 
reason, in the spring of 1793, those with gold coins hoarded them because they 
believed, probably correctly, that no safe investments existed. Their best strategy 
was to hold onto the gold coin that everyone else wanted.  
  
There was still another possibility, however. If individual debtors could not be 
trusted, a better alternative was an entity representing the community as a whole. 
While it was a challenge to anticipate which individuals owing money on bills of 
exchange were likely to make good on their promises to pay, and, consequently, 
almost impossible to get a coordinated response while each creditor negotiated 
separately with each debtor, some creditors would receive payment at some point in 
the future. A portion of the community would then be able to meet their tax 
obligations, meaning that a fund of money existed that belonged to the community 
as a whole and was independent of each individual creditor and debtor. It was the 
guarantee of these tax receipts that the Liverpool Corporation, acting on behalf of 
the community as a whole, prepared to offer the Bank of England as security for a 
loan in the spring of 1793.  
  
The Bank of England refused to help, however. Recall that the events of 1793 
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affected the whole of Britain.
171
 It was to the Bank of England, after exhausting the 
assistance of his London agent, that every banker turned. As a result, the Bank was 
unable, or perhaps just unwilling, to offer sufficient assistance to all who came 
calling. The government was next in line as a potential source of cash but, probably 
due to the size of the credit expansion in Liverpool before 1793, the relief that 




When negotiations broke down between the Bank of England and the city of 
Liverpool, the city considered a bold alternative remedy. In the same way that the 
tax base of Britain supported the value of the governmentÕs promises to pay, the city 
of Liverpool struck on the idea of using the more limited, but quite substantial, tax 
receipts of the city of Liverpool to underpin an issue of paper money. Rather than 
using the cityÕs tax base to guarantee a Bank of England loan, these same tax 
receipts could support the circulation of the CorporationÕs own paper currency. What 
the British state could do on a large scale, the city of Liverpool could replicate 
locally.  
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 See CLAPHAM, supra note 41, at 260-61. 
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 Hyde et al, supra note 134, at 372.  The statute authorizing the issue of Exchequer Bills was 33 
Geo. III c. 29 (1793) [Exchequer Bills Act]. To help bankers and others in the grip of commercial 
crisis, the government issued £5 million in Exchequer Bills in denominations of £100, £50, and £20. 
Exchequer Bills were government promises to pay bearing interest, in this instance 3 ! %. The 
government lent the Exchequer Bills to approved bankers, merchants, and manufacturers at a rate of 
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etc who borrowed the Exchequer Bills did not want to hold the bills as an investment since they were 
paying a higher rate to the government than the government was paying on the Exchequer Bills. 
Rather, those borrowing the Exchequer Bills hoped that these bills would serve as a substitute for 
gold coin and Bank of England notes given that Exchequer Bills also had the backing of the 
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section, was essentially the same as the governmentÕs scheme using Exchequer Bills, with the 
difference than in Liverpool the issue of paper notes was a local rather than national initiative. On the 
government issue of Exchequer Bills in 1793, see FEAVERYEAR, supra note 40, at 178; and 
CLAPHAM, supra note 41, at 264-5.  
 




An anonymous contribution in the local Advertiser newspaper first mooted the idea 
while negotiations continued with the Bank of England.
173
 With the prospect of a 
Bank of England loan dead in the water, but the collapse of credit still real, the 
Mayor of Liverpool petitioned Parliament for an act authorizing the Liverpool 
Corporation to issue negotiable notes up to a fixed amount. The Liverpool Note 
Issue Act
174
 passed with speed, perhaps indicating the influence held by LiverpoolÕs 
commercial elite at the time.
175
     
  
With the requisite permission in place, the scheme worked as follows.
176
 The Act 
empowered the Corporation to issue notes of £100 and £50 with interest not 
exceeding the lawful rate (5% in 1793), redeemable 12 months after issue in return 
Òfor value received and other due security.Ó The Corporation could issue notes for 
two years, from 25 May 1793 onwards, with the option of an extension. Moreover, it 
was permissible for the Corporation to issue non-interest bearing notes of £10 and 
£5 on adequate security. However, the redemption of these notes was only possible 
three years after issue. Furthermore, the Act granted the Corporation the power to 
convert interest-bearing notes into those not bearing interest. The total note issue 
was not to exceed £300,000.    
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 HUGHES, supra note 169, at 149. 
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 33 Geo. III c. 31 (1793) [Liverpool Note Issue Act]. 
175




 The description of how the CorporationÕs note issue worked draws on Hyde et al, supra note 134, 
at 369-70. 
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The Act tasked a Loan Office with determining who was eligible for assistance. A 
separate committee saw to the day-to-day business of the note issue. Adequate 
security included 2/3 of the value of goods, wares, and merchandise. The Loan 
Office might also consider bills of exchange of no longer than nine months until 
maturity. The Act, however, placed restrictions on the use of real estate as security. 
In addition, no one was to receive a loan of more than £3,000. In an effort to give the 
notes a wider circulation, the Corporation appointed the banking firm Joseph 




The idea was that merchants and bankers, presently unable to discount or receive 
payment for bills and/or goods in their possession could use these bills and goods as 
security to obtain a loan from the Corporation. The Corporation would make the 
loan by issuing paper money either in £100 and £50 notes bearing interest, or in 
smaller denominations of £10 and £5 not bearing interest. The hope was that these 
notes might then circulate, and in the process provide a means of fulfilling debts. 
The key to the appeal of the notes was that at a set date in the future the holder could 
present them to the Corporation to be redeemed for their value in legal tender 
currency. By the time the note holder could redeem the note, the Corporation 
anticipated that those who had borrowed the notes in the first place would have re-
paid their debt in legal tender coins, plus interest if applicable. Assuming the 
repayment of these debts, the Corporation would have the funds available to redeem 
the notes without suffering any loss. If those who had borrowed failed to repay the 
                                                
177
 Joseph Denison & Co.Õs job was to offer the services typically performed for a country 
correspondent by their London banker, see supra Section C (1). Having a London agent made the 
notes convertible into gold coin or Bank of England notes in London, thereby giving the notes a 
wider circulation.  
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loan, and if the security offered, in many instances bills of exchange, turned out to 
be worthless, the notes could still be redeemed using the CorporationÕs tax income. 




Supplementing both the pledge by the merchants of Liverpool that they would 
accept in payment bills bearing the name of the remaining Liverpool bankers, and 
the request that all residents of Liverpool show restraint when demanding the 
payment of debts, was another commitment. This further commitment saw the 
Liverpool Corporation promise to underwrite the obligations of those merchants and 
bankers to whom it issued loans. For the Corporation to achieve its goal of relieving 
the commercial distress affecting Liverpool, it needed a reciprocal commitment from 
the inhabitants of Liverpool. The Corporation made clear in a public announcement 
to the ÒMerchants and Inhabitants of LiverpoolÓ (28 May 1793), Òthe remedy in a 
considerable degree is now within your powers, and that is by receiving the notes to 
be issued in discharge of all your simple contract debts.Ó
179
 The Corporation knew 
that if the majority of the population of Liverpool refused to accept the notes in 
payment of debts, the scheme would collapse. That the notes had the backing of the 
tax revenues of the city ought to have helped install confidence, but to get the 
initiative moving the Corporation also hoped that each member of the community 
would inspire confidence in all of the other members,  
 
that you may inspire each other with confidence in this respect, it is 
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 HUGHES, supra note 169, at 152-3 reproduces an overview of the revenues of the Liverpool 




 HUGHES, supra note 169, at 154 reproduces this public announcement. 
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recommended that you signify your ascent to do so [i.e. accept the notes in 
fulfilment of debts] publicly and without reserve. It has been suggested that 
this intention will be most easily collected by signing your acquiescence at Mr 




Once enough people displayed their confidence in the notes, and therefore in the 
future financial health of the Corporation, the Corporation hoped that the notes 
would become generally acceptable, and the crisis, in Liverpool at least, would ease.  
  
Such an innovative approach to dealing with commercial distress was not without its 
problems. For instance, in June 1793, with the crisis at what turned out to be its 
peak, the Corporation agreed to broaden the type of security acceptable to the Loan 
Office.
181
 Forty-five commercial firms, including the cityÕs banks, received 
assistance, with two of these firms obtaining more than £5,000. Many smaller firms 
operating in the cotton industry found it hardest to get help from the Loan Office, 
and often had to make more than one application. Those who had difficulty finding 
adequate security were the hardest hit.
182
 Yet given the repayment of all of the loans 
made by the Corporation, many earlier than agreed, and the general alleviation of the 
commercial strain affecting the economy of Liverpool, the scheme was largely a 
success. 
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182
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When the commercial distress of 1793 first hit Liverpool, the initial response of the 
cityÕs merchants and bankers was to turn to their connections in London. With most 
debtors in danger of default, there was a general shift away from the bills 
representing the debts of merchants towards gold coins and Bank of England notes 
that had the backing, even if indirectly, of the state. But this high demand for gold 
coin and Bank of England notes made it difficult to obtain them, even more so under 




When the people of Liverpool responded to the commercial distress of 1793 the 
contractual relations underpinning money came to the fore. Yet these contractual 
relations did not follow from discrete transactions between autonomous, self-reliant 
individuals, and they did not result in fixed, inflexible agreements. In fact, the 
importance of re-working the agreement behind each bill of exchange was a key 
response to the crisis advocated by, not just the cityÕs merchants, but the community 
as a whole. Significantly, however, the people of Liverpool also understood 
contractual renegotiation as only a partial response. The problem was that in a 
climate of commercial uncertainty, the promises supporting the debts under 
renegotiation could not be, under the circumstances, rationally considered credible. 
Given the difficulty, perhaps impossibility, of obtaining gold coin or Bank of 
England notes, there existed barely any credible promises. 
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 Under a gold standard monetary regime, all paper money is convertible into gold coin on demand. 
Limiting the amount of paper money is the amount of gold coin that the paper money issuer can 
access. During a crisis, when gold coin was in high demand, the Bank of England faced a dilemma. If 
it issued more of its own notes, it increased the amount of notes in circulation at a time when its 
reserve of gold coin was declining. It hence placed at risk its commitment to convert all paper notes 
into gold coin on demand. Yet if the Bank of England opted not to issue more of its notes, it risked 
making the crisis worse by depriving merchants, bankers, and others of a credible means of payment. 
This dissertation explores the dilemmas faced by the Bank of England under a gold standard in 
Chapter III. 




The solution utilized by Liverpool focused on an alternative source of public 
authority. Later this chapter explores many communities across England and Wales 
that turned to the most prominent members of their local landowning gentry in times 
of financial and banking distress, benefitting thereby from the sense of responsibility 
many of the gentry felt towards the wider community. In Liverpool, however, that 
option was not up for consideration. Liverpool, as a commercial port, sat outside the 
gentryÕs sphere of influence,
184
 but that did not result in a power vacuum. In the 
absence of the landowning gentry, and their sense of noblesse oblige, the cityÕs 
politics was dominated by a powerful commercial oligarchy that controlled the cityÕs 
Corporation.
185
 Consequently, when access to money with the guarantee of the 
British state was not forthcoming, the city of Liverpool turned to the collective 
promise of the community to pay their taxes. It was that promise Ð institutionalized 
in the form of the Liverpool Corporation and buttressed by the willingness of the 
community to use the new money Ð that created a substitute source of public backing 
and provided the circulating medium of Liverpool with the credibility needed to 
weather the crisis. 
  
2. BankersÕ notes in Newcastle during the crisis of 1793 
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 In the late eighteenth century, Liverpool had strong ties to the Atlantic economy. Yet its economy, 
and that of its hinterland, was also more diverse than the phrase Òcommercial portÓ suggests. See 
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The crisis of 1793 spread across Britain, undermining bills of exchange in Liverpool 
and country bankersÕ notes elsewhere. This section turns to events in Newcastle, in 
the northeast of England, and the ways the regions commercial and landowning elite 




The challenge facing bankers in Newcastle in the spring of 1793 was that of 
remaining faithful to the promise to convert their notes into gold coin on demand. 
The bankers found it difficult to fulfil their obligations, partly because of the 
difficulties experienced by local traders and industrialists. These traders and 
industrialists had borrowed from the banks, but owing to the state of the economy 
now found it an onerous commitment to repay these loans. With confidence low, 
people holding country bankersÕ notes and bills of exchange wanted to convert into 
money with government backing, such as gold coin. The holders of country bankersÕ 
notes could obtain gold coin by cashing in these notes. Yet if they all tried to do so 
as at the same time, the banker lacked the reserves to honour his commitment.  
 
If NewcastleÕs bankers relied exclusively on their own reserves, each banker was 
unable to cover his obligations. If each note holder thought only of their own claim 
to gold coin, most note holders risked finding themselves with only worthless pieces 
of paper. If the bankers and note holders in Newcastle had been self-reliant, self-
interested strangers, the banks would have collapsed, and most note holders would 
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 The account of the response in Newcastle and the northeast of England to the events of 1793 
draws on MABERLY PHILLIPS, A HISTORY OF BANKS, BANKERS AND BANKING IN NORTHUMBERLAND, 
DURHAM AND NORTH YORKSHIRE (1894). 
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have held nothing more than a country Òrag.Ó But the country bankersÕ notes that 
circulated in Newcastle were not the result of promises between self-reliant, self-
interested bankers and self-reliant, self-interested strangers. Instead, ties of 
reciprocity bound the banker to his community and the community to their banker. 
Although formally each note holder could claim gold coin on demand in exchange 
for the note, making such a claim would precipitate the collapse of the bank and the 
communityÕs means of exchange. Supporting the notes issued by NewcastleÕs 
bankers called, accordingly, for a collective response that drew on the strength of the 
local community.  
 
The strain experienced by the bankers resulted in a public meeting in April that led 
to declarations of support for the banks and, as was also the case in Liverpool, led to 
the appointment by the city of a committee set with the task of exploring the options 
open to the town and region. The committeeÕs report established the outstanding 
note circulation of the four banks at £230,000.
187
 The banks were solvent, 
however.
188
 Their problem was one of confidence and a shortage of gold coin. 
Getting hold of the latter was difficult due to the distance from London, and the 
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 The committee established in Newcastle closely resembled the alternative to bankruptcy 
frequently pursued by creditors during times when they believed debtors were only temporarily 
unable to meet their obligations (see supra note 140). During such moments, a debtor would convince 
his creditors that he was solvent, generally by allowing the creditors to inspect his books, as happened 
here. The creditor then issued the debtor with a letter of license, and retained the power to continue to 
inspect the debtorÕs transactions through a deed of inspection. Although I cannot show that a letter of 
license and deed of inspection were formally issued here, we do know that the committee allowed the 
Newcastle bankers to continue on the assumption that the banks were most likely solvent in the long 
run. The committee appointed by the city also continued to monitor the banks closely for the rest of 
1793. My guess is that this process of inspection, license, and ongoing supervision, which was 
perhaps the most common means of dealing with temporarily insolvent debtors during the period, was 
the institutional mechanism resorted to most often by communities when their bankers were on the 
verge of collapse. As this chapter explores later, other instances of community support for insolvent 
bankers resemble in many respects the response in Newcastle, and hence contain elements similar to 
this process of inspection, license, and ongoing supervision.   
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expense and dangers of transportation in volatile times.
189
 As was the case in 
Liverpool, restoring confidence in the short-term was possible through a declaration 
of support made at the public meeting.
190
 The pledges of support made at the public 
meeting meant that the majority of the community had opted not to exercise their 
right obliging the banker to fulfil the promise on the note. But, as in Liverpool, a 
public pledge to accept but not cash the notes said nothing about the longer-term 
viability of the bankerÕs obligation to honour their promise on the note.  
 
The committeeÕs search for a solution in Newcastle had to deal with the same 
underlying problem faced by Liverpool Ð long-term uncertainty. In addition, the 
proposed remedy in Newcastle had to give due regard to the nature of the local 
economy in the northeast of England. Whereas Liverpool was an expanding port 
with a population of about 60,000, second only to London, Newcastle was around 
half that size. Owing to LiverpoolÕs role as a linkage point between English and 
Welsh manufacturing centres and the Atlantic trade, bills of exchange served as the 
main source of credit, and as a prominent means of payment. Bills of exchange were 
not absent in Newcastle, but country bankersÕ notes tended to serve as the means of 
payment. Newcastle was a significant east coast port and due to mining and shipping 
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 PHILLIPS, supra note 186, at 45 provides an example taken from a York newspaper illustrating the 
dangers of travelling between London and towns further north, 
 
1782, Aug. 10.ÑAn attack on one of the York diligences was perpetrated on Finchley Common 
about dusk. The villains robbed the coach and passengers of everything valuable. They had 
two carts at hand in which they deliberately deposited the stolen property and went oft 
unmolested. 
1790, Feb 1.ÑThe York and Newcastle coach with a guard all the way and carrying five 
inside passengers, sets out from York Tavern, the George, and the Black Swan Inns alternately 
every morning at 6 o'clock. This coach meets at the above places the Highflyer and Paul Jones 
post coaches, carrying six inside passengers with a guard all the way and sets out from York 
every morning at 5 o'clock for London. Fares, Newcastle to York, inside £1 4s., outside 12s ; 
York to London, inside £2 10s., outside £1 53. 
 
190
 PHILLIPS, supra note 186, lists those who made the pledge of support at 49. 
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had some manufacturing. But the city was also closely connected to the agricultural 
economy of the northeast and to the neighbouring towns of Sunderland and Durham. 
Consequently, social prestige and influence in Newcastle and the northeast of 
England was a mixture of elements drawn from both a growing commercial elite and 
long established landowners from the peerage and gentry.
191




 on how to support the credit of NewcastleÕs bankers 
reflected in its proposals the situation faced by Newcastle.  
 
 É we suggest the propriety of all, who are any way connected with the landed 
or Commercial interests of this town, and the adjoining counties, entering into 
a guarantee for the space of twelve months, securing to the holders of the 
notes of these Banks, the full sums due upon them. It is our idea that every 
gentleman should name the sum for which he will be answerable, and that 
proper persons should be authorized to call for the sums subscribed, or any 





The report concluded with the signatures of 148 local gentlemen and merchants, 
who each added a figure after their name. The figure was the sum each person 
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signing the declaration was willing to contribute to the guarantee fund. The sums 
varied from £500 to £20,000. The citizens of the nearby town of South Shields 
offered £60,500. The total raised was £320,000, £90,000 more than the city needed 
to cover the note issue of its four banks.
194
 The towns of Gateshead, Sunderland, and 
Durham all held their own public meetings, making further pledges of support to the 
Newcastle bankers. The Newcastle committee continued to make public 
announcements each week on the state of the four banks. By late April, they reported 
that the guarantee fund had risen to £490,600.
195
   
  
A municipal note issue in Newcastle would have added more notes on top of the 
£230,000 already in circulation. In the spring of 1793, the citizens of Newcastle and 
the northeast of England were not necessarily looking for more notes. Instead, they 
needed a guarantee that the notes they held would retain their value. While doubts 
over the future viability of the cityÕs bankers persisted, the value of each bankÕs note 
issue was questionable. The solution was to guarantee that each note remained 
payable in gold regardless of the fate of the banks.   
  
In contrast to Liverpool, where the tax revenue of the city supported the promise on 
the notes, the approach in Newcastle was to call on individuals to pledge voluntarily 
sums to a guarantee fund. Newcastle was a smaller city than Liverpool in the 1790s, 
so perhaps the Corporation of Newcastle lacked the revenue stream or the political 
will from influential figures from the Corporation to cover such a large level of debt 
with confidence. Regardless, a public promise on the part of those local citizens of 
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known or perceived wealth, both merchants and gentry, guaranteeing the promise on 
each note should any of the banks fail, served the same purpose. It used the wealth 
of the community to underwrite the commitments of the cityÕs bankers, wealth that 




The solutions adopted in Newcastle and Liverpool differed in their specifics owing 
to the presence of country bankersÕ notes in the former and bills in the latter. Despite 
this difference, both examples illustrate that money ultimately depends on public 
commitment for its success. These public commitments saw the resources of the 
community, especially prominent members of the local elite, used to underwrite the 
local currency. Moreover, such commitments serve as examples of contractual 
arrangements that expose the inadequacy of the conventional assumptions belying 
traditional accounts of contract. Country bankersÕ notes and bills of exchange were 
not the products of promises following from discrete transactions between self-
reliant autonomous bankers and note holders. Instead, they depended on community 
conventions that looked upon contracts as settlements open to renegotiation rather 
than fixed agreements. When the communities of Newcastle and Liverpool 
responded collectively to the potential losses that economic crisis threatened, they 
drew on local sources of influence, prestige, and convention to inspire institutional 
innovations that compensated for the absence of one source of public backing Ð the 
tax intake of the British state Ð by bringing forth an alternative form of public 
support.   
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 It seems plausible that because Liverpool was a port the Corporation could tax all of the trade 
going through the city, adding to its revenue. Newcastle was likewise a trading city, but it was also 
located in a prominent agricultural region. That would have led to less revenue ending up in its 
Corporation and more staying in the land, i.e. with the gentry, who played such a prominent role 
when assisting NewcastleÕs bankers.  




To the extent that their responses differed, the key distinguishing feature was the 
composition of the local elite. Merchants and traders in Liverpool drew their stature 
from overseas trade, while the influence of the gentry in Newcastle stemmed from 
the agricultural estates in the northeast, though NewcastleÕs own merchant elite was 
also significant. Both communities successfully institutionalized the collective 
commitments that made their local currencies credible. Others across England and 
Wales were less fortunate, prompting, eventually, the legislative reforms that this 
dissertation turns to in Chapter III.  
 
3. Communities supporting their bankers, 1797-1825 
 
Not all communities across England and Wales rescued their banks from imminent 
collapse with the success of Liverpool and Newcastle. It was not rare, however, to 
find other similar successes, spearheaded by a local merchant elite, and/or by the 
local gentry, most often by a combination of the two.197 Collective action initiated by 
communities in support of their local banker became increasingly necessary with the 
commencement of the Napoleonic Wars, particularly following the suspension of 
convertibility.  It is to these examples of collective action that this chapter now turns. 
 
 In 1797, owing to the commencement of hostilities with France, Parliament 
suspended the obligation requiring the Bank of England to convert its notes into gold 
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 References to this phenomenon in contemporary pamphlets include, ANON., A LETTER TO PEEL ON 
THE ISSUES OF COUNTRY BANKERS 13-14 (1819). Other pamphlets recognized the public, though 
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 Left unclear by the legislation freeing the Bank of England from 
this obligation was whether it also applied to country bankers. The courts were given 
an opportunity to resolve this uncertainty in 1801 when a Mr Grigsby presented for 
payment in gold coin one of the notes issued by a banker, Oakes & Co., in Bury St 
Edmunds. The banker refused to pay in gold coin, citing the legislation of 1797 
suspending convertibility. Grigsby responded to the bankerÕs refusal by taking the 
matter to court. Both at the local level and on appeal before the Court of Common 
Pleas, the court sided with Grigsby.
199
 Although the legislation of 1797 suspended 
the Bank of EnglandÕs obligation to convert its notes into gold coin on demand, it 
said nothing about the obligations of country bankers. The Court of Common Pleas 
interpreted this silence as an indication that the legislation did not apply to country 
bankers, and hence, the banker from Bury St Edmunds was obliged to convert his 
notes into gold coin on demand.   
 
Despite siding with Grigsby, the judgment of the Court of Commons Pleas was not 
entirely sympathetic to his argument. The judgment explained that,  
 
... with respect to individuals, it [the legislation of 1797] was not intended to 
prevent any creditor who should be so disposed from captiously demanding a 
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payment in money, though such a creditor is deprived of the benefit of 
arresting his debtor. Thank God few such creditors as the present Plaintiff 
have been found since the passing of the Act! But yet, whatever inconvenience 
may arise, and to whatever length they may go, Parliament and not this Court 




Grigsby was entitled to demand gold coin in exchange for country bankersÕ notes 
because the court felt unable to apply the legislation of 1797 to country bankers. 
Nevertheless, the court considered GrigsbyÕs actions Òcaptious.Ó By demanding gold 
coin, Grigsby pointed to a fault or defect with the 1797 legislation, but in doing so, 
he only added to the already difficult situation facing country bankers, a point 
recognized by the court when it added with emphasis, ÒThank God few such 
creditors as the present Plaintiff have been found since the passing of the Act!Ó In 
the difficult commercial climate brought about by the war with France, the 
credibility of country bankers and their notes was hard to sustain if too many 
individuals like Grigsby exercised their formal legal right to demanded payment in 
gold coin. Without access to the Bank of England, too many such demands Ð a run 
on the bank Ð would leave the banker bankrupt.  What bankers needed instead was 
the support rather than captiousness of their local community. They were fortunate, 
as the court was pleased to note, that since the passing of the 1797 Act, they had 
found an abundance of the former and little of the latter.  
 
In 1797, the threat of invasion hung in the air, and public meetings took place across 
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England, where communities made declarations of public support for beleaguered 
local bankers. In the northeast of England, the residents of Newcastle again passed a 
resolution, this time declaring, ÒThat we whose names are hereunto subscribed will 
receive the notes of All the Banks here, in Payment as usual.Ó
201
 The document 
contained the signatures of many prominent local merchants. Meetings in 
Sunderland, Durham, South Shields, and Berwick followed with the same result. In 
the Midlands, at Banbury, a meeting in the town hall led to declarations of support 
not only for the local banks, but also for the Bank of England, with the town 
inhabitants promising to Òtake in payment from both banking houses in Banbury not 
only the notes of the Bank of England but also the notes of both banking houses; the 
general concern of the said houses being in situations of the greatest 
respectability.Ó
202
 While in the southwest, the Mayor of Bristol called a meeting 
attended by seventy leading citizens, including the most prominent bankers, where it 
was resolved unanimously that  
 
In order to prevent any inconvenience that may result to the community, and to 
preserve public confidence in this emergency, we will accept, and we earnestly 
recommend our fellow citizens to take payment in, the promissory notes of the 
several Bankers in the city in lieu of cash: and we recommend to the several 
Bankers that they do not make any payments in specie, or demand specie for 
any bills in their hands from any person who shall tender Bristol or Bank of 
England notes to the amount of such bills: and this resolution shall be in force 
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By demanding payment in gold coin, Grigsby was doing exactly the opposite of 
what those behind the declarations in Newcastle, Banbury, and Bristol asked of note 
holders. In earlier sections of this chapter, we saw the same plea in Liverpool and 
Newcastle in 1793, when the authorities asked creditors to show forbearance by not 
demanding the payment of all debts owed. Grigsby, by contrast, ignored pleas of this 
sort; he had a right to gold coin and was not interested in placing the execution of 
this right on hold. And to an extent he or any other holder of a country bankersÕ note 
was rational to do so. If they held the note upon the failure of the banker, they held 
only the ÒragÓ of a Òcountry merchant.Ó
204
  Yet if everyone did what was in his or 
her own individual self-interest, and all did so at the same time, some would get gold 
coin while many others would not. Yet even those who converted the country 
bankerÕs notes into gold coin before the banker ran out of gold coin would lose out 
owing to the collapse of the local currency. Without a medium of exchange, the 
community as a whole suffered, including people like Grigsby.  
 
Creditors like Grigsby were relatively rare, however. It should not be surprising that 
it is difficult to find other cases brought by individuals demanding payment in gold 
coin, despite the formal legal obligation requiring that country bankers stand ready 
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present the note to the banker for payment within a Òreasonable time.Ó See supra note 159. 





 because currency cannot prosper if people behave as if they live in a 
self-reliant, autonomous void. Currency prospers when people find ways of 
collectively acting together to support it. To make their local currency viable during 
the first three decades of the nineteenth century, communities rallied round their 
banker by collectively choosing not to exercise their formal legal entitlement to have 
the note converted. These collective acts of forbearance were only possible provided 
the members of each community maintained the collective ties that bound that 
community together. They had to cooperate rather than pursue self-interest alone; 
and they had to allocate losses collectively rather than leave each individual to fend 
for themselves. When people think of each other as discrete and self-reliant 
individuals, they will struggle to sustain a local currency. Conversely, in the early 
nineteenth century, local currencies prospered in adverse circumstances where the 
local community drew on a code of behaviour that stressed the collective ties 
binding its members together.  
 
When one banker failed, the community often had to act, regardless of their attitude 
towards the failed banker, because the collapse of one banker posed a threat to other 
bankers in the area. Consider events in Halifax, West Yorkshire, where in 1803 both 
of the townÕs banks, SwaineÕs and InghamÕs, experienced a run at the same time. 
One hundred and fifty local manufacturers and traders (towns in Yorkshire were 
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the decision seemed to open the door for every creditor to demand payment in specie. In view 
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closer to Liverpool in having strong mercantile elites) put their names to a public 
document declaring their willingness to accept the notes of the two banks in 
payment.
206
 By 1807, however, another panic brought together the creditors of 
SwaineÕs who decided it was best to wind up the banking house. Yet if it was 
reasonable to doubt the solvency of SwaineÕs bank, was it likely that InghamÕs 
finances were any more solid? Many felt that InghamÕs deserved their confidence, 
and made their opinion known publicly via advertisements in the local newspaper, 
the Halifax Journal, declaring, for instance, that ÒRobert Fell of Skipton will give 
cash, or bank paper for Messrs. InghamÕs Halifax Notes É.Ó
207
 A further notice then 
appeared in the same paper, and reappeared weekly for two months, stating ÒTo the 
Public. Messrs. InghamÕs Notes will be taken in payment of Calicos by Mr. Dyson, 
North Bridge Mills, Halifax.Ó Other advertisements in the paper, such as for the sale 




There was a similar response in Exeter, Devonshire, in the summer of 1810 
following the collapse of the Western Bank.
209
 At a public meeting, five hundred 
prominent citizens pledged their support to the four remaining banks. The following 
day, the front pages of the two local newspapers, the WoolmerÕs Gazette and the 
Flying Post, printed these five hundred names, each name confirming Òreliance and 
confidence in the above-mentioned banks which they so amply merit.Ó Doing so 
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guaranteed the credit of the remaining banks in the wake of the collapse of the 
Western.
210
 There was a similar response in Darlington, in the county of Durham, in 
1815. When Mowbrey, Hollingsworth and Co. stopped payment, the townÕs citizens 
came together and expressed publicly their support for Backhouse Bank.
211
 The 
document contained the names of the most influential men in the region, particularly 
local gentry, who rallied behind the bank partly thanks to the actions of men like Mr. 
Ord and Mr. Thornton,  
 
[Mr. Ord], at this time Ð 1815 Ð banked with Messrs. Backhouse, in whom he 
had the greatest of confidence in every respect. In proof of which he mounted 
horse and, accompanied by a neighbour, Mr. Robert Thornton, called upon 
every influential gentlemen in the district, obtaining in every instance a 
signature to a Declaration of Confidence in the Banking House of Jonathan 
Backhouse ÉEarly next morning (being the market day) É [Mr. Ord] É rode 
into Darlington and there beheld large posters having printed upon them the 
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211
 The Declaration of Confidence reads as follows:  
 
A report having been industriously circulated that Messrs. Jonathan Backhouse and Co., 
Bankers, Darlington, have been under the necessity of suspending their payment for a short 
time, the friends of the Bank have great pleasure in assuring the public that there was not the 
least foundation for such a report, as Messrs. Backhouse and Co. have had no occasion 
whatever, either before or since the failure of Messrs. Mowbrey and Co., to suspend their 
payment for a single moment, and it appears but justice to the community at large that they 
should be informed that the commercial and agricultural interests of Darlington, and its 
neighbourhood, have unanimously come forward to testified their approbation and support for 
Messrs. Backhouse and Co., and that the utmost confidence is reposed in them, a confidence 
justly merited by the substantial manner in which they have uniformly and uninterruptedly 
carried their business for forty years. 
 Having the most perfect confidence in the stability and security of the Bank of Messrs. 
Jonathan Backhouse and Co., a confidence fully justified by the substantial manner in which 
they have carried on business uninterruptedly for the space of forty years, we, the 
undersigned, of the agricultural interest, think it due to them to publicly state that it is our 
determination to receive their notes in payment to any amount as usual (Darlington, 24 
July1815).  
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Many believed they owed something to their banks. As noted earlier, with the spread 
of panic across the northeast of England in 1816 to include Newcastle, a letter in the 
Newcastle Courant made an argument in support of the banks in the following 
terms, ÒThat we may receive credit from them [the bankers], let us give credit to 
them, and then mutual confidence É will be once more re-established ....Ó
213
 Many 
shopkeepers thereafter responded to the plight of the banks by declaring, ÒThe Notes 
of all the Banks in Newcastle will be taken here.Ó 
 
No banker could take such declarations of support for granted since the decision 
whether or not to support a banker was a gift from the bankÕs creditors, including the 
local community who used the country bankerÕs notes. During the crisis of 1825, the 
citizens of Bath held a meeting where they expressed their confidence in three town 
banks. There was no mention, however, in the declaration of Messrs. Cavenagh, 
Browne, Bayley and Browne who thereafter collapsed.
214
 And, on occasions, it was 
felt that liquidation was the best option for all concerned, as was the case with 
SwaineÕs bank in Halifax in 1807, and the East Grinstead Bank in Sussex in 1816. 
The latterÕs creditors appointed a committee of local gentlemen to oversee the 
liquidation process. It was not easy to call in all of the debts owed to the bank. In 
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particular, local landowners had borrowed from the bank, though some loans had 
gone to men of little means, such as the labourer William Hills, who had borrowed 
£50. He was now unable to pay this debt. The local parish stepped in by offering the 
trustees £10 for the value of the debt, which was accepted.
215
   
 
By the 1820s, country bankersÕ notes remained formally convertible into gold coin 
on demand, though there were indications that much of the public believed that they 
were not. For instance, in 1825 Mr Fredrick Jones walked into the Castle Bank at 
Bristol and demanded gold coin in exchange for £6 of the bankÕs own notes. The 
Castle Bank refused, just as Oakes and Co. had refused to meet GrigsbyÕs demand 
24 years earlier. The Castle Bank cited the legislation leading to the resumption of 
convertibility in 1821 that referred only to the Bank of England.
216
 According to 
their understanding, they were obliged to convert their notes into Bank of England 
notes, as they had offered to do for Jones, but the law only required the Bank of 
England to convert its notes into gold coin.  
 
The problem for the Castle Bank was that no Act of Parliament had ever suspended 
the requirement that country bankersÕ convert their notes into gold coin on demand. 
The statute suspending convertibility in 1797 applied only to the Bank of England 
and its notes, a point emphasized by the court in Grigsby v Oakes. Similarly, the 
statute re-establishing convertibility in 1821 referred only to the Bank of England. It 
did not need to refer to country banks because the suspension of convertibility had 
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not applied to them in the first place. Subsequent legislation dealing with the affairs 
of country bankers, such as that allowing country bankers to continue issuing small 
denomination notes,
217
 did not refer to convertibility. Against this legislative 
background and with the help of prominent public figures, Jones submitted a petition 
to Parliament asking for clarity over the convertibility of country bankersÕ notes. 
Parliamentarians responded to the petition by making clear that the notes of country 




Perhaps we might explain this episode involving Mr Jones and the Castle Bank of 
Bristol as a product of the confusion that followed the resumption of convertibility. 
After more than twenty years of inconvertible Bank of England notes followed by a 
complex timeline aimed at restoring convertibility, it seems plausible that many 
people may not have been aware of the formal position with respect to the 
convertibility of different types of notes. Perhaps that interpretation is too generous 
to the Castle Bank however. The bankÕs proprietors might have thought they could 
get away with refusing to convert their banks notes into gold coin, working under 
the assumption that few note holders would go to the trouble of bringing the matter 
to court, or exposing it to the public by petitioning Parliament.
219
 In Jones, however, 
they found one of the few note holders who was prepared to go to the trouble, aided 
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by relatively influential allies who were no friends of country bankers.
220
 Both of 
these interpretations are plausible, but so is a third. The third interpretation is that 
country bankers grew accustomed to not having to pay out in gold coin upon the 
presentation of the notes they had issued. When trade was buoyant, confidence in the 
future was high and extended to country bankersÕ notes. Yet even when such 
confidence vanished, country bankers notesÕ retained their value in those areas 
where the community collectively pledged to support the banker and his note issue. 
As a result of such declarations of support, the community opted to forego their right 
to demand gold coin and eased the pressure on their local banker. So widespread 
where these declarations of support from the 1790s until the 1820s that, I would like 
to suggest, the formal legal position Ð that country bankerÕs notes were convertible 
into gold coin on demand Ð drifted into the background. In fact, it drifted so far into 
the background that many country bankers could ignore the formal convertibility of 
their notes altogether, because they knew that few within the local community were 
prepared to exercise this formal right.      
 
Even after Parliament reminded the holders of country bankersÕ notes in 1825 that 
these notes were convertible into gold coin on demand, it remained a common 
practice during the crisis of 1825-26 for local communities to issue public 
declarations in support of their local banker.
221
 Despite the resumption of 
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convertibility in 1821, during this crisis, 73 banks across England collapsed. As far 
as banking crises go, it was Òone of the most violent of the centuryÓ
222
 and brought 
the English economy to Òwithin twenty-four hours of barter.Ó
223
 Local communities 
set in motion the by now customary range of responses. Bankers first looked to their 
agent in London, as the house at Banbury had done. Gibbins, Gillett & Tawney, 
despite their vigorous efforts, proved unsuccessful, however.
224
 When it was no 
longer possible to secure gold coin and Bank of England notes, two options 
remained for country bankers across England and Wales. On the one hand, there was 
bankruptcy. On the other, they looked to their local community for support. The 
Banbury Bank was fortunate to benefit from the latter. Local shops displayed notices 
in their windows declaring their willingness to take the bankÕs notes.
225
 And on 28 
December, the townÕs tradesmen, as well as many of the local gentry and lawyers, 
delivered a Statement of Confidence to the Oxford Journal for publication. It read, 
 
   We the undersigned, Creditors of Messrs. Gibbins, Gillett & Tawney, have 
this day examined a statement of their affairs; from which it appears to us that 
they have effects belonging to the concern, without resorting to the property of 
either of the parties, not only equal to answer all demands upon it, but to leave 
a very considerable surplus.  
                                                                                                                                    
originally issued the note (the bankerÕs agent in London taking responsibility for payment in 
London). During a crisis, declarations of support aimed to reassure all of the bankÕs note holders, 
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   Owing to the difficulty of discounting Bills at present we have advised that 
the Bank be not re-opened until the 15
th
 of February next, when the greater 
part of the bills they hold will have become due. 
   Our further reasons for this advice will be seen in the Resolutions of the 
meeting this day held, which are left for the inspection of any of the Creditors 




Largely due to this support from the Banbury community, the bank reopened earlier 
on 25 January. A similar demonstration of public support was forthcoming in 
Ipswich, when Òthe mercantile Interests of the town and the Landed Interests of the 
NeighbourhoodÓ signed and circulated a declaration announcing their confidence in 
AlexanderÕs Bank and in the Ipswich Town and Country Bank. The latter bank 
benefited from the introduction of three new partners.
227
 In Sussex, the response was 
more selective. Although many Sussex banks had collapsed in December 1825, 
when the rumour spread that the Lewes Old Bank was on the verge of suspending 
payment, thirty-seven Òlocal gentlemen and merchantsÓ signed and published a 
declaration guaranteeing the note issue to the extent of £183,000, mostly in sums of 
£5,000. Handbills were then printed and distributed in the town and beyond. Each 
handbill read:  
 
We, the undersigned, having full Confidence in the Integrity and Responsibility 
of Messrs Hurly, Molineux, Whitfield, and Dicker, of the Lewes Old Bank, and 
wishing to prevent the public and private Evils consequent on the Prevalence 
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of any unfounded Alarm respecting the Safety of their Bank-Notes, do hereby 
undertake to indemnify the Holders, during the next Six Months, of such Notes 
to the Amount of several Sums set against our respective Names.  
 
Most of the individuals offering to guarantee the notes of the bank were also 




All of these instances of community support for beleaguered bankers highlight the 
significance of contractual relations as the foundation upon which money rests. Not 
contractual relations in the sense of bargains between self-reliant, autonomous 
individuals Ð the bankers considered here were far from self-reliant and autonomous. 
In reality, these bankers were at the mercy of their local communities, for better or 
worse. Local communities, sometimes led by merchants and traders, the local 
gentry, or both classes working together, used this power in various ways. On 
occasions, the community saved some bankers while restructuring others. At times, 
many communities rescued their banker owing to a sense of ethical responsibility, 
though at other times, self-interest helped to guarantee the bankerÕs notes. And it 
was not uncommon for the local community to use their influence, not to save a 
local banker, but to allow him to fail. True throughout, however, was that the 
bankerÕs promise underpinning his notes was not fixed and irreversible. Instead, 
such a banker found that he could renegotiate the terms of his relationship with the 
local community as circumstances changed. Through the renegotiation of these 
terms, the conventions and norms of each community came to the fore and made 
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strikingly apparent the public role the local community played in the success or 






This chapterÕs task has been to make sense of the puzzle created by the circulation of 
both country bankerÕs notes and bills of exchange as currency during the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century. How could these alternative currencies 
circulate without the direct backing of the state? To make sense of this puzzle, this 
chapter goes beyond the state to find other forms of public backing, in particular, the 
collective commitments provided by local communities across England and Wales 
as they lent support to the notes and bills that comprised their local currency.  
 
By focusing on the source of credibility that allowed these notes to survive periods 
of crisis, in this chapter I have moved beyond, and called into question, 
ÒfunctionalistÓ accounts of the relationship between law and the economy. Law 
played a profound role in making these local currencies possible. Law was not, then, 
merely a ÒfetterÓ that through restrictive legislation limited banks to a maximum of 
six partners, forcing commercial interests to find ways round this legislation by 
spontaneously creating a currency of their own. There was nothing spontaneous 
about country bankersÕ notes. A promise to pay underpinned these notes and was 
enforceable by the courts, while each note grew out of the intricate credit networks 
of local communities across England and Wales. Each community depended on their 
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banker for a medium of exchange. During moments of crisis, they changed places, 
with the banker becoming dependent on the collective support furnished by the local 
community.   
 
This support required that the community make public their collective commitment 
to sustain the bank. Communities did so by covering the bankÕs debts. Regardless of 
the precise forms taken by these collective commitments, they all used law to shift 
and adapt contractual relations. Frequently, the contractual modification included 
placing promises to pay on hold. Through public declarations in Liverpool, 
Newcastle, Bristol and a long list of other towns, bill or note holders exercised 
forbearance at the request of local representatives. Although the note holder could 
cash that note on demand, and the bill holder could cash the bill at maturity, by 
choosing not to do so, the holders of these alternative currencies extended a form of 
credit to bankers otherwise bound by the promise to pay on the bill or note.  
 
On occasions, collective forbearance was accompanied by the creation of institutions 
designed to collectivize losses should they result. The response of the Liverpool 
Corporation to the crisis of 1793 stands out as the most institutionalized answer to 
the threat this crisis posed to the cityÕs bankers and means of exchange. The 
Liverpool Corporation obtained an Act of Parliament that authorized the creation of 
a paper currency, as well as the committees and offices needed to facilitate the 
circulation of this currency. Through the creation of this paper currency, the 
Liverpool Corporation re-worked the contractual promises to pay that the cityÕs 
economy depended upon. As prices fell promises to pay looked less and less 
credible. The city responded by replacing one set of promises (on the bills of 
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exchange drawn by Liverpool merchants and endorsed by the cityÕs bankers), with 
an alternative set of promises (on the notes issued by the Corporation), made 
credible by a third set of promises (the tax liabilities of the local population). The 
response and level of institutionalization in Liverpool in 1793 was unique. Other less 
institutionalized responses stand out from elsewhere. These responses also 
collectivized losses, though the action taken was less formal in that it did not call for 
an Act of Parliament and did not use tax revenues as collateral. Yet when local 
communities asked local gentry and merchants to guarantee the notes issued by local 
bankers, potential losses were again collectivized and contractual commitments 
rewritten.   
 
As communities searched for and found ways of maintaining their currencies, what 
is striking about these responses Ð collective forbearance, community guarantees, 
and the creation of local authority backed paper money Ð is the range of options 
made possible by the legal regime. LawÕs role was not solely as a fetter, standing in 
the way of the expansion of the economy and the commercial classes. Rather, 
making possible, and then rendering sustainable, both country bankersÕ notes and 
bills of exchange as currency was law, in particular the malleable legal regime 





This chapter has described the reciprocal relations between banker and community. 
Communities needed the means of exchange provided by their banker. Conversely, 
and especially during times of crisis, the banker needed the help of the wider 
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community to support this means of exchange. Yet communities and their elites 
became vulnerable when they extended assistance to their local banker. To illustrate 




In 1816, all four of the country banks in Newcastle found themselves in a state of 
discredit and run on each of them soon commenced. To reassure the bankÕs 
creditors, one of the typical responses documented in this chapter was set in motion. 
A number of Òrespectable inhabitantsÓ from the town and neighbourhood publicly 
declared their willingness to not only take the notes of the four bankers in payment 
for debts owed, but to guarantee the ultimate payment of the notes in gold coin. One 
of the Òrespectable inhabitantsÓ who lent his signature to the public declaration of 





Joplin was acutely aware of the dilemmas and dangers involved in making a pledge 
of this nature. The pledge, as Joplin recognized, could easily ruin those who gave it 
should any of the banks fail. A bank had, for instance, failed in the northeast of 
England a few years before paying only 4s. in the pound to its creditors. If others 
had guaranteed the bankÕs debts, those providing the guarantee would have been 
liable for the rest.
230
 Surely, Joplin reflected, there must be an alternative to small 
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As Joplin noted with respect to the public guarantees of 1816,  
 
It is not unusual for the friends of a Bank so situated, to issue out Bills or Notices, pleading 
themselves to the public, to take its Notes in payment, to any amount. By this measure, should 
the Bank happen to stop, many of them would necessarily be ruined. Within these few years, 
pledges of this kind were repeatedly issued in favour of the Durham, Stockton, and Sunderland 
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banks of only a handful of partners, dependent during hard times on the 
ÒrespectableÓ and ÒpropertiedÓ from the local community, Òblindly entering into an 
obligationÓ to support the credit of the bank. 
 
JoplinÕs reflections soon led him to a possible solution: Òit would be better, for each 
party [pledging to support the bank], to become surety for his own Bankers, for a 
specific sum, not only in periods of difficulty, but at all times.Ó
231
 In this solution, 
the parties would offer to guarantee the debts of otherwise independent bankers on a 
permanent basis, providing the foundation for a further possibility,  
 
Such an idea being once started, it was only necessary to go a step further, 
and imagine that these parties, instead of guaranteeing another Bank, should 
pay up a capital, and form a Bank of their own, to be managed by such a 





Guaranteeing the debts of a banker during moments of crisis placed those providing 
surety at considerable risk without offering them any direct and formal control over 
the activities of the banker during ÒnormalÓ times. The solution imagined by Joplin 
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was for those guaranteeing the debt of the banker to unite their credit together on a 
permanent basis by forming a joint stock bank. The legislation in 1826 opened the 
doors to allow joint stock banks.
233
 Chapter III takes up the story of these first joint 
stock banks, their interactions with the Bank of England, and the consequences that 
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BARGAINING WITH ÒOCTOPUS TENTACLESÓ: THE BANK OF ENGLANDÕS 
BRANCHES AND THE FIRST JOINT STOCK BANKS, 1826-1844 
 
In the late 1820s, the Bank of England believed that it faced a problem in its 
management of the gold standard monetary regime re-instated in 1821.
234
 This 
regime required the convertibility of paper money into gold coin at the bearersÕ 
request. As described in Chapter II, country bankers across England and Wales 
issued paper money alongside the Bank of England and, after 1826, provincial joint 
stock banks did so too.
235
 According to the Bank of England, the problem it faced 
was that, should protecting the gold standard require reducing the quantity of paper 
money in circulation, there was no guarantee of provincial banks falling into line 
quickly enough. To control these ÒindependentÓ issues and smooth the workings of 
the gold standard, in the early 1830s the Bank of England innovated and came up 
with Òcirculation accountsÓ through which it offered favoured provincial joint stock 
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 The legislation of 1826 prohibited joint stock banks outside of London from issuing notes payable 
on demand in London (7 Geo. IV c. 46 (1826) [Country Bankers Act], section II). Consequently, the 
value of demand notes issued by provincial joint stock banks was not initially large, standing at just 
over £1.3 million in December 1833 (by contrast, the note issue of banks of six partners or less in 
December 1833 was valued at just over £8.8 million). The number of joint stock banks formed before 
1833 was also not large (38 before the end of 1833). Legislation in 1833 (3 & 4 Will. IV c. 83 (1833) 
[Bank Notes Act]) repealed the prohibition on joint stock banks issuing demand notes payable in 
London. Thereafter, the number of joint stock banks increased rapidly. Around 79 joint stock banks 
appeared in 1834-1836. The note issue of joint stock banks increased accordingly, reaching a value of 
£4.2 million in December 1836. By contrast, the value of the note issue of banks with less than six 
partners in December 1836 was £7.7 million. The figures on the value of the note issue of private 
banks and joint stock banks are from the Report from the Select Committee on Banks of Issue, 
BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1840) (602) IV at Appendix 2. The figures on the number of joint 
stock banks are from THOMAS, supra note 10, Appendix M. For commentary on the problems joint 
stock banks faced before 1833, see THOMAS, supra note 10, at 180-181. 
 
 
                                                                                                                
131 
 
banks cheap access to Bank of England notes in return for these banks giving up 
their own note issue. By, as one contemporary put it, stretching its Òoctopus 
tentaclesÓ
236
 through its new network of branches,
237
 the BankÕs directors aimed at 
Òmonopolizing to themselves the circulation of the countryÓ
238
 by replacing local 
notes with those of the Bank of England. Their hope was that by monopolizing the 
circulation, they would ease the burden they faced managing the convertibility of 
paper money into gold coin. 
 
The use of circulation accounts as a means of managing the gold standard is 
puzzling, however. In return for giving up their note issue and circulating only Bank 
of England notes, the provincial bank discounted bills of exchange at the their local 
Bank of England branch at below the London discount rate up to a set maximum. 
Agreements of this sort both spread Bank of England notes at the expense of 
ÒindependentÓ notes, and gave the Bank some influence over the discounting habits 
of the new provincial joint stock banks. By placing boundaries around the credit 
creating capacity of joint stock banks, the Bank of EnglandÕs directors hoped to 
enhance the responsiveness of the monetary system to changes in the state of the 
foreign exchanges to safeguard the convertibility of bank notes into gold coin. 
Although the circulation accounts did place boundaries around the capacity of 
                                                
236
 The Birmingham banker and MP, Thomas Attwood, coined the phrase. See THOMAS ATTWOOD 
AND JOHN SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 55-58. 
 
237
 Section 15 of 7 Geo. IV c. 46 (1826) [Country Bankers Act], empowered the Bank of England to 
set up branches. Between 1826 and 1844, the Bank of England opened thirteen branches, mostly in 
key commercial centres across England and Wales. Branches were opened in Gloucester, Manchester 
and Swansea (1826), Birmingham, Liverpool, Bristol, Leeds and Exeter (1827), Newcastle (1828), 
and Hull and Norwich (1829), see ZIEGLER, supra note 25, at 7.  
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CLAPHAM, supra note 126, at 114, quoting C. S. Forster, debate on the Bank Charter Act, 
HANSARD, HC VOL. 18, COL. 203 (31 May 1833). 
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provincial joint stock banks to create their own notes, the problem was that these 
same accounts also guaranteed the contracting bank access to a cheap source of 
credit whenever that bank wanted it. On those occasions when the Bank of England 
wanted to protect the gold standard by curtailing the creation of new money and 
credit, it was conceivable that its commitment to discount bills for those provincial 
banks with a circulation account might prevent it from doing so. 
 
 
The puzzle, then, is that on exactly those occasions when the Bank of England 
needed to restrict the creation of credit, the circulation accounts compelled the 
BankÕs branches to do the opposite. This is what happened in 1836 when the foreign 
exchanges Òturned against Britain.Ó The Bank of England tried to end the credit 
boom of the previous three years by raising its rate of discount. But the Bank had 
tied its hands in the provinces. As the Circular to Bankers observed in late July 
1836,  
 
they [the directors of the Bank of England] raise the value of money to the 
London merchants to four and a half percent. while they continue to lend to 
non-note-issuing bankers in the country at three per cent; and thus on the one 
hand they propose to put more money into circulation in districts where the 
prices of manufactured goods and the raw materials of manufacturers may be 
raised or affected in price by money lent at low interest; while on the other 
they propose in London ... to restrict accommodation and render money 
difficult to be obtained.
239
  
                                                
239
 CIRCULAR TO BANKERS, 29 July 1836, at 13. 
 




It was Ònot in the power of the bankÓ to cancel its arrangement with banks outside of 
London Òtill the expiration of the time for which the agreement was concluded,Ó 
leaving the Bank with little choice but to continue with this Òinconsistent course of  
... proceeding.Ó
240
       
 
How are we then to account for the expansion of credit through contractual 
arrangements that were intended to have given the monetary authorities greater 
control over the currency and the creation of bills of exchange? Towards addressing 
this puzzle, let us start with a watershed event in the period dealt with in this chapter 
Ð the legislation of 1826 that permitted people to form joint stock banks, that is, 
banks of any number of partners.
241
 A great deal of talk about ÒfreedomÓ surrounded 
this piece of legislation. Those in favour of joint stock banking believed that the 
restrictions preventing people from forming banks with an unlimited number of 
partners were an assault on their Òcommercial freedom.Ó As one contemporary 
campaigner in favour of an end to restrictions on joint stock companies put it, ÒAre 
we now, in this age of civil liberty, to be deprived of commercial freedom? Are the 
people of small capitals to be restrained from making them productive by uniting to 
trade as a body?Ó
242
 Many of the interest groups behind the reform argued that the 
Act of 1826 freed banking from unnecessary and counterproductive legislative 
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 Id., 13. 
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 7 Geo. IV c. 46 (1826) [Country Bankers Act]. 
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 Bishop C. Hunt, The Joint-Stock Company in England, 1800-1825, 43(1) THE JOURNAL OF 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 1, 7 (1935) quoting [Philopatris], OBSERVATIONS ON PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS, 
MONOPOLIES AND JOINT STOCK COMPANIES (1807). 
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Yet the rhetoric of freedom was not the sole preserve of the proponents of joint stock 
banking. Those against Òcorporate privilegesÓ stressed the artificial nature of joint 
stock entities, contrasting them with the enterprise of individuals not aided by 
legislative advantages. As the lawyer, John George, argued,  
 
The Joint Stock Company is, in substance, saying Ð ÔWe, by means of our great 
capital, shall be able to supply you with milk, or garden stuff, or fish, at a 
lower price than the ordinary milkman, market gardener, or fishmonger can 
afford them to you for. But from our very numbers we are exposed to some 
natural and necessary inconveniences in the bringing of actions, which we will 
thank you to remove, in order that we, who are a giant, may the more 
successfully oppose and drive out of the market the common tradesman, the 





                                                
243 As one commentator in an article entitled Hints by way of Warning, on the Legal, Practical, and 
Mercantile Difficulties, attending the foundation and management of Joint Stock Banks 20 (39) 
WESTMINSTER REVIEW 58, 71 (1834) argued in 1834 with respect to corporate privileges in general  
 
whatever facilities are now granted by charter or by Act of Parliament ought to be a matter of 
common right, upon the principle of Laissez-nous faire. Whether a person should embark all 
his capital in one enterprise or more, as an individual, or in one of these companies, should be 
a matter left to his own discretion.  
 
244
 JAMES TAYLOR, CREATING CAPITALISM: JOINT-STOCK ENTERPRISE IN BRITISH POLITICS AND 
CULTURE, 1800-1870, 45 (2006) quoting JOHN GEORGE, A VIEW OF THE EXISTING LAW AFFECTING 
UNINCORPORATED COMPANIES 73 (1825). 
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To the list of milkman, market gardener and fishmonger, George might have added 
banker. GeorgeÕs point was that large partnerships, that is, joint stock companies, 
tended to grow so large that to operate effectively they needed special privileges, 
such as the right to sue and be sued in the name of a public officer. Smaller 
partnerships, such as the banks of six partners or less explored in Chapter II, needed 
no such special benefits. The problem as George saw it was that affording these 




Both sides presented their case in terms of freedom, either from restrictions on the 
number of partners, or from rivals with unfair advantages. Even the circulation 
accounts between the Bank of England and select joint stock banks reflect, on one 
reading, Òfreedom of contract,Ó understood as the unfettered freedom of the joint 
stock banks and the Bank of England to contract as they saw fit. The joint stock 
banks got cheap credit. The Bank of England got control over paper money. Both 
sides satisfied their individual preferences through exercising their freedom.  
 
The concern in this chapter with all of this talk about freedom, however, is that it 
does not help us resolve the second puzzle addressed by this dissertation. There is a 
danger in either seeing law as a means of ordering people by compelling or 
prohibiting conduct through legislative fetters, or as marginal force easily dispensed 
with after liberating people from these prohibitions through permissive legislation. 
                                                
245
 As a broker stressed in 1825,  
 
it should be a leading principle with Parliament, never to give sanction to any plan, by which 
numerous bodies of men propose to carry on any trade or business, which it is in the power of 
individuals to carry on; because every plan of that kind operates as a direct injury to the little 
trader and leads to monopoly and extortion, in TAYLOR, supra note 244, at 45, quoting from 
WEEKLY DISPATCH,, 20 March 1825).  
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The body of criminal law does direct human conduct through rules that compel or 
forbid, and it is tempting to view all law in this light. Through the lens of 
compulsion and prohibition, for example, lawÕs significance with respect to banking 
in 1826 was the removal of a clear prohibition, a statute forbidding banks of any 
number of partners. The legislation of 1826 was vague, however, in the sense that it 
failed to tell bankers what to do or not to do. It liberalized banking, but without any 
further provisions directing the conduct of bankers, or compelling the creation of 
one kind of banking over another. Without such explicit directives, it is tempting to 
view lawÕs role as marginal until further legislation in the 1840s.  
 
Moreover, an interpretation that views law as either prohibiting conduct or as a 
source of liberation from such fetters, runs the danger of encouraging a functionalist 
view of the legal regimeÕs role in the 1830s. In a sense, it may be that the legal 
regime before 1826 served as a fetter preventing the banking system from 
responding to the needs of a growing commercial class. This class then responded to 
these fetters by agitating for and eventually achieving legislation that allowed them 
to establish the type of banks that served their interests. But if we follow Duncan 
Kennedy and define freedom as Òdoing or getting what one wants,Ó
 246
  then viewing 
the legislation of 1826 through the lens of freedom misses too much.  
 
Although the legislation of 1826 made joint stock banking possible in the provinces, 
the interests behind these new banks could not do anything or get everything they 
wanted. The circulation accounts are a case in point, something I demonstrate in this 
chapter. Although from one perspective the circulation accounts represent Òfreedom 
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of contractÓ and the satisfaction of preferences, in reality they did not always look so 
satisfying. The joint stock banks lost their note issue and the Bank of England 
endangered the gold standard. And we today are left with a puzzle: why did the 
Bank of England endanger the gold standard by offering joint stock banks an 
alternative source of cheap credit to compensate these new banks for the notes they 
gave up? 
 
Perhaps, then, there is more to the story besides the removal of restrictions by 
liberalizing legislation. Perhaps law was significant beyond sometimes responding 
to, at other times fettering, the commercial ÒneedsÓ of interest groups. And perhaps 
by building on a different view of law, we can address the puzzle explored in this 
chapter: in this ÒliberalizedÓ and ÒfreeÓ banking environment, why did the Bank of 
England offer provincial joint stock banks cheap credit? 
 
As a start to answering this puzzle, this chapter adopts a different view of law. Not 
all conceptions of law follow an image of the criminal law based on prohibition and 
compulsion, and the alternative to compulsion and prohibition is not a legal vacuum. 
The non-directive institutions of private law, such as property and contract, provide 
a further alternative. These institutions provide Òthe rules of the gameÓ within and 
through which people pursue objectives.
247
 As they pursue their objectives, they do 
not have unlimited freedom. Rather, this freedom is qualifying by the freedom of 
others, such as the Bank of England, London bill brokers, and manufacturers in 
search of credit, to take three of the most important groups that joint stock banks 
entered into relations with in the 1830s. The conflicts between the first joint stock 
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banks and these groups prevented the parties from getting everything they wanted. 




The extent to which some can get more of what they want, while guarding against 
the impact of the choices made by their opponents, depends on how well endowed 
they are by institutions like property and contract.
249
 This chapter focuses on the 
advantages that the combined property of their shareholders, or proprietors, 
conferred onto the first joint stock banks, wealth that these banks then used in the 
1830s to bargain with, or Òcoerce,Ó the Bank of England. The significance of the 
legislation of 1826, then, was not so much that it ÒfreedÓ interest groups from 
unnecessary legislative fetters, but rather that it allowed individuals to combine their 
capital in a single entity, transforming thereby the property relations that shaped the 
outcome of the bargaining between those responsible for the creation of money and 
credit in the 1830s. As this chapter demonstrates, it is by focusing on these new 
bargaining powers that we stand the best chance of solving the puzzle affecting the 
Bank of EnglandÕs circulation accounts. 
 
Part A of this Chapter describes the theoretical underpinnings of the gold standard 
that the directors of the Bank of England were steeped in from the 1820s onwards. 
Part B turns to how the circulation accounts worked. The Bank of EnglandÕs use of 
its circulation accounts is puzzling because through them joint stock banks received 
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 See R. L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1943), and 
R. L. Hale, Coercion and distribution in a supposedly noncoercive state, 38 POLITICAL SCIENCE 
QUARTERLY, 470 (1923). For an introduction to HaleÕs work, see Kennedy, supra note 246 and 
Warren J. Samuels, The economy as a system of power and its legal basis: the legal economics of 
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privileged access to credit despite the adverse impact these arrangements had on the 
BankÕs management of the gold standard. Addressing this puzzle grapples with the 
factors that shaped the bargaining powers of the Bank of England and the joint stock 
banks. As Part C explores, joint stock banks turned to London bill brokers to obtain 
finance independent of the Bank of England. To explain why London bill brokers 
discounted liberally for joint stock banks, in Part D this chapter turns to the tensions 
undermining the Bank of England in the mid 1830s, and in Part E considers the 
constitution of the early joint stock banks. 
 
Provided provincial joint stock banks maintained the backing of their proprietors, 
London bill brokers happily discounted bills carrying the endorsements of these 
banks because that meant the bill was guaranteed by the unlimited liability of the 
banks community of shareholders, or co-partners. As long as this faucet of cheap 
finance flowed, joint stock banks backed by a large body of proprietors were less 
concerned about maintaining a circulation account with their local Bank of England 
branch. To persuade these banks to stop issuing their own notes, the Bank had to 
offer something more enticing to bring joint stock banks to the table. 
 
As Part F explains, the backing of the proprietors of the first joint stock banks made 
the debt of the bank credible. Conversely, if a joint stock bank lost the backing of its 
proprietors, it lost much of its bargaining power. Maintaining this backing was not 
straightforward. The proprietors upon whom the credibility of the first joint stock 
banks rested, were not a homogenous group. Although all had ties to the same town 
or region, some remained relatively passive investors, others became depositors, 
many borrowed from the bank they owned, while a select group took over the 
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management of their bank. The organisation, or constitution, of the bank through its 
deed of settlement determined the role played by these groups.
250
 It also influenced 
the degree to which the bank took on debt relative to its assets, the property of its 
proprietors. Joint stock banks that managed the tensions between their proprietors 
successfully maintained their bargaining position against the Bank of England, a 
point Part G demonstrates by referring to the Manchester and Liverpool District 
Bank. But where a joint stock bank failed to mediate these tensions successfully, its 
bargaining position vis--vis the Bank of England would collapse, as shown by the 
example of the Northern and Central Bank of England, also taken up in Part G.    
 
 
A. The Foreign Exchanges, Convertibility, and the Country Note Issue 
 
 
                                                
250
 T. L. ALBORN, CONCEIVING COMPANIES: JOINT-STOCK POLITICS IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND (1998), 
describes the joint stock banks of the period 1826 to 1836 as Òlocal republicsÓ of shareholders. 
Pearson, in his study of the highly personalized local business networks that shared risk and pooled 
resources in the insurance industry of Leeds, Liverpool, and Manchester, considers the legal and 
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Contemporaries understood a company as Òa collection of many individuals united into one body,Ó Ôa 
ÒtheyÓ rather than an Òit,ÓÕ Paddy Ireland, Property and Contract in Contemporary Corporate 
Theory, 23(3) LEGAL STUDIES 453, 457 (2003).      
 





 behind the operation of the gold standard owes much to David 
Hume.
252
 Working under the assumption that gold is the only money, HumeÕs model 
tells us that when gold flows into a country, the money supply increases, and that 
money finds its way into the pockets of the general population who then spend more 
on goods and services. Following this increase in demand, goods and services 
increase in price. As these goods and services increase in price, they become less 
competitive relative to cheaper goods and services elsewhere in the world that have 
not seen the same price increases. The inflow of gold that led to an increase in prices 
will then reverse itself as gold flows overseas to take advantage of the cheaper goods 
and services found there. Domestic prices then start to decline before the whole 
process repeats. HumeÕs conclusion is that this monetary system based on gold self-
adjusts automatically provided governments do not meddle in the flows of gold that 
settle the balance of payments between countries.    
 
Matters become more complex when paper money is introduced into the model. For 
the theory to continue to apply in this context, the paper money issued by, say, the 
central bank has to increase and contract in proportion to the flows of gold into and 
out of the country. One device for holding in check the creation of paper money is 
Òfiduciary money,Ó paper money convertible into gold coin on demand. Central 
banks can create as much paper money as they please, provided they always stand 
ready to convert that paper money into gold coin at the bearersÕ request. If gold 
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starts to flow overseas because domestic prices are internationally uncompetitive, 
the central bank must somehow contract the circulation of its own notes, or find too 
many of its notes in circulation relative to its reserve of gold.  
 
In 1820s Britain, many influential contemporaries argued that there was an 
additional problem. The Bank of England, the largest bank at that time and what we 
today call a central bank, was not the only issuer of paper notes. As Chapter II 
explored, before 1826 country banks of six partners or less also issued paper 
notes.
253
 After 1826, they continued to do so alongside banks of any number of 
partners, known as joint stock banks. The paper notes issued by both the country 
banks and the joint stock banks were convertible into Bank of England notes or gold 
coin. To maintain the convertibility of their notes, country banks and joint stock 
banks formed close ties with bankers in London who had access to gold coin and 
Bank of England notes. In theory, then, the note issue of provincial bankers could 
not expand out of line with monetary conditions in London. Nonetheless, according 
to those later known collectively as the ÒCurrency School,Ó
254
 a problem remained. 
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 The Currency School refers to the group of writers in the late 1830s and early 1840s who sought a 
means of ensuring that a paper currency behaved in the manner called for by HumeÕs model. They 
argued for a mixed currency of paper and gold to vary in accordance with flows of gold into and out 
of Britain, but did not believe that convertibility alone was a sufficient means of guaranteeing against 
an over issue of paper money. Their remedy, that restricted the capacity of the Bank of England and 
the country banks to create paper money independent of gold backing, gained Parliamentary approval 
in PeelÕs Act of 1844. ÒCurrency SchoolÓ refers to those thinkers who conceptualized PeelÕs Act in 
the late 1830s and early 1840s, though writers in the 1820s and early 1830s expressed similar views 
without proposing the same reform. The same reform was proposed, however, in HENRY 
DRUMMOND, ELEMENTARY PROPOSITIONS ON THE CURRENCY (1826). 
In the 1840s, the Banking School arose in opposition to the Currency School. While writers 
associated with the Currency School believed that a central bank could control the quantity of money, 
and that it was imperative that it do so under HumeÕs model, those writers grouped under the heading 
ÒBanking SchoolÓ believed that a central bank could not and should not try to control the quantity of 
money.  The Banking School were committed to the gold standard just like the Currency School, but 
unlike the Currency School believed that convertibility alone was sufficient to prevent an over issue 
of paper notes. They supported this position by arguing that bankers issued their notes in response to 
demand from the public (i.e., the Òneeds of tradeÓ), and the public borrowed to pursue ventures they 
hoped would be profitable. As the borrowed notes then circulated, the option belonging to each note 
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As summarized by the economic historian Jacob Viner, the problem identified by the 
Currency School was Òthat the country banks could expand their note issue relatively 
to the Bank of England note circulation for a long enough period to create 
difficulties, without being adequately checked by the resultant adverse balance of 
payments with London.Ó255 
  
In the late 1820s, the Bank of England director, and soon to be Governor, Horsely 
Palmer,
256
 adopted a perspective of the monetary system comporting with much of 
the thinking later associated with the Currency School. Palmer wanted the currency 
regulated by inflows and outflows of gold as in HumeÕs model. But Palmer was also 
conscious of the failure of the gold standard to operate smoothly in the years after 
1821. In a circular dated 1827 sent to country bankers throughout England and 
Wales, Palmer explained,  
 
                                                                                                                                    
holder of returning the note to the bank of issue for conversion into gold coin prevented the 
development of an excess circulation. Hence, according to the Banking School, and in opposition to 
the view of the Currency School, country bankersÕ notes did not cause high prices because note 
holders converted any excess notes into gold.  
For an overview of the Currency-Banking debate, see Marion R Daugherty, The Currency-
Banking Controversy 9 SOUTHERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL 140 (1942). For a summary of the ideas of 
the key writers associated with each school, see WOOD, supra note 251, at 28-43. Perry Mehrling 
provides an analysis that connects the Banking School view to modern ideas about the monetary 
system, see Perry Mehrling, The Relevance to Modern Economics of the Banking School View in 
MONEY IN MOTION: THE POST KEYNESIAN AND CIRCULATION APPROACHES 331(G. Deleplace and E. 
J. Nell eds., 1996).  
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under the present system of issues by the Bank of England, and the Country 
Bankers, there is the greatest difficulty, amounting almost to an impracticality, 
of so regulating the paper money currency as to attain the objects [of 
maintaining a paper currency convertible on demand]. The confliction of 
action and interest between these two descriptions of issues is the main 
difficulty; the fact being that, as prices expand, and even where the notes are 
returning upon the Bank for gold to be exported, the issues of the country 
bankers are extending, and are never attempted to be withdrawn, until the 
Bank makes an evident demonstration to the country of contracting from a 




Palmer believed that during periods when gold was moving overseas to take 
advantage of lower prices, country bankers expanded their note issue to fill the gap 
left in the domestic currency.
258
 Prices then failed to drop as HumeÕs theory dictated 
they should. Moreover, an increase in paper notes in conjunction with gold moving 
overseas rendered vulnerable the commitment to convertibility. By the time the 
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 A. ANDREADES, HISTORY OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND, 1640-1903, 274 (4
TH
 ED. 1966). Palmer and 
writers associated with the Currency School, such as Samuel Jones Loyd (later known as Lord 
Overstone), were clear that the circulations of the Bank of England and the country banks moved in 
opposite directions, and that a contraction in the BankÕs issue led to an expansion in the issue of the 
country banks. As Elmer Wood has argued, there is no evidence from the 1820s and 1830s showing 
the accuracy of this view held by Palmer and Loyd (See WOOD, supra note 251, at 25 and 32). 
Regardless of the factual accuracy of the view held by Palmer and the Currency School, they 
nonetheless held the belief that the note issue of the country banks expanded because the Bank of 
England contracted its note issue. This belief then shaped the policy pursued by the Bank of England 
under Palmer, and the reforms proposed by the Currency School.  
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authorities in London responded to flows of gold overseas by contracting credit, 
Palmer feared that country bankers would have already expanded their note issue. 
Because country bankers kept their reserve in London, over time, they moved in the 
same direction as the Bank of England.
259
 But Palmer and others believed in the 
short term they did not.
260
 This Òconfliction of action and interest between these two 
descriptions of issuesÓ
261
 was, for Palmer, the root cause of financial panic in the 
1820s and 1830s, and the main threat to the credibility of the commitment 
underpinning the gold standard. 
 
Palmer and the directors of the Bank of England regarded maintaining the gold 
standard as sacrosanct. So too did those who later in the 1830s argued from the 
vantage point of the Currency School. When crises unfolded, both Bank of England 
officials and public figures associated with the Currency School, blamed reckless 
provincial bankers.
262
 As a later section of this chapter explores, it was common in 
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 See WOOD, supra note 251, especially at 23-7.  
 
260
 CIRCULAR TO BANKERS (16 September 1836) captures this divergence between the Bank of 
England and those running businesses in EnglandÕs centres of commerce,  
 
the Bank had no such effect as we anticipated. We thought it [raising the BankÕs discount 
rate] sufficiently significant of approaching difficulty, but we must confess that it was not so 
regarded in the manufacturing districts: there, every individual engaged in large pecuniary 
transactions still continued to act under the influence prevalent in his particular circle; he 
looked singly and almost exclusively at the local circumstances of his neighbourhood, and 
gave but little attention to the proceedings of the Bank of England. When safe and profitable 
business is offered, it is in the nature of enterprising Englishmen to take it, and in that manner 
to promote the circulation that it creates.   
   
261
 The Bank of England and the Country Banks, supra note 257. 
 
262
 See J. HORSELY PALMER, THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF PRESSURE ON THE MONEY-
MARKET WITH A STATEMENT OF THE ACTION OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND (1837) and SAMUEL JONES 
LOYD, REFLECTIONS ON THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF PRESSURE ON THE MONEY MARKET 
(1837). Those associated with the Currency School tended to divide blame between the provincial 
joint stock banks and the Bank of England. They directed their criticism of the Bank of England at the 
so-called Palmer Rule. Horsely Palmer developed this rule to guide the Bank of EnglandÕs efforts at 
ensuring that the paper currency expanded and contracted in response to the foreign exchanges. The 
rule stated that when the foreign exchanges were at par, that is, when specie was neither imported nor 
exported, the securities held by the Bank of England, such as government debt and bills of exchange, 
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the 1830s for joint stock banks to lend recklessly. Yet the obligation on the Bank of 
England to maintain the gold standard also played its part in the crisis of 1836-37.  
 
To see the relationship between the gold standard and crisis, it is worth recalling the 
reality of early nineteenth century credit relations explored in Chapter II. During 
periods when merchants, manufacturers, and bankers invested heavily in the 
expectation of future profits, they created credit in the form of bills of exchange and 
country bankersÕ notes that they hoped to pay off with the returns generated by their 
investments. If these expectations were not met, the debts created could only be 
sustained with additional credit. The manufacturers then turned to merchants, who in 
turn looked to their local banker. The local banker drew on his line of credit in 
London. But when all other provincial bankers did the same, the London bankers 
found themselves short, and called upon the Bank of England for accommodation.  
 
Under a gold standard regime, when the foreign exchanges had turned against 
Britain, the Bank of England was, in theory, not supposed to lend. But if the Bank 
                                                                                                                                    
should be equal to two-thirds of the BankÕs liabilities. Whether bullion was then imported or 
exported, the Bank should hold its securities constant and allow its liabilities to vary in accordance 
with in flows and out flows of specie. Currency School thinkers like Loyd came into conflict with the 
Bank of England over the operation in practice of the Palmer Rule. The main point of controversy 
concerned the meaning of Òliabilities.Ó The Currency School did not consider deposits to be a form of 
money making the BankÕs paper notes its only liabilities. By contrast, the Bank of EnglandÕs directors 
considered its liabilities to be both its notes and its deposits. When people exported specie overseas, 
the Bank of England found that those with claims on the Bank of England converted deposits into 
gold just as often as they converted the BankÕs notes.  Consequently, when people exported gold from 
Britain, the BankÕs note issue did not contract to the same extent because some of the reduction in the 
BankÕs liabilities fell on the deposits held by the public. Authors such as Loyd focused on the failure 
of the BankÕs note issue to fall at the same rate as gold was leaving the country. The Currency School 
feared that there were too many notes in circulation relative to reserves of gold. In this situation, 
commentators such as Loyd reasoned that it was foolish for the Bank to keep its securities constant. 
Rather, the Bank should sell these securities until it had absorbed enough paper money to offset flows 
of gold overseas. Loyd had additional grounds for criticising the Bank because in practice the Bank 
failed to keep its securities constant, not because it sold securities, but because it purchased bills of 
exchange. The Bank did so partly because it was obliged to do so owing to its circulation accounts 
with provincial bankers. Palmer defended the actions of the Bank of England against LoydÕs 
criticisms in J. HORSELY PALMER, REPLY TO THE REFLECTIONS OF MR SAMUEL JONES LOYD (1837). 
On the Palmer Rule in theory and its operation in practice, see R. C. O. MATTHEWS, A STUDY IN 
TRADE-CYCLE HISTORY: ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN, 1833-1842, 168-175 (1954).  
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refused to provide accommodation, bankers, merchants, and manufactures all 
collapsed. If the Bank did provide accommodation, even at increased cost, most 
London bankers borrowed what they could to meet the demand from other bankers 
and the merchants and manufacturers dependent on this additional credit. In this 
latter scenario, the Bank of England circulated more of its notes at a time when gold 
was leaving the country. The quantity of Bank of England notes increased without 
any corresponding increase in its gold reserve. Therefore, while one scenario led to 
widespread bankruptcy, the other left the BankÕs commitment to convertibility 




Reversing the 1819 decision to restore the gold standard would have freed the Bank 
of England from this dilemma. But the Bank of England was in favour of the gold 
standard, and so too was much elite opinion.
264
 The alternative to abolishing the gold 
standard was to attempt to make it work in accordance with the dominant theory of 
the time drawn from David Hume. To make the gold standard work, the Bank of 
England under the leadership of Horsely Palmer believed that it had to control the 
creation of money, including country bankersÕ notes, and influence credit conditions 
outside of London.
265
 The BankÕs most innovative policy towards achieving these 
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 In January 1825, the Bank of EnglandÕs bullion reserve stood at £9.4 million. By November 1825, 
the reserve had fallen to £3 million and by December to £1.2 million. The figures are from THOMAS, 
supra note 10, at 54. The Bank of England suffered a similar drain of bullion during the crisis of 
1836-37. Between January1833 and December 1835, the Bank of EnglandÕs reserve of gold did not 
fall below £6.7 million. In 1837, the average was just over £4 million but shot up again in 1838 to 
almost £9 million. The figures for the 1830s are from Report from the Select Committee on Banks of 
Issue, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1840) (602) IV, Appendix 24, at 261. 
  
264
 See FRANK FETTER, DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH MONETARY ORTHODOXY (1965). 
 
265
 During his time as Governor of the Bank of England, Palmer was convinced that the Bank of 
England should have a monopoly over the creation of paper money in England and Wales. See 
Horsely Palmer to the Committee on renewing the Charter of the Bank of England, BRITISH 
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1831-32) (722) VI at 35 (Q: 469) and at 39 (Q: 503); CLAPHAM supra note 
126, at 114; J. K. Horsefield, The Opinions of Horsely Palmer, Governor of the Bank of England, 
1830-33, 16 ECONOMICA 143, 150-52 (1949); and THE CIRCULAR TO BANKERS, 7 June 1833 at 372. 
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ends was through circulation accounts with provincial joint stock banks. It is to these 
circulation accounts that this chapter now turns. 
 
B. The Òoctopus tentaclesÓ Take Hold: The Three Percent Circulation 
Accounts 
 
In October 1834, the Manchester and Liverpool District Bank concluded an 
agreement for a circulation account with the Bank of England. It was not the first 
such agreement entered into by the Bank of England, but it was arguably the most 
generous yet. In return for ceasing the circulation of its own notes through its 
branches in Cheshire and the Potteries, the District received discounts from the Bank 
of EnglandÕs branches at Liverpool and Manchester at a fixed rate of 3%. By 
contrast, the Bank of EnglandÕs discount rate in London was 4%. The maximum 
amount the District could discount at any one time was £400,000, a sum that 
shocked the Circular to Bankers given the DistrictÕs note issue stood at around 
£120,000-£130,000. As the editorial in the Circular observed,  
 
[w]hatever the state of the money market, this sum they [the Bank of England] 
must continue to advance to the District Bank for, at least, one or two years to 
come, because in transactions of this nature it would be impossible to 
                                                                                                                                    
On PalmerÕs interest in having the BankÕs branch agentÕs influence local credit conditions, see 
CLAPHAM supra note 126, at 118-9. Amongst those who supported the country banks, there was 
widespread fear over the Bank of EnglandÕs intentions. Consider, as an example, the view of the cloth 
merchant and financial journalist (and editor of the Circular to Bankers in the 1830s), Henry Burgess, 
who captured the fears of many country bankers when he observed, ÒThe bank directors certainly 
intend to take the whole circulation of the country into their own hands. They receive and pay 
dividends and transfer money gratis, and they will certainly be resorted to by some amongst the 
country gentlemen for depositing without interest their surplus money,Ó in THE CIRCULAR TO 
BANKERS, 10 August 1827. 
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Although the Bank of England had persuaded the District to cease issuing its own 
notes, and could now exert some influence over the quality of the bills the District 
discounted,
267
 the agreement placed a strain on the BankÕs capacity to meet its 
obligations under the gold standard. The CircularÕs editorial board stated that the 
terms obtained by the District highlighted the Òdiminishes power which the Bank 
exercises over the gold currency of the realm.Ó It explained that, 
 
the suppression of a comparatively small circulation by a method which at the 
same time has a tendency to increase the circulation of Bills of Exchange 
cannot have the slightest effect in bringing the entire currency of the kingdom 
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 CIRCULAR TO BANKERS, 3 April 1835, at 290-1. 
 
267
 See Appendix 1 to this dissertation for more on the Bank of EnglandÕs eligibility rules on 
discounting bills at its branches.   
 
268
 CIRCULAR TO BANKERS, 3 April 1835, at 290. The Circular was not alone in observing this 
tension. See THOMAS supra note 10, at 307-8; the evidence of James William Gilbart before the 
Parliamentary inquiry of 1837, Report on Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS 
(1837) (531) XIV at 114 (Q: 2055); COPPIETERS, supra note 42, at 99-100; and A MERCHANT, 
OBSERVATIONS ON THE CRISIS, 1836-37 (1837), arguing (at 20) that  
 
A mass of mercantile credit may ... be created in any locality, by Joint Stock Banks who do not 
issue notes of their own, but who command a certain amount of Bank of England paper, at a 
given rate of interest, by agreement with the Bank. For the time that these loans of notes are 
given (and they are given for extended periods), the Bank of England loses all control over the 
amount of her issues, and the Joint Stock Banks being irresponsible for the payment of the 
notes in Bullion, make the most of them possible, by discounts and facilities of various kinds, 
and as soon as the notes are returned they may be issued anew in the shape of fresh facilities. 
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From the late 1820s to the mid 1830s, the District was not the only beneficiary of 
cheap credit from the Bank of England.
269
 Walters, Voss & Co. from Swansea 
provides one of the earliest examples of a circulation account between the Bank of 
England and a provincial bank. In February 1829, the Bank of England wanted 
Walters, Voss & Co. to cease issuing its own notes. As an enticement towards 
making this acceptable to Walters, Voss & Co., the Bank granted Òa Discount and 
Drawing Account for general purposes.Ó The account was limited to £10,000 worth 
of discounts at any one time. Yet whenever Walters, Voss & Co. needed access to 
Bank of England notes, they had a guaranteed £10,000 at their disposal at the 
Swansea branch, on the condition that Walters, Voss & Co. presented a sufficient 




Though the discount rate was no different to that available to the BankÕs other 
account holders, Walters, Voss & Co. of Swansea could discount £10,000 at any 
time. Later in 1829, the Bank hit upon a further innovation that, instead of applying 
a uniform rate of discount, made greater use of its ability to vary its discount rate. In 
December 1829, the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer granted the 
Bank of England permission to provide discount facilities at its branches at 1% 
below the BankÕs London rate of discount. A bank granted this privilege agreed, in 
return, to cease circulating its own notes.
271
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 For more information on the Bank of EnglandÕs branches, and the circulation accounts entered into 
with provincial joint stock banks, see the references at supra note 25. 
 
270
 Roberts, supra note 25, at 234-5. On the Bank of EnglandÕs standard of Òlegitimacy,Ó see 
Appendix 1 to this dissertation. 
 
271
 CLAPHAM, supra note 126, at 140. 
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The first account of this type opened in January 1830 after the Bank reached an 
agreement with the Birmingham Banking Company.
272
  With the Bank of EnglandÕs 
London rate at 4% (it remained steady at that level from 1828 to 1835),
273
 the newly 
formed Birmingham Banking Company could discount bills (either its own drafts or 
commercial bills) at 3% up to a maximum of £200,000. As part of the agreement, the 
Birmingham Banking Company promised not to issue any demand notes of its own. 
Instead, in return for the bills it discounted with the branch it received Bank of 
England notes, which it then lent out to customers at a higher rate.
274
 Having reached 
an agreement with a major Birmingham bank, a largely identical deal followed in 
December 1831 with the Bank of Liverpool, which agreed not to circulate bills of 
exchange as currency. By the summer of 1838, the Bank of England had used its 
branches to arrange twenty-one contracts for circulation accounts with banks across 
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 See CLAPHAM, supra note 126, Appendix B at 429. 
 
274
 The discount rate charged by provincial bankers at that time for almost all bills that came their 
way was 5% (Moss, supra note 25, at 12). The Birmingham Banking Company now had the option of 
either continuing to discount commercial bills at 5%, which it could then rediscount at the branch at 
3%, or it could undercut its rivals by discounting below 5%, safe in the knowledge that it would still 
make a profit provided the discount rate it charged for commercial bills remained above 3%. 
 
275
 See Report on Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1837-38) (626) VII, 
Appendix 8 at 123. The Bank of EnglandÕs note issue shot up in Manchester, Liverpool, and 
Birmingham and their hinterlands. In 1829 the circulation of Bank of England notes in Lancashire (by 
far the largest concentration of its notes outside of London) was not much more than £500,000. By 
the late 1830s, it had increased to over £2million out of a total branch circulation of around £4million, 
ZIEGLER, supra note 25, at 27. The Bank of EnglandÕs branch circulation also increased as a 
percentage of the BankÕs total circulation during the 1830s, propelled largely by this growth in its 
Lancashire circulation. See Report on Banks of Issue, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1840) (602) 
IV, Appendix 16 at 106-246. 
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Why then did the Bank of England agree to arrangements that left it contractually 
obliged to meet the demand from provincial bankers for discounts at a reduced rate, 
even when the Bank wanted to contract the supply of currency? The Bank of 
England had a longer-term goal of monopolize the paper currency of the country in 
order to safeguard the gold standard, and that necessitated exerting some influence 
over the creation of credit outside of London. By contrast, joint stock banks outside 
of London wanted to retain their influence over local credit. That task was easier, 
and their profits higher, if they could access cheap credit in both good times and 
during a crisis. To an extent, then, each side had what the other side wanted. On the 
one hand, the joint stock banks controlled the local currencies that the Bank of 
England wanted abolished. And, more generally, they influenced the local credit 
conditions over which the Bank wanted to exert a greater degree of influence. On the 
other hand, the Bank of EnglandÕs notes were the most credible in the country 
because the Bank was the governmentÕs biggest lender. As a result, the tax base of 
the British state ultimately backed the BankÕs own liabilities, including its notes. The 
Bank of England, then, had the leeway to offer cheap credit in good times, and the 
resources to support other banks during a crisis, precisely the type of resources to 
which the joint stock banks wanted access. 
 
It was the capacity of both sides to withhold what the other side wanted that 
ultimately shaped the outcome of the bargaining process between the Bank of 
England and the provincial joint stock banks in the 1830s. The key question is to 
what extent could the joint stock banks prosper without access to the credit facilities 
provided by the Bank of England. Answering this question calls for an account of 
the alternative source of credit joint stock banks taped into to by-pass the Bank of 
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England. As I explore in this chapter, the attractiveness of this alternative source of 
credit ultimately depended on the property relations underpinning both Bank of 
England and the joint stock banks. 
 
 
C. Rediscounting in the London Money Market as an Alternative to 
Bargaining with the Bank of England  
 
As Chapter II explained, prior to 1826 few banks in England and Wales had 
branches. Even after 1826 and the arrival of joint stock banks, most networks of 
branches confined their activities to the region surrounding the head office. The 
highly localized structure of English and Welsh banking meant banks, both private 
and joint stock, called upon the intermediary services of the London banks or bill 
brokers to transfer funds from regions and districts with surpluses to areas where 
capital was in short supply. Regions with an abundance of savings, like East Anglia, 
deposited sums in London with banks or, more often after 1830, bill brokers, which 
merchants, manufacturers, and bankers from capital hungry regions, like the 




 in London allowed joint stock banks from industrial regions in 
the 1830s to procure the funds they needed to expand their lending beyond the paid-
up capital of the bankÕs proprietors and the deposits left by savers. Joint stock banks 
discounted the bills presented to them by their customers using the banks existing 
capital or the deposits at its disposal. To continue discounting after the exhaustion of 
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 For an overview of bill discounting and rediscounting, see Appendix 1 to this dissertation.  
 
                                                                                                                
154 
 
the bankÕs capital and deposits, the bank turned to the London money market. There, 
bill brokers rediscounted the bills joint stock banks from Yorkshire and Lancashire 
sent them, bills that the brokers purchased to satisfy the investment needs of their 
clients, often joint stock or private banks from agricultural regions.
277
 In return for 
supplying bill brokers with bills, Yorkshire and Lancashire joint stock banks 
received cash, which they used to discount more bills, with the process then 
repeating itself. 
 
The appearance of the Bank of EnglandÕs network of branches after 1826 offered 
new sources of credit. Rather than calling upon London banks or bill brokers, 
provincial joint stock banks could now have a direct relationship with the Bank of 
England. The high credibility of the Bank of EnglandÕs notes and its potential as a 
source of cheap credit due to its sheer size attracted bankers outside of London. 
Moreover, working with the Bank of England freed joint stock banks from 
dependency on the London banks and bill brokers for credit. But the Bank of 
England had its own interests not necessarily in tune with those of the provincial 
banks. If the Bank of England was going to concede benefits to the joint stock 
banks, in particular, access to Bank of England notes and cheap credit, joint stock 
banks had to offer something in return. What the Bank of England wanted was an 
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 Simon Martin, a banker with the Norwich house of Gurney, Birkbeck & Martin, acknowledged in 
1836 that his bank did not rediscount in London because it accumulated more money than it could 
invest locally. This excess money supplied the London money market with the funds to rediscount 
bills sent from manufacturing districts. See Simon Martin to the Committee on Joint Stock Banks, 
BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS, (1836) (591) IX at 145 (Q: 2349-2351). See also the evidence of 
John Amery, the general-manager of the Stoubridge and Kidderminster Banking Company, who 
disliked the practice of bill rediscounting, probably because his bank accumulated more cash than it 
had investment outlets locally, and so had little need to rediscount. See John Amery to the Committee 
on Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS, (1836) (591) IX at 36 (Q: 548-550) and 40 
(Q: 641, 644). 
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end to the independent note issue orchestrated by joint stock banks and some 
influence over the quality of local credit. 
 
Joint stock banks from regions like Lancashire had a choice to make between 
turning to credit from the Bank of England and credit from the London money 
market. If the credit offered by the Bank of EnglandÕs local branch was significantly 
cheaper than that offered by bill brokers in London, the decision was relatively easy. 
The availability of cheap credit in London made the decision less straightforward.
278
 
In the mid 1830s, two factors came together to influence the price of credit and the 
choice facing joint stock banks like the District. First, the Bank of England felt 
pressure to lend because of the property relations structuring the choices open to the 
Bank. Second, it is again to the structure of property relations that we must look for 
an explanation of the widespread credibility of joint stock banks. 
 
D. Shareholders and Dividends at the Bank of England 
 
                                                
278
 Banks were not in an either/or position. For instance, the first circulation accounts introduced by 
the Bank of England at its branches in Birmingham and Liverpool soon encountered what was, from 
the Bank of EnglandÕs perspective, a problem. At these branches, the initial agreement was a 3% 
discount rate up to a fixed maximum of £200,000, in return for the termination of the circulation of 
both bills and notes as currency. Significantly, these agreements did not stipulate a fixed minimum. 
Consequently, when interest rates were low in London Ð below 3% Ð the contracting banks in 
Birmingham and Liverpool discounted bills with London bill brokers. Yet when the discount rate was 
high in London Ð above 3% Ð the branch found itself under pressure, as the contracting banks took up 
their maximum amount of discounts. If one of the aims behind these discounting arrangements with 
favoured provincial banks was to enhance the Bank of EnglandÕs degree of control over the currency, 
then arbitrage by joint stock banks initially thwarted that aim. In August 1833, the Bank of Liverpool 
had £181,000 under discount, and by October of the same year, it had £231,000. The fluctuations in 
the Birmingham Banking CompanyÕs account were also extreme. It had a mere £28,000 under 
discount in August 1833. By October, the figure had leaped up to £143,000. The figures are from 
Moss, supra note 25, at 14. See Collins, supra note 25, table 6, for the average market discount rate in 
London between 1827 and 1844. See Report on Bank Acts, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS 463-4 
(1857) (200) X at Q: 4876 for Overend GurneyÕs discount rate throughout the second quarter of the 
nineteenth century. The Bank of England responded to these arbitrage opportunities exploited by joint 
stock banks by requiring that a fixed minimum (usually £150,000) be under discount at all times. See 
also WOOD, supra note 251, at 100-101. 
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The Bank of England was unquestionably a ÒpublicÓ institution in the nineteenth 
century given its intimate relationship with the government, its monopoly over the 
creation of money in London, and its past and present privileges, manifested most 
dramatically in the limited liability protection enjoyed by its shareholders. Yet much 
of the historiography covering the nineteenth century monetary system refers to the 
Bank of England as a ÒprivateÓ institution.
279
 The best explanation for this common 
mischaracterisation of the Bank of England is the emphasis placed on its pursuit of 
profits. More precisely, the Bank of England had shareholders and these 
shareholders, less they take their investment elsewhere, expected a consistently high 
dividend each year.   
 
The tensions faced by the Bank of England in the 1830s grew out of its Janus-faced 
character.
280
 The Bank had public obligations due to its close ties with the 
government, of which one of the most significant was its obligation to uphold the 
gold standard by guaranteeing the convertibility of its notes into gold coin on 
demand. Simultaneously, however, the Bank owed obligations to its shareholders, 
particularly to produce a consistent dividend. Life was not easy for the Bank of 
EnglandÕs directors in the 1830s because safeguarding one of these obligations 
frequently placed the other at risk. 
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 See, for example, J. L. Broz and R. S. Grossman, Paying for Privilege: the Political Economy of 
Bank of England Charters, 1694-1844, 41(1) EXPLORATIONS IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 48, 49 (2004); 
and COLLINS, supra note 13, at 167. 
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 H. V. Bowen, The Bank of England During the Long Eighteenth Century, 1694-1820, in THE 
BANK OF ENGLAND: MONEY, POWER AND INFLUENCE 1694-1994, 1 (Richard Roberts and David 
Kynaston, eds., 1995). 
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Following the removal in 1833 of the East India CompanyÕs monopoly over trade 
with China, the Bank of England faced exactly this sort of dilemma.
281
 To prepare 
for the increased competition it would now face, the East India Company elected to 
sell off assets. Since it did not immediately need all of the funds thereby raised, the 
East India Company deposited the surplus with the Bank of England and received a 
favourable rate of interest of between 2% and 3%.
282
 To pay the interest owed on the 
funds deposited by East India Company, while still generating a profit to pay the 
dividend its shareholders expected, the Bank of England needed to make a return on 
its own investments sufficient to cover these expenses. The Bank identify LondonÕs 
bill brokers as an outlet for these funds and offered them loans at a rate of between 2 
" % and 4%. To cover what they owed to the Bank of England the bill brokers in 
turn charged their clients, including most prominently provincial joint stock banks, a 
discount rate of between 2 ! % and 4 # % between 1832 and 1836.
283
 The key point 
is that with an excess of funds looking for an investment outlet, the cost of 




                                                
281
 Two further events from the same period were also significant. The first event saw the Trustee 
Savings Banks deposit £3 million at the Bank of England. The second event was the Emancipation 
Act of 1834 that freed West-Indian slaves. Under the terms of this Act, the owners of the slaves were 
to receive compensation from the government. To pay this compensation, the government directed 
the Bank of England to organize a loan. Those subscribing to the loan made their payment to the 
Bank of England. As these subscriptions accumulated, the Bank made them available to borrowers at 
3 " %. Loans of this sort were available from the Bank of England from 5 August 1835 to 15 April 
1836. See MATTHEWS, supra note 262, at 171-172.  
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 See MATTHEWS, supra note 262, at 171-172. For the figures, see KING, supra note 125, at 87-88. 
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 See figures referenced supra note 278. 
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 For contemporary references to the cheap money available in the London money market in the mid 
1830s, see MANCHESTER CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, REPORT ON THE EFFECTS OF THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND UPON THE COMMERCIAL AND MANUFACTURING 
INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRY 3-4 (1839) on the affect of the BankÕs policy on the cost of money. See 
also J. B. SMITH, EFFECTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND: REPLY TO THE LETTER 
OF SAMUEL JONES LOYD (1840). 
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Flooding the London money market with funds looking for a return was not, as one 
might expect, strictly in tension with the gold standard in the mid 1830s. Although 
the theory behind the gold standard required the Bank of England to curtail its note 
issue when gold was flowing out of Britain, when gold was flowing into Britain the 
reverse was true. With the foreign exchanges running in BritainÕs favour in 1833, in 
theory, the Bank of England was free to expand its note issue by increasing its 
lending.
285
 There was a further factor to consider however. By lowering the cost of 
borrowing in London, the Bank of England created conditions favourable to joint 
stock banks in search of cheap credit. And since the joint stock banks could now 
obtain funds from bill brokers in London for around 3% with no strings attached, the 
attraction of borrowing from their local Bank of England branch under 
comparatively onerous terms and conditions was less compelling. 
 
To keep the Bank of EnglandÕs branches competitive, the cost of borrowing from 
these branches in industrial regions would have to fall. We can now start to see why 
the Bank of England offered the District a guaranteed amount of cheap credit in 
1834. Without such advantageous terms, an agreement with the Bank of England 
was not compelling given the availability of funds from other sources in London. 
Yet from the Bank of EnglandÕs perspective, once a circulation account was in 
place, the Bank was compelled to lend cheap credit over a period of time regardless 
of the state of BritainÕs balance of payments. Hence the puzzle pervading each 
circulation account: set up with the intention of helping the Bank of England manage 
the gold standard, their implementation in reality threatened to undermine this very 
objective. 
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 MATTHEWS, supra note 262, at172. 




E. Shareholders and their Joint Stock Banks 
 
As this chapter explored in Part D, joint stock banks took advantage of cheap credit 
in London in part because the Bank of England was itself in search of a return on the 
funds it held as interest-bearing deposits. If the Bank failed to cover the cost of these 
deposits, it risked paying out a below average dividend to its shareholders. Yet this 
is only half the story. Creating an environment where low cost loans are available is 
one thing, being able to take advantage of the availability of this cheap money is 
quite another. Crucially, in the mid 1830s bill brokers in London were only too 
happy to lend money to provincial joint stock banks. 
 
To understand the high regard the London bill brokers had for the debts of the first 
provincial joint stock banks in England and Wales, we must keep in view the 
property relations supporting each joint stock bank. Joint stock banks made money 
when rediscounting bills of exchange in the London money market because the rate 
charged to the original party discounting the bill in, say, Lancashire or Yorkshire 
was higher than the rediscount rate the bill brokers in London charged the joint stock 
banks.
286
 The latter rate was generally lower because with the endorsement of a joint 
stock bank on the bill, the unlimited liability of the bankÕs wealthy and/or numerous 
                                                
286
 According to Moss, in the 1830s the discount rate charged by provincial bankers for almost all 
bills was 5% (Moss, supra note 25, at 12). Joint stock banks could expect to rediscount these bills in 
the London money market for between 2 ! % and 4 # % between 1832 and 1836 (See Report on 
Bank Acts, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1857) (200) X at 463-4 (Q: 4876) for Overend 
GurneyÕs discount rate throughout this period), or for 3% from a Bank of England branch if the joint 
stock bank had a circulation account. 
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proprietors guaranteed the payment of the sum due on the bill.
287
 As one 
contemporary described the benefits of joint stock banking,  
 
a Joint Stock Bank can hold out to the public ... the most UNQUESTIONABLE 
SECURITY for its liabilities of every kind. This security arises from its 
numerous body of partners, whose property guarantees to the creditors of the 
Bank, whether they be note holders or depositors [or the holders of re-
discounted bills], an assurance of payment, which no private banking form can 
undertake ... [I]f some persons prefer to have the security of one, two, or three 
individuals for their deposits and bank notes, instead of 500, 700, or 1,000 
individuals ... no one has a right to quarrel with their taste on this score ... But 
[...] there is no denying the extent of the security [of a joint stock bank] 




                                                
287
 A number of economic historians of banking during this period note the importance of the 
unlimited liability of the joint stock bankÕs shareholders to the credibility of the bankÕs debts. See 
Cottrell and Newton, supra note 11, at 106; COLLINS, supra note 13, at 98; MATTHEWS, supra note 
262, at 196; KING, supra note 125, at 92-94; THOMAS, supra note 10, at 309-10; and WOOD, supra 
note 251, at 100 (footnote 61). By contrast, the original party discounting the bill in the provinces 
could expect London bill brokers to charge him a higher rate if he chose to buy pass his local joint 
stock bank because only he or, at most a handful of others, guaranteed the bill. 
 
288
 ANON., AN EXPOSITION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF JOINT STOCK BANKING IN REFERENCE TO THE 
DISTRICT SYSTEM OF THE NORTHAMPTONSHIRE BANKING COMPANY 6 (1836). The manager of the 
Birmingham Banking Company, Paul Moon James, made a similar point before the 1836 
Parliamentary inquiry into joint stock banking,  
 
if losses are incurred, the joint stock system enables the banking company to pass off those 
losses by calls on a greater number of proprietors, without stopping or exciting alarms in the 
community. Losses that have occurred to some joint stock banks would have shaken the credit 
of private banks, Paul James Moon to the Committee on Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH 
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS, (1836) (591) IX at 44 (Q:689). 
 
One of the architects of joint stock banking, Thomas Joplin, made a similar point by 
reference to the Northern and Central, a bank this chapter looks at in detail later. According to Joplin 
in THOMAS JOPLIN, ANSWER TO THE JOINT STOCK BANKS REPORT 13-14 (4
th
 Ed. 1837),  
 
The Northern and Central Bank of England, for instance, has 1,200 partners; the whole 
property of each partner is liable for the engagements of the Bank, and the paid up capital is 




The crucial element behind the credibility of the debts of the first joint stock banks 
was the unlimited liability of the bankÕs owners. By virtue of the legislation 
permitting joint stock banking, the property of the bankÕs proprietors now served as 
security for the obligations of the bank, whether notes, deposits, or rediscounted 
bills.
289
 Moreover, although the legislation of 1826 prevented the proprietors from 
limiting their liability to outside creditors, through the deed of settlement they could 
limit their liability to their proportionate share of the debt. Gilbart explained the 
potential offered by the deed of settlement to his contemporaries thus,  
 
                                                                                                                                    
£700,000. This, if there be any degrees in perfect safety, renders it safer than the Bank of 
England....  
 
Joplin then went on to note that ÒThe superior credit of Joint Stock Banks gives them, both in the 
form of deposits, and by means of re-discounting, a greater command of capital than private banks ...Ó 
(Id., 18).  
Joplin was not the only proponent of joint stock banks who emphasized the advantage these 
banks derived from the backing of their shareholders. Joplin and the other supporters of joint stock 
banking were not neutral observers. Their pamphlets defended joint stock banks and countered the 
attacks launched by, for example, private bankers. Though biased their central point was correct: the 
unlimited liability of the bankÕs proprietors backed the debts of the joint stock banks. In addition to 
pamphlets written by Joplin, other pamphlets supporting joint stock banking by stressing the credit 
generated by the combined wealth of the banks proprietors include, ANON., [A. MERCHANT], LOCAL 
ISSUES: JOINT STOCK BANKS AND BANK OF ENGLAND NOTES CONTRASTED 6-7 (1834); SAMUEL 
BAILEY, MONEY AND ITS VICISSITUDES ... WITH A POSTSCRIPT ON JOINT STOCK BANKS 191 (1837); G. 
M. BELL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOINT STOCK BANKING 7 (1840); PETER WATT, THE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF JOINT-STOCK BANKING 43 (1836); and FRANCIS C. KNOWLES, THE MONETARY CRISIS 
CONSIDERED 42 (1837). See also the evidence of Simon Martin, a banker with the Norwich house of 
Gurney, Birkbeck & Martin, to the Committee on Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY 
PAPERS, (1836) (591) IX at 150 (Q: 2422-2423). 
  
289
 7 Geo. IV c. 46 (1826) [Country Bankers Act], Sections XII. This was subject to two requirements 
applicable to all joint stock banks. The first of these required the lodging of an action for the recovery 
of a debt owed by the bank against the public officer (as registered at the Stamp Office) of the bank, 
at least initially (Section IX). If the bank was liable, the banks funds rather than those of the 
shareholders covered the debt until the bankÕs resources ran out. The second requirement focused on 
former shareholders, stipulating that those who had transferred their shares were no longer liable, 
provided the remaining body of shareholders was able to cover the debt owed. Only in extreme 
circumstances was a former shareholder called upon to contribute towards paying the debts of the 
bank in which they no longer held shares. And, at any rate, shareholders were completely free of all 
liability three years after the sale of the shares, (Section XIII). For a contemporary commentary on the 
Act, see JAMES WILLIAM GILBART, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON BANKING 56 (1828). 
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The act of parliament [of 1826] says to every shareholder, Òyou are 
responsible to the whole extent of your property for all the debts of the bank.Ó 
The deed of settlement says to him, Òif any claims be made upon you, while a 
shareholder, by the creditors of the bank, we, the other shareholders, engage 
to pay our proportion of the debt; and if you have ceased to be a shareholder, 




As Thomas puts the point, Òthe body of shareholders, by accepting the Deed, 





One way, then, by which the proprietors in the first joint stock banks managed the 
extent of their personal liability vis--vis each other, was by limiting liability to an 
amount proportionate to their shareholding.
 292
 Such an arrangement meant there was 
less chance of one proprietor left solely responsible for the banks debts. But it did 
not entirely remove this risk because if the bankÕs other proprietors had only modest 
property to their names, an action brought against them under the deed of settlement 
                                                
290
 Id., 57. 
 
291
 S. E. Thomas, The First English Provincial Banks, 3 ECONOMIC HISTORY 129, 132 (1934). 
Emphasis in original. For the problems that nonetheless arose respecting the proportionate 
distribution of losses between shareholders, see Appendix 2 to this dissertation.  
 
292
 In addition to the proportionate sharing of debts, the typical deed of settlement drawn up by the 
first joint stock banks further limited the liability of the bankÕs shareholders by stipulating that should 
a set amount of capital be lost by the bank, then the bank should cease operating. For this check to 
work, the shareholders were required to keep a careful watch on the bankÕs directors to catch the 
moment the bank overstretched (See Thomas, supra note 291, at 132). 
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might result in the recovery of some of the debt, but it might not lead to the 




The threat that some proprietors might bear more of the burden than their fellow 
proprietors encouraged each proprietor to take an interest in the affairs and 
management of the banks of which they were members. In particular, in the late 
1820s until the 1830s, proprietors assessed the character of their fellow proprietors 
and the likely qualities they would bring to the bank. The approaches taken by joint 
stock banks fell into two broad categories.
294
 Those who argued for and practiced the 
first strategy, recommended the issue of shares that only those of wealth could 
afford, using the wealth of each proprietor to uphold the credit of the bank.
295
 The 
                                                
293
 These points depend on the assumption that joint stock bank shareholders could bring actions 
against each other in respect of the bankÕs debts. Doing so was not necessarily straightforward in the 
1830s, as Appendix 2 to this dissertation explains.  
 
294
 See ALBORN, supra note 250, at 85-107. As many scholars have noted, and regardless of the 
differences in how joint stock banks selected their members, a regional character was common to 
almost all joint stock banks formed in the 1830s. Communities formed joint stock companies within 
their own towns and districts with the objective of having the new bank serve the Òwants of the 
district in which the bank is located,Ó Thomas, supra note 291, a137, quoting BELL supra note 288. 
Whether the membership was restricted to people of wealth and rank, or whether it was, to a greater 
or lesser degree, broad based, the bank drew its membership from the local population that the bank 
intended to serve. The names of joint stock banks formed after 1826 reflect this sense of localism. 
The ÒDistrict BankÓ was a common name, such as the Manchester and Liverpool District Bank 
(established in 1829) and the Northumberland and Durham District Bank (1836). Others aimed to 
cover a larger geographical region and had names reflecting that fact, such as the East of England 
Bank (1836), the North of England Joint-Stock Banking Company (1832), or the North Wiltshire 
Banking Company (1835). The Union Bank (1836), based in Manchester, was even more confined 
geographically, determining that its shares could only be held by residents of Manchester. The Bank 
of Manchester (1829), and the Manchester and Salford Bank (1836), both adopted the same measure. 
So too did Commercial Bank of Liverpool, which preferred its shares to go Òchiefly to residents of 
Liverpool É with a view to securing to the Bank, as far as possible, the profits arising from the 
business of its own SubscribersÓ (ALBORN, supra note 250, at102-3, quoting from LIVERPOOL 
CHRONICLE, 24 Nov. 1832). The Leeds Banking Company (1832) likewise set a geographical 
boundary around those who could own its shares (Id., 103). The practice was common across 
England and Wales, emphasizing the extent of the connection between particular localities and their 
joint stock bank. On the geographical concentration of the shareholders in the first English joint stock 
banks, see Lucy Newton, Towards Financial Integration: the Development of English Joint Stock 
Banks in London and the Provinces in BUSINESS AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION  SINCE 1800: 
REGIONAL, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 316 (Ulf Ollson ed., 1997).  
 
295
 StuckeyÕs Bank (formally known as the Somersetshire Banking Company) in Somersetshire 
represents the best example of a joint stock bank following the model of offering shares that only the 
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second route was to encourage a broad base of less individually wealthy 
shareholders. Doing so involved offering affordable shares to the public in the hope 
that a large number of investors would offer their support to the bank. Although the 
separate property of each proprietor in this second model could be modest, the 
combined wealth of all of the proprietors backed the bankÕs liabilities, who often 
numbered in the hundreds, sometimes in the thousands. The Manchester and 
Liverpool District Bank pursued a compromise between the two approaches. The 
Northern and Central Bank of England is a clear example of the second. This chapter 
considers both of these banks in detail, but first it is worth pausing to reflect on how 
the strong property base of the joint stock banks affected their bargaining position 
against the Bank of England.  
 
In the mid 1830s, the joint stock banks exploited internal tensions within the Bank of 
England. Caught between the conflicting obligations of protecting the gold standard 
and satisfying its shareholders, the Bank of England prioritised the latter, thus 
contributing to the low interest rates of the period. The joint stock banks were first in 
line for the cheap credit made available by these low rates because the property of 
their proprietors guaranteed any debts incurred by the bank. In the play of forces 
                                                                                                                                    
wealthy could afford. Formed in 1826 upon the combination of five small private banks (including 
the banks of Vincent Stuckey himself), the bank aimed at restricting its shares to men of property and 
respectability. Consequently, the shares had a price of £100, half of which had to be paid-up upon 
purchase. Shares at £50 paid-up were too expensive for all but elite merchants and manufacturers. But 
Vincent Stuckey wanted wealthy shareholders, ideally with some banking experience, because only 
figures of Òknown integrity and prudence, would be entitled to the confidence of the public,Ó PHILIP 
SAUNDERS, STUCKEYÕS BANK 24 (1928). Before the Parliamentary inquires of the 1830s, Stuckey set 
the absolute minimum he would continence for paid-up capital at £25 per share. Any less, he feared, 
would encourage Òlittle peopleÓ to become shareholders, see Stuckey to the Committee on Joint Stock 
Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS, (1836) (591) IX at 92 (Q: 1522). By Òlittle people,Ó he 
meant those of modest property who would be unable to cover the full extent of the bankÕs debts 
should it fail. StuckeyÕs emphasis on the ÒrespectabilityÓ of his fellow proprietors meant that the bank 
had by the mid 1830s only 35 Ð albeit very wealthy Ð proprietors. On the history of StuckeyÕs Bank, 
see PHILIP SAUNDERS, STUCKEYÕS BANK 24 (1928), and StuckeyÕs own account, VINCENT STUCKEY, 
THOUGHTS ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE SYSTEM OF COUNTRY BANKING (1836). 
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between the Bank of England and the joint stock banks, the latter found that the low 
cost of money in London worked to their advantage. As long as interest rates 
remained low, joint stock banks could access generous quantities of cheap credit 
from London bill brokers, retain control of their note issue, and avoid the scrutiny of 
the Bank over the quality of the bills presented for discount. In these circumstances, 
why put up with the scrutiny and the loss of independence that came with ties to the 
Bank of England when credit was available elsewhere at a similar price.  
 
Although their proprietors aided the bargaining position of the first joint stock banks 
against both the Bank of England and the London bill brokers, these same 
proprietors could also be the undoing of their bank. As the next section explores, 
many proprietors of joint stock banks from Lancashire wanted cheap credit in return 
for guaranteeing the debts of their bank. Crucially, where a joint stock bank was 
unable to resolve the conflict between upholding its credibility and providing the 
loans some of its members wanted, it faced a severely weakened bargaining position 
against the Bank of England.   
 
F. The Perils of Publicly Guaranteed Banking 
 
Recall from Chapter II that country banks of no more than six partners needed the 
support of their local community during times of crisis, but that those who offered 
this support placed themselves in a vulnerable position if the bank failed. To make 
this vulnerability more acceptable, Thomas Joplin proposed joint stock banking. 
Those guaranteeing the debts of the bank would now do so not only during periods 
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of economic crisis, but permanently and in return could expect to exert some 
influence over the running of the bank. 
 
In order to prosper, then, joint stock banks, like the country banks before them, 
needed the backing of the community of which they were a part. Conversely, the 
community needed the finance that banks made available. This was increasingly the 
case in the 1830s, especially in areas characterised by intense industrial competition 
such as Yorkshire and Lancashire, where merchants and manufacturers needed the 
backing of their local banker during the first decades of the nineteenth century more 
than ever before due to the increase in British manufactured goods exported to the 
US. This increase in exports in the face of the risks brought be Trans-Atlantic trade 
reflected a change in the practice of British manufacturers away from manufacturing 
to order towards the production of large volume of goods as cheaply as possible. The 
profit generated by each article under this approach may have been low but the 




Mass sales depended on the full exploitation of the export market. To quicken the 
process of transferring goods from the factory to the point of sale, manufacturers 
                                                
296
 Here is how Gabriel Shaw, a partner in a London firm of commission merchants, described the 
process in 1833, 
 
the savings arising from operations upon a very large scale are considerable; for instance a 
difference of three to four percent between operating with £20,000 and operating with 
£40,000, and these savings I believe may be greatly increased. Some of our manufacturers 
employ £100,000 or £200,000 or £300,000 capital. Suppose I make 100,000 pieces of goods, 
and I made ten percent [profit] upon 75,000 pieces, there is a positive gain [in manufacturing 
on this scale]; then I export the residue and incur a small loss; I am fully compensated for that 
loss by the profits I realized upon the three- fourths . . . [and] I produce the whole cheaper.  
 
Shaw is quoted in S. D. Chapman, Financial Restraints on the Growth of Firms in the Cotton 
Industry, 1790-1850, 32(1) THE ECONOMIC HISTORY REVIEW 50, 55 (1979). See also HUDSON, supra 
note 68, at 168-169. 
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consigned their goods to a commission agent
297
 who had the power to sell them.
298
 
In theory, until the commission agent sold the product and made payments, this 
system left the manufacturer out of pocket. In practice, the system benefited the 
manufacturer because the commission agent drew a bill of exchange with a typical 
usance of four months or less, with payment guaranteed by an acceptance house.
299
 
The knowledge of a commission agent combined with the guarantee of an 
acceptance house made it possible to create four month bills on which the promise to 
pay appeared credible. It was then easy to find a banker
300
 or bill broker willing to 
discount these bills. 
                                                
297
 The export trade to the US was fraught with risks, not the least of which was the time between the 
sale of and payment for the goods exported. Bills of exchange drawn with 12 months until maturity 
were common in the early nineteenth century. As Buck observes, Òcash transactions were so rare as to 
be negligible,Ó NORMAN SIDNEY BUCK, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ORGANISATION OF ANGLO-
AMERICAN TRADE, 1800-1850, 112 (1969). Consequently, merchants, unless they had a specific 
order, were reluctant to purchase goods from British manufacturers for export to the US market. With 
merchants reluctant to purchase this enlarged volume of exports, manufacturers initially opted to 
export their surplus themselves, but that was difficult to do well without some knowledge of the 
importing market. In time, the manufacturers turned to commission agents working under the 
consignment system (Id., 121).  
The commission agent had in the past operated as a merchant, buying the goods outright 
from the manufacturer. Early in the nineteenth century, buying the goods outright had become too 
risky for many merchants. Still, as Buck observes, merchants nonetheless  
 
had the specialized knowledge of the needs of different markets, and of the technique of 
shipping, which could be of value to the manufacturer. Therefore, if circumstances were such 
as to discourage him [the merchant] from purchasing directly from the manufacturer, he 
could at least serve him by acting as his commission agent (Id., 125). 
 
298
 Pat Hudson described the process as follows: ÒA common form of organization É was 
consignment by a manufacturer to a commission merchant who then reconsigned them to his agent 
abroad and settled with the manufacturer when he received the proceeds of their sale,Ó HUDSON, 
supra note 68, at 169. 
 
299
 Acceptance houses, sometimes called merchant houses, facilitated international trade by granting 
acceptance credits. The house of first-class credit agreed to accept bills on behalf of someone of 
second-class credit in return for a commission payment. These bills were easier to discount because 
they carried the endorsement of a respectable acceptance house. See ELIAS T. POWELL, THE 
EVOLUTION OF THE MONEY MARKET, 1385-1915, 374 (1915), and  S. D. CHAPMAN, THE RISE OF 
MERCHANT BANKING (1984). In the late eighteenth century, credit of twelve months had been the 
standard. An emphasis on low prices and high turnover provoked the move to shorter credits. See 
HUDSON, supra note 68. 
 
300
 Bankers preferred to discount bills of exchange drawn at four months to those drawn at twelve 
months, because the former matured sooner. Given that the bankerÕs own debts to the holders of his 
notes or to his depositors were payable on demand, holding short-dated, self-liquidating investments 
was preferred over those with longer maturity dates. The manufacturer also benefited from short-




Due to the intensity of competition between manufacturing firms exporting to the 
US, the more short-dated bills the manufacturer discounted with a banker, the more 
funds he could then reinvest in his production process to maintain a high turnover 
and low prices.
301
 Accepting bills of exchange as payment worked within this 
competitive environment provided discounting the bills remained easy. With the 
help of commission agents, acceptance houses, and bankers, this was relatively 




The willingness of bankers to discount kept the process liquid, and helped to prop up 
the export trade from Britain to the US. Any manufacturer who could not get bills 
discounted by a banker was out of the game. By contrast, manufacturers who could 
get large volumes of bills discounted at low rates gained advantages over their rivals. 
To guarantee the support of a bank, some found ways to back one, and some even 
went so far as to found one. The banks they backed worked to the beat set by their 
owners, and a large number of proprietors, including merchants and manufacturers, 
desired generous lending facilities. 
 
                                                                                                                                    
dated bills because the banker charged lower rates for discounting four-month than for discounting 
twelve-month bills. See HUDSON, supra note 68. 
 
301
 Manufacturers were happiest when they received cash payments, expressing their approval by 




 The number of bills of exchange in circulation increased throughout the 1830s. In 1832, just over 
356 million bills entered circulation in Britain and Ireland (89 million in circulation at any given time 
during that year). By 1836, the figure stood at almost 486 million (with more than 121 million in 
circulation at any given time). Following the crisis of 1837 the figure dropped to 455 million (113 
million in circulation at any given time) but by 1839 had surpassed the 500 million mark (132 million 
in circulation at any given time). Figures from THOMAS, supra note 10, at 302), based on Stamp 
Office records. 
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In the 1830s, therefore, becoming a proprietor in a joint stock bank often came with 
access to loans and or discounts.
303
 As the general manager of the Stourbridge and 
Kidderminster noted in 1836, ÒNo doubt every man who is a shareholder becomes to 
a certain degree his own banker.Ó
304
 The manager of the Birmingham Banking 
Company, when asked  
 
É do you consider that the relation which exists between a joint stock bank 
and a great commercial community, being proprietors or shareholders, affords 
any increased facility for acquiring custom on the part of the bank and 
obtaining accommodation on the part of the customers?  
 
                                                
303
 The following articles provide evidence that a large number of proprietors in the first joint stock 
banks were merchants and manufacturers: Newton, supra note 294, at 324-7; Hudson, supra note 24, 
at 280; and, especially, Lucy Newton, The Birth of Join-Stock Banking: England and New England 
Compared, 84 BUSINESS HISTORY REVIEW 27, 44-5 (2010). In her article from 2010, Newton 
provides evidence showing the percentage of lending by joint stock banks going to their own 
shareholders. In 1836, 59% of total business credit granted by the Ashton Bank went to its 
shareholders. In 1836, the equivalent figure for the Bliston District Bank was 44%, and for the 
Liverpool Union Bank, 43%.  A number of witnesses before the 1836 Parliamentary inquiry into joint 
stock banking explained that their bank made most of its loans to its own shareholders. See, for 
example, General Austin (director and manager of the North of England joint stock banking 
company) to the Committee on Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1836) (591) IX 
at 125 (Q: 2101-2102), and Joseph Gibbins (a director of various joint stock banks) to the Committee 
on Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1836) (591) IX at 69 (Q: 1089). On the 
influence of textile manufacturers over banking in Lancashire, see JONES, supra note 27; Stuart Jones, 
The Cotton Industry and Joint-Stock Banking in Manchester, 20 BUSINESS HISTORY 165 (1978); 
Stuart Jones, The Manchester Cotton MagnatesÕ Move into Banking, 9 TEXTILE HISTORY 90 (1978); 
and ANTHONY HOWE, THE COTTON MASTERS, 1830-1860 (1984). 
 
304
 John Amery to the Committee on Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1836) 
(591) IX at 36 (Q: 567). Peter Watt, a proponent of joint stock banking , echoed the attitude that those 
who owned shares in a joint stock bank should be recognized as bankers,  
 
If an over-powering argument in favour of joint-stock banking were required, it ought to be 
found by the public in the consideration of how much the customers lose by giving away their 
bank profits to a few individuals, in place of becoming an association of bankers themselves ... 
retaining among themselves the profits of banking. See PETER WATT, THE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF JOINT-STOCK BANKING 15 (1836), emphasis in the original.  
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echoed the view of his counterpart at the Stourbridge and Kidderminster, answering 




This practice of extending credit liberally to proprietors who were merchants and 
manufacturers came with a downside. Should the bank suffer losses, the onus was on 
these same proprietors to meet the debts incurred. In theory, that meant there was an 
incentive for the proprietors to monitor the extent of the bankÕs lending. As was the 
case in practice, one consequence that followed from the risk borne by the 
proprietors was that each proprietor took a close interest in the character of their 
fellow proprietors. Hence, the early joint stock banks guaranteed their obligations 
through, either a small number of wealthy members, or through partners who, 
though of modest individual wealth, countered this by uniting with a large number of 




Moreover, the proprietors of joint stock banks could further check the capacity of the 
bank to multiply its liabilities through both restrictions in the deed of settlement on 
the discretion of the directors,
307
 and strict rules on the security needed by borrowers 
                                                
305
 Paul Moon James to the Committee on Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS 
(1836) (591) IX at 44 (Q: 690). 
 
306
 See discussion at supra Part E of this chapter. 
 
307
 Safeguards were put in place by a number of joint stock banks to prevent the directors lending, 
either to their own firm, or to the businesses of family members. The Liverpool Union Bank, for 
example, barred directors from participating in the decisions concerning loan applications,  
wherein he, either solely or in partnership with any other person or persons, is or may be 
interested É [or] wherein any person standing towards him in relationship either of 
consanguinity or affinity is or may be interested, if the other directors then present, or any of 
them, shall object, THE DEED OF SETTLEMENT OF THE LIVERPOOL UNION BANK (1835), Article 
24.  
The deed of settlement of many joint stock banks also stipulated that should a set amount of capital 
be lost by the bank, then the bank should cease operating. For this check to work, the shareholders 
were required to keep a careful watch on the bankÕs directors to catch the moment the bank 
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to obtain a loan.
308
 But placing formal restrictions on the types of loans a bank could 
make risked leaving the bank marginalized from those it hoped to serve. The first 
joint stock banks were up against stiff competition from other joint stock banks, and, 
frequently also, established private banks with intimate knowledge of local credit 
networks.
309
 If one joint stock bank chose to apply strict lending criteria, its rivals in 
the 1830s would almost certainly fill the void with less exacting standards. 
 
A flexible and informal attitude towards lending led many joint stock banks to lessen 
the effectiveness of the provisions in their deed of settlement limiting the freedom of 
                                                                                                                                    
overstretched, see Thomas, supra note 291, at 132. On the qualifications needed to become a director, 
see Newton, supra note 294, at 327. For examples of other safeguards adopted by the first joint stock 
banks, see Cottrell and Newton, supra note 11, at 89-90. 
 
308
 The Surrey, Kent and Sussex Joint Stock Banking Company limited credit beyond six months to 
that supported by adequate security, defined as Òsufficient freehold, leasehold, or copyhold, 
hereditaments, government stocks or funds, or sufficient collateral personal security,Ó see THE DEED 
OF SETTLEMENT OF THE SURREY, KENT AND SUSSEX JOINT STOCK BANKING COMPANY (1837), Article 
31. Moreover, the objection of a single director blocked the loan (id., Article 31).  
 
309
 Some private bankers (i.e. banks with six partners or less) believed their system of banking was 
inherently superior to that of the new joint stock banks. According to Henry Burgess, the secretary of 
the country bankersÕ lobby, private banks of at most six partners were best suited to meet the needs of 
their customers. What gave them their edge was that the banker interacted personally with those 
looking for accommodation, using his intimate knowledge of both the surrounding region and the 
characteristics of his customers to judge the prudence or otherwise of his lending. Burgess, in his 
evidence before the Parliamentary inquiry of 1832, then went on to remark that  
the lending of money to the productive classes of the country is a matter of great nicety; it 
requires an extremely nice discrimination as to the character and circumstances of the party 
borrowing. I think it is the sort of discrimination that the managers of a Public Bank [whether 
the Bank of England or a joint-stock bank], who have not an individual interest in the 
management, rarely exercise; and consequently I think they are liable to much greater losses 
because they have not the same vigilance and experience as the private bankers, and they are 
not so constantly animated by a desire for success as a private banker, who looks to the profit 
of the bank as a means of establishing his family in life, and whose personal character is 
identified with his conduct as a banker, Henry Burgess, to the committee on the Bank of 
England Charter, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1831-32) (722) VI) at 422-3 (Q: 5253).  
 
ÒFixed principles of managementÓ hindered the ÒpublicÓ banks Ð the Bank of England and the joint 
stock banks. Burgess thought that joint stock banks, though restrained by regulations to a lesser 
degree than the Bank of England, still possessed only limited scope to discriminate between their 
customers than the private bankers owing to the fact that Ò[t]he business of a Joint Stock Bank is not 
directed by a single individual, or two, but by cumbrous Boards of Directors and Managers, who meet 
perhaps only once a week to decide upon such matters as advances of money to applicants,Ó Id., at 
418 (Q: 5199).   
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their directors by delegating considerable discretion to their directors elsewhere in 
the deed of settlement.
310
 When the proprietors actively monitored the bank, or when 
the directors closely supervised each other,
311
 the bank could contain the biggest 
dangers brought by the strong demand for credit from many proprietors. But what if 
the proprietors failed to supervise the bankÕs directors with sufficient care? The first 
join stock banks found themselves in an environment where an increasing number of 
merchants and manufacturers needed financial support, and it was to the new joint 
stock banks that they turned, often in their capacity as the bankÕs owners. Yet the 
task of monitoring excessive or oblique lending then fell to these proprietors, 
typically the merchants and manufacturers most in need of financial backing from a 
joint stock bank. Some private bankers noticed the inherent conflict. John Harding, 
who part owned a private bank at Burlington, Yorkshire, observed with respect to 
the joint stock banks,  
 
we find those partners all promiscuously assembled, good, bad and 
indifferent; every one has an interest in extending the business of the concern 
within his own circle, and it is impossible that so great a number should have 
                                                
310
 For example, few banks prohibited loans where the only security offered was the bankÕs own 
shares. Although most joint stock banks stopped short of allowing their shareholders the right to 
demand loans on the security of the bankÕs shares, almost all left the option open. It seems many 
early shareholders understood that they did hold such a right. Banks, formed after the mid 1830s 
tended to, in their deed of settlement, explicitly rule out any entitlement to such loan, though they left 
open the possibility at the discretion of a bankÕs directors. On joint stock banks lending to their 
shareholders on the security of the bankÕs own shares, see THOMAS, supra note 10, at 250-252. See 
also Hudson, supra note 24, at 390.     
 
311
 In an effort to curtail long-term loans made on little or no security, many joint stock banks 
assigned to their directors the power to veto loans. See, for example, THE DEED OF SETTLEMENT OF 
THE BIRMINGHAM TOWN AND DISTRICT BANKING COMPANY (1836), Articles 18 and 19, THE DEED OF 
SETTLEMENT OF THE COUNTRY OF GLOUCESTER BANKING COMPANY (1836), pages 37-38, and THE 
DEED OF SETTLEMENT OF THE HEREFORDSHIRE BANKING COMPANY (1836), Article 53. Problems 
arose when the directors did not monitor each other but acted nefariously in concert. See Part G (2) of 
this chapter for an analysis of this problem in relation to the Northern and Central Bank of England.   
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the discretion or knowledge of the true principles of banking to make the 




Joint stock banks, then, accessed cheap credit by bill rediscounting thanks to the 
unlimited liability of the bankÕs proprietors, and this cheap credit fuelled the demand 
for loans from these same proprietors in their role as local merchants and 
manufacturers. Rediscounting allowed joint stock banks to walk a perilous line, in 
particular when no one monitored the extent of the debt the bank then assumed 
through rediscounting. One anonymously written pamphlet from 1834 captures the 
potential trap well,  
 
The practice [of the early joint stock banks] seems to be, to establish a Bank 
upon a nominal capital of £500,000 or a million, upon which a deposit of 
£50,000 or £100,000 only (as a guarantee capital) is called up. Upon the 
strength, or rather weakness, of these inefficient means, the new Bank, by 
virtue of deposits entrusted to it, or notes issued, advances, by way of loans or 
discounts, say £400,000 or £500,000, which of itself is quite sufficient 
                                                
312
 John Harding to the Committee on Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1836) 
(591) IX at 132 (Q: 2168). Harding then continued (at 132 (Q: 2171)), ÒThose who take shares in the 
newly established banks seem to consider themselves, and I think are considered by the company, as 
not only interested in getting but engaged to get all the shareholders and all the business they can.Ó 
Others who observed the tensions faced by the early joint stock banks include ANON., [A 
MERCHANT], OBSERVATIONS ON THE CRISIS, 1836-37, 19-20 (1837),  
 
It will be seen that an immense superstructure of Commercial Bills may thus be raised on a 
basis of on the basis of Joint Stock Bank Notes, the notes themselves created on the mere 
credit of the shareholders, and a majority of these shareholders being the very parties 
receiving the Bank facilities. 
 
Joint stock banks supported this lending to their own shareholders by rediscounting in the London 
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engagement in proportion to the paid up capital; but in fact, too many of these 
institutions go far beyond this, because, whenever the bills offered to them 
exceed the amount of available capital, of the deposits in hand, and the notes 
issued, they still go on discounting all that is offered, relieving themselves by 
re-discounting the excess in London, and thus running into liabilities upon a 




Rediscounting worried many observers of banking in the 1830s because it allowed 
joint stock banks to assume, taking one modest estimate, liabilities of 6 to 8 times 
their paid up capital.
314
 Practically without exception, private banks, not to mention 
many joint stock banks from less capital hungry regions, viewed the tendency 
towards rediscounting as unsafe because of the extent of the bankÕs liabilities in 
excess of its capital. Moreover, they considered it Òdegrading to the character of a 
private banker placing himself in the character of a bill-broker.Ó
315
 The majority of 
MPs sitting on the committee set with the task by Parliament in 1836 of inquiring 
into the state of joint stock banking echoed these concerns as to both the safety and 
the appropriateness of rediscounting. This inquiry also, however, offered those joint 
stock banks that practised rediscounting the chance to present their point of view.  
 
As part of the inquiry, the committee requested from all joint stock banks across 
England and Wales a return of their liabilities and assets. Some joint stock banks Ð 
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 ANON., HINTS BY WAY OF ENCOURAGING THE FORMATION OF A JOINT STOCK BANKING CO IN 
LONDON, ETC , 11-12 (2
nd
 Ed. 1834). 
 
314
 John Amery to the Committee on Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1836) 
(591) IX at 37 (Q: 592). 
 
315
 Id., 39 (Q: 630). 
 
                                                                                                                
175 
 
most notably the Bank of Manchester and the Manchester and Liverpool District 
Bank Ð were reluctant to provide such information, especially details relating to 
Òbills bearing the endorsement of or guaranteed by the bank.Ó Their fear was that the 
subsequent disclosure of the bankÕs liabilities Òwould lead to very erroneous 
conclusions,Ó
316




As the general manger of the District Bank, John Stanway Jackson, pointed out in 
his evidence before the committee, the liabilities incurred on adding an endorsement 
to a bill of exchange were Òcontingent, but not absolute.Ó
318
 In order to demonstrate 
the Ògreat difference betwixt the contingent and the actual liability on endorsement,Ó 
Jackson noted that his bank Òhad in bills dishonoured (many of which were 
afterwards paid) only 7s. 4d. out of every 100l. of the bills we had rediscounted in 
one half year, which, I believe, is a very fair criterion of previous half years.Ó
319
 
JacksonÕs point was that the joint stock banks liability on the bills it endorsed and 
then rediscounted only kicked in should the other parties named on the bill fail to 
meet their obligations. The primary obligation lay on the acceptor of the bill. Failure 
to meet that obligation resulted in payment then falling on the drawer of the bill. It 
was only in a scenario where the drawer of the bill was also like the acceptor unable 
to meet their obligations, that the holder of the bill called on the District to meet its 
contingent liability.  
                                                
316
 John Stanway Jackson to the Committee on Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS 
(1836) (591) IX at 6 (Q: 57). 
 
317
 Edmund Burdekin to the Committee on Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS 
(1836) (591) IX at 2 (Q: 22). 
 
318
 John Stanway Jackson to the Committee on Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS 
(1836) (591) IX at 7 (Q: 70). 
 
319
 Id., 7 (Q: 74).  
 




Yet as Jackson additionally stressed, it was possible to take precautions against the 
possibility that both the acceptor and the drawer of the bill might fail to fulfil their 
obligations. First, when the bank considered whether to discount a bill, it took 
account of the ÒcharacterÓ of the drawer and the acceptor, that is, the likelihood that 
they would keep their respective promises. Second, as Jackson also noted, Òthere are 
bills of exchange which have passed through many joint stock banks.Ó Having added 
their endorsement, each of these joint stock banks was contingently liable for the 
same debt on the bill. Hence, Òas each joint stock bank must make a return of all 
these bills as liabilities, an impression would be made upon the public that the 
aggregate liabilities of joint stock banks were much greater than they really are.Ó
320
 
In reality, a joint stock bank shared the liability on the bills it had discounted with 
other joint stock banks, as well as others parties that had also added their 
endorsement to the bills. Yet when the joint stock bank tallied up its liabilities, it 
was difficult to convey that it was merely contingently liable on these debts. The full 
extent of the bankÕs liabilities would only ever fall due if every drawer, acceptor, 
and endorser that the bank shared liabilities with simultaneously failed.  
 
Notwithstanding the general validity of JacksonÕs arguments, there was a potentially 
serious flaw in the practice of bill rediscounting not captured in JacksonÕs evidence. 
The flaw was that rediscounting left joint stock banks from industrial regions 
dependent on others, typically banks from agricultural areas, maintaining their 
willingness to buy bills of exchange as an investment through the intermediation of 
bill brokers. During periods of falling prices and lower confidence, individuals and 
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 Id., 8 (Q: 76). 
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organizations alike tended to prefer liquidity, swapping investments for money. At 
such moments, joint stock banks dependent on rediscounting to fund the credit needs 
of their customers, found London bill brokers reluctant to buy further bills, given 
that those on whose behalf the bill brokers bought the bills wanted money rather 
than an investment. It was a moment such as this that brought the Northern and 
Central Bank of England to the Bank of England in search of emergency assistance 
in the winter of 1836, a drama explored later in this Chapter. 
 
The Bank of England, then, was not the only bank struggling to resolve the tensions 
between its conflicting obligations in the mid 1830s. Joint stock banks, especially 
those from Lancashire and Yorkshire, faced their own internal conflicts. First and 
foremost, they had to uphold the value of the bankÕs property because it was owing 
to the value of this property that others lent to the bank. Yet the credibility of a joint 
stock bank was strained by the demands for credit of local merchants and 
manufacturers, who were simultaneously debtors and proprietors of the same bank. 
While many joint stock banks found their bargaining position enhanced against the 
Bank of England by the inability of the latter to resolve its conflicting obligations, 
on occasions there was a reversal in the terms of the struggle. On these occasions, 
joint stock banks found that the property of their shareholders struggled to cover the 
magnitude of the bankÕs liabilities. One such occasion was the crisis of 1837. To 
survive, joint stock banks like the District and the Northern had to mobilize their 
proprietors despite the bankÕs liabilities, or risk finding themselves at the mercy of 
the Bank of England.  
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With respect to the District and the Northern, in the next section I delve into the 
organizational structure that they adopted. The District initially pursued a variation 
on the strategy of appealing to a select but wealthy group of proprietors, while the 
Northern offered low cost shares in the hope that a large body of proprietors would 
lend credibility to the bank. In the next section, I also discuss the consequences 
following from the adoption of these respective strategies. Both the District and the 
Northern found it difficult to contain the demand for credit that some of their 
proprietors wanted in return for guaranteeing the debts of the bank. To meet these 
demands for credit, the District and the Northern went down different avenues. The 
former opted for a circulation account with the Bank of England, and the latter 
exploited alternative sources of cheap credit in the London money market. When 
money became tight and crisis engulfed the English and Welsh banking system in 
1837, the District was able to call upon the further support of its proprietors, but the 
Northern was not, leaving it exposed to the dictates of the Bank of England.   
 
1. The Manchester and Liverpool District Bank 
 
From its formation in 1829, the District operated in a challenging environment due 
to competition from the Bank of Manchester
321
 and ManchesterÕs private banks.
322
 
                                                
321
 The District Bank initially struggled partly because its early rival, the Bank of Manchester, had the 
backing of many leading Manchester merchants, whereas the District did not. While the Bank of 
Manchester could boast a board of twelve directors, included seven merchants (three from the cotton 
trade), the DistrictÕs ten directors had only one merchant (dealing in corn rather than cotton). 
Otherwise, the DistrictÕs board was comprised of what The Circular to Bankers (5 December 1834) 
described as Òmen of an inferior grade in societyÓ representing a hodgepodge of business ventures 
and professions. These included a journalist; a surgeon; two hat makers; a solicitor; a cutter, tanner 
and leather seller; a grocer and tea dealer; and a Manchester shopkeeper. See JONES, supra note 27, at 
176, 178; see also LEO H. GRINDON, MANCHESTER BANKS AND BANKERS, 242, 252 (1878). 
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The District worked to avoid this competition by building a support base of 
shareholders from the towns and countryside surrounding Manchester and 
Liverpool. During the course of 1829, the DistrictÕs promoters established Òdistrict 
committees,Ó which had the task of raising capital by marketing the shares of the 
bank throughout the towns of Lancashire and beyond. According to the historian of 
banking in Manchester, Frank Stuart Jones, by the middle of 1829, Òcommittees had 
sprung up in the Potteries, Liverpool, Birmingham, Stockport, and more were 
planned for the numerous cotton towns.Ó
323
 To reinforce further the bankÕs support 
base in September 1829, the bankÕs management in Manchester went so far as to 
send out deputations to local gentry and nobility in Lancashire, Cheshire, and 
Stafforshire in an attempt to procure further backing.    
 
The District looked outside of Manchester as a strategy for tapping into the spare 
capital held by those from across the industrial heartlands of England and Wales. In 
order to entice people, especially merchants and manufacturers from towns like 
Oldham, Stockport, and Rochdale,
324
 to offer their backing to the bank, it needed to 
offer advantages, not least because the nominal value of the bankÕs shares was on 
the high side at £100. In the late 1820s and early 1830s, the second approach taken 
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 Both the Bank of Manchester and the District posed a threat to ManchesterÕs established and 
relatively prosperous private bankers. The private bankers were characterized by THE CIRCULAR TO 
BANKERS as Òold, sagacious, experienced bankers of great experience and unquestionable stability,Ó 5 
December 1834.  
 
323
 JONES, supra note 27, at 179. 
 
324
  In 1836, the District listed the following towns, in addition to Manchester and Liverpool, as the 
locations of its branches: Stockport, Oldham, Hanley, Nantwich, Warrington, Ashton-under-Lyne, 
Bury, Blackburn, Stafford, Wigan, Preston, Stalybridge and Rochdale. The bank listed its sub-
branches as Leek, Burslem, Lane End, and Cheadle (all within 10 miles of Hanley); Market Drayton 
(13 miles from Nantwich); Hyde and Glossop (both within 10 miles of Ashton-under-Lybe); and, 
Rugeley (8 miles from Stafford).  See Report on Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS 
(1836) (591) IX at 240. For an outline of the DistrictÕs planned branches and sub-branches at its 
establishment, see the MANCHESTER TIMES, 22 AUGUST 1829. 
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by joint stock banks to the selection of the membership Ð low priced shares aimed at 
attracting a broad base of shareholders Ð was not yet a common practice. The 
DistrictÕs approach was more in line with banks like the Stourbridge and 
Kidderminster Bank (1834) and the Birmingham Banking Company (1829). These 
two banks maintained a high nominal share price, but attracted a broad base of 
members by allowing members to pay for the shares over a number of instalments, 
up to half of the shareÕs value.
325





                                                
325
 To address the danger of attracting the Òwrong kindÓ of investors by making the bankÕs shares too 
affordable, authority was delegated to the directors of the bank giving them discretion over the 
allocation of shares. This strategy was adopted by the Stourbridge and Kidderminster Bank, whose 
general manager boasted in 1836 that ÒOur shares are 25l.; and I think I may venture to say, there are 
very few proprietors more respectable and more wealthy than ours: with only one exception we have 
not had a transfer of any share from a resident in Stourbridge,Ó John Amery to the Committee on Joint 
Stock Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1836) (591) IX at 41 (Q: 651). The bank was only 
interested in members who were either Òprincipal traders, manufacturers and merchantsÓ or who were 
Òvery wealthy landed proprietors.Ó And it was possible for the bank to reinforce and preserve these 
characteristics because, under the bankÕs deed of settlement, Òno one can become a shareholder, by 
purchase or otherwise, except with the approbation of our board of directors, testified in writingÓ (Id., 
42-3).  
Other banks were equally selective. For example, the Birmingham Banking Company, 
instead of advertising for prospective members by public notice in the local newspaper,  
only distributed some of the prospectuses to such persons we were desirous should unite in the 
concern; and as soon as a certain number of shares were subscribed for, we considered the 
company formed, reserving the other shares to be distributed among the persons who were 
likely to promote the interest of the bank, Joseph Gibbins to the Committee on Joint Stock 
Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1836) (591) IX at 60 (Q: 913).  
 
The Gloucestershire Banking Company adopted a similar approach, seeking out a Òrespectable 
proprietaryÓ (Id., 65 (Q: 1022)) through a circular, rather than a public advertisement, sent to those 
whom the promoters of the bank hoped would be interested (Id., at 62 (Q: 944).  
For more on the role of the directors of the first joint stock banks in allocating the bankÕs 
shares, see Lucy Newton, supra note 294, at 319-20; Cottrell and Newton, supra note 11, at 92; and 
THOMAS, supra note 10, at 223-6. 
 
326
 While the DistrictÕs shares had a nominal value of £100, only £15 was paid-up over four relatively 
modest instalments (£1 upon the granting of the share(s); £4 per share, 1 October 1829; £5 per share, 
1 June 1830; and £5 per share, 14 February 1835. See Report on Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH 
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1836) (591) IX at 240). For a list of the DistrictÕs shareholders as of March 
1838, see ANON., A LIST OF THE COUNTRY BANKS OF ENGLAND AND WALES, PRIVATE AND 
PROPRIETARY; ALSO OF THE NAMES OF ALL THE SHAREHOLDERS OF JOINT-STOCK BANKS 233-245 
(1838). 
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The advantages the District offered proprietors built on its efforts at attracting 
members in 1829. Restructuring the committees as Òlocal boards,Ó the deed of 
settlement empowered the boards to manage the branch in their locality. Although in 
theory each local board was subject to supervision from the General Board of 
Directors sitting in Manchester, the reality was that the latter body was under the 
control of the local boards. According to Article IX of the deed of settlement,  
 
... for the first year the General Board shall consist of the whole of the Local 
Directors; after which they shall be chosen at the Annual General Meeting of 
Shareholders, out of the Local Directors, and shall consist of such number, not 
exceeding twenty-one or less than fifteen, as such General Meeting shall agree 
upon. Provided that each branch be fairly represented, and that Liverpool and 





Under the deed of settlement the local boards had scope to control the general board, 
despite the fact that the creation of the latter was supposed to lead to controls over 
the former. That meant the bankÕs members from towns outside Manchester, such as 
Oldham and Stockport, gained control of a branch only loosely under the influence 
of the bankÕs other directors based elsewhere. Furthermore, the locally controlled 
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 DEED OF SETTLEMENT OF THE MANCHESTER AND LIVERPOOL DISTRICT BANKING COMPANY 
(1831), Article IX.  
 
328
 See Report on Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1836) (591) IX, Appendix at 
240.  
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Gaining control of a branch was the first benefit proprietors received from the 
District. The power to determine lending decisions was the second. The deed of 
settlement permitted the local boards to favour the bankÕs own shareholders, 
presumably part of the inducement used to entice people in places like Oldham and 
Stockport to lend their backing to the bank in the first place. While it was Òlawful for 
the local Boards of Directors to give credit upon Cash Accounts to the partners of 
the Company,Ó and for them to do so on the security of the bankÕs own shares,
329
 
other parties applying for credit had to produce substantial forms of security.
330
 
Moreover, although the members served by the local board were not Òentitled to 
demand or insistÓ upon credit, it was nonetheless noted in the deed of settlement that 
Òthe same shall be given or withheld, at the discretion of the General Directors.Ó The 
board of general directors comprised of representatives from each of the local 
boards, meaning that discretion over granting credit effectively lay with the local 
directors. 
 
Through the advantages conferred onto the bankÕs members running its local boards, 
in the early 1830s the Manchester and Liverpool District Bank attracted the support 
of men involved in the production of and trade in cotton from outside of Manchester, 
based predominately elsewhere in Lancashire. Despite a lukewarm reception from 
                                                
329
 DEED OF SETTLEMENT OF THE MANCHESTER AND LIVERPOOL DISTRICT BANKING COMPANY 
(1831), Article XLII. With respect to the security shareholders had to provide for loans from the local 
boards, Article XLII read:  
 
 É it shall be lawful for the local Boards of Directors to give credit upon Cash Accounts to the 
partners of the Company, to such an extent or amount of their advanced stock, as they may 
think proper, not exceeding one half of the stock paid-up, without further security, except the 
security arising from the right of retention competent to the Company ... 
 
330
 According to the DEED OF SETTLEMENT OF THE MANCHESTER AND LIVERPOOL DISTRICT BANKING 
COMPANY (1831), Article XLII, loans were not to be made to non members, Òunless on security 
(except the General Board shall otherwise approve and direct the same;) and if the security be 
personal, then, the party requiring the advance, shall produce not less than two sureties, in addition to 
the principal party, who shall be bound in the usual way ...Ó 
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potential proprietors within the town of Manchester, the District raised sufficient 
capital to commence with, and consolidate its position in, the business of banking. 
Soon enough, the lack of interest in the bank from ManchesterÕs own cotton 
merchants and textile manufacturers began to recede. The favourable borrowing 
facilities offered to members allowed the District to offer credit on terms that were 
sufficiently attractive to draw cotton merchants away from ManchesterÕs private 
banks. By the summer of 1833, a group of Manchester textile manufacturers had 
joined the bank. They soon dominated the local Manchester board and influenced 
the general board. Given the more than 800 proprietors backing the bankÕs credit, 
these Manchester textile manufacturers doubtless wanted to dominate the District 
completely, but owing to the bankÕs structure, they were unable to do so. 
 
The powers the deed of settlement conferred upon the other local boards stood in the 
way of the Manchester local board controlling the lending decisions of the entire 
bank. All of the local boards had to be Òfairly representedÓ on the general board. 
Consequently, the composition of the DistrictÕs general board in January 1834 
consisted of a reasonably even distribution of representatives from all fifteen of the 
bankÕs local boards.
331
 All board members had one vote each.
332
 While the 
Manchester representatives had nine votes, the other representatives combined 
controlled forty-seven. 
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 The Manchester board had the largest contingent, with nine representatives; the Liverpool and 
Ashton boards could delegate six; three boards had five representatives; two boards had four; six 
boards had three; while the local board at Nantwich provided only two representatives (see JONES, 
supra note 27, at 182). 
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 DEED OF SETTLEMENT OF THE MANCHESTER AND LIVERPOOL DISTRICT BANKING COMPANY 
(1831), Article XI. 
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Although the conflict between the DistrictÕs different groups of directors could leave 
those based in Manchester up against the rest, alliances sometimes also formed 
along other lines, such as manufacturing towns (like Manchester, Oldham, and 
Blackburn) against relatively rural areas (such as Cheshire and the Potteries). 
Characterizing a prominent dispute within the District in 1832, touched on earlier, 
was such a town versus country divide, and concerned whether the District should 
cease issuing demand notes in return for a Bank of England circulation account. The 
textile manufacturers wanted guaranteed access to rediscounts from the Bank of 
England to free them from dependence on London banks and bill brokers. Yet many 
of the Districts branches in rural areas found issuing demand notes advantageous as 
a means of meeting the needs of their customers, typically farmers looking for 
seasonal advances. The manufacturing interest on the bankÕs board held the greater 
number of votes, and hence the bank sacrificed its note issue in return for closer ties 
with the Bank of England. This chapter will analyse some of the consequences that 
followed from this circulation account with the Bank of England shortly, in 
particular the extensive bill rediscounting that it enabled. Before doing so, let us 
consider the Northern. 
 
2. The Northern and Central Bank of England 
 
Established in Manchester in 1834, the Northern and Central Bank of England (the 
ÒNorthernÓ) came into a banking environment where the Bank of Manchester and 
the older private banks dominated banking within Manchester. Moreover, the 
District was a powerful presence in large towns within a thirty-mile or so radius of 
Manchester. The Northern aimed to compete with these established banks by 
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attracting a large body of shareholders by offering shares at the low price of £10, 
fully paid up. Its strategy was successful. By 1836, the Northern had over 1,200 
proprietors, the District, by contrast, had around 800.
333
 Furthermore, to bypass 
head-to-head competition with other banks in and around Manchester, the Northern 
strategized that its prospects would improve if it exploited the desire for banking 
services further away from Manchester.
334
 Not one of the DistrictÕs branches was 
more than 52 miles from head office, and the vast majority closer. By contrast, the 
Northern had a branch 80 miles from head office in Nottingham to the southeast, 
103 miles from head office in Bangor to the west, and 83 miles from head office in 
Birmingham to the south. South of Birmingham, the Northern even had a branch at 
Worcester, 110 miles from head office, and a ÒsubÓ branch at Eversham, 15 miles 




A problem accompanied this geographical dispersion in that a branch located at, say, 
100 miles from head office was subject to minimal supervision. To deal with this, 
the bank needed to limit the discretion of their agents through provisions in the deed 
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 See Report on Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1836) (591) IX, Appendix at 
224. For a list of the NorthernÕs shareholders as of March 1838, see ANON., A LIST OF THE COUNTRY 
BANKS OF ENGLAND AND WALES, PRIVATE AND PROPRIETARY; ALSO OF THE NAMES OF ALL THE 
SHAREHOLDERS OF JOINT-STOCK BANKS 284-294 (1838). 
 
334
 There were still instances of head-to-head competition, such as in Manchester itself, and in other 
major manufacturing centres like Birmingham and Liverpool, where the District and the Northern 
came into conflict with other new joint stock banks like the Commercial Bank of England (also 
headquartered in Manchester). In the case of Preston in Lancashire, the District, the Commercial, and 
the Northern battled for business alongside the Lancaster Banking Company. In Nantwich, the 
District and the Northern went head-to-head. In Rochdale, the conflict was between the District and 
the Commercial. While in Chester, locals in need of a bank had the Commercial and the Northern 
vying for their custom. See Report on Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1836) 
(591) IX, Appendix at 224 for the Northern and Central; 226 for the Commercial; 240 for the District; 




 See Report on Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1836) (591) IX, Appendix at 
224. 
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of settlement, such as the requirement that the directors in Manchester approve all 
advances.
336
 Enforcing such formalities was difficult, however, given the reality that 
many of the bankÕs proprietors expected advantages in return for guaranteeing the 
bankÕs debts.
337
 As James R. Lyle, the accountant at the Northern remarked in 1837, 
Òit would be considered quite an offense if any person came to you in Manchester 
with a bill if it was not instantly cashed.Ó
338
 LyleÕs views echoed those of the 
NorthernÕs London representative, Walter Gibson Cassels, who noted that,  
 
where customers are liberally supplied at one bank, those in the same line of 
business with them, and possessing equal means, and whose business could be 
done with equal safety, say, Òwhy can not we have our business done in the 




A striking feature about the Northern was its diverse scope that included industrial 
Lancashire where the bankÕs customers took advantage of cheap credit, and 
                                                
336
 The branch agents had Òno right whatever to give advances without applying to the Directors at 
the head-office.Ó Officials at the Northern recognized both the possibility that local agents might 
enter into transactions without the consent of the directors from the head office, and that the bank 
would have to honour the obligations thereby assumed because Òit would be unfair to the public if it 
were otherwise,Ó Walter Gibson Cassels to the Committee on Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH 
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1836) (591) IX at 115 (Q: 1896). Nonetheless, countering the risk in their 
view was the security provided by each agent upon taking up their post. The security provided by the 
agent depended on the volume of business head office anticipated at a particular branch, but varied 
from £1,500 to £10,000. Each agent had to secure the backing of two sureties, Id., 115 (Q: 1892). 
 
337
 The NorthernÕs deed of settlement allowed the bankÕs proprietors to borrow up to one-half of the 
value of their investment. See Walter Gibson Cassels to the Committee on Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH 
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1836) (591) IX at 97 (Q: 1593); and THOMAS, supra note 10, at 250. The 
Northern also allowed some proprietors to borrow without providing any security, see Walter Gibson 
Cassels to the Committee on Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1836) (591) IX at 
110 (Q: 1806-1807). 
 
338
 James R. Lyle to the Committee on Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1837) 
(531) XIV, at 92 (Q: 1773). 
 
339
 Walter Gibson Cassels to the Committee on Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS 
(1836) (591) IX at 100 (Q: 1629). 
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agricultural regions where fewer opportunities existed for large-scale investments. 
Because of the unitary structure of English banking prior to 1826, banks from across 
the country called on the intermediary services of London banks or bill brokers to 
transfer funds from regions with a surplus of savings, like East Anglia, to areas 
where capital was in short supply, like Lancashire. The model of banking adopted by 
the Northern aimed at cutting out the intermediary role of the London banks and bill 
brokers by opening branches in areas where people saved before transferring these 
funds to those areas where there was a demand for capital. As the NorthernÕs 
London agent described the system in 1836,  
 
There are two descriptions of branches, one a branch debtor to the head 
office, and many others which are creditors to the head office; for instance, the 
deposits of money which are obtained at the branch, go to supply the demands 
in other places where they are called upon for large discounts. There are a 
number of branches in various parts which require no assistance, and where 
the discounts are almost nothing, but where the deposits amount to 30,000l. 
40,000l..
340
   
 
While debtor branches served the bankÕs proprietors by providing discounts, 
proprietors served by branches with a surplus of savings had no need for borrowing 
facilities. Rather, they were looking for interest on their deposits and, ideally, high 
dividends from their investment in the bank. To maintain the support of these 
proprietors/depositors, the Northern met their demands. As the NorthernÕs 
                                                
340
 Id., 106-7 (Q: 1724). Elsewhere, Cassels also elaborated on the difference between the Òtwo 
descriptions of branches,Ó see Id., at 104 (Q: 1679). 
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representatives confessed before the 1836 Parliamentary inquiry, ÒWe pay interest 
on everything deposited,Ó including on approximately £100,000 worth of deposits 
available for withdrawal without notice.
341
 Because the bankÕs shares were 
affordable at £10 fully paid up, Òmany É persons in the humbler walks of life and 
the middle classes,Ó invested their savings Ð ranging from £100 to £1000, even 
£1500 Ð in the bank by buying its shares.
342
 On occasions, the promise of high 




Interest payments on all deposits and the promise of competitive dividends ensured 
the Northern had deposits and share capital to work with in those regions where the 
bank had proprietors looking to borrow. Not only was the bank now in a stronger 
position to lend, it faced a strong imperative do so in order to meet both interest 
payments on deposits and a dividend sufficient to counter any temptation the banks 
shareholders might have to sell up and move their capital to another bank or 
investment. Provided the Northern was able to maintain interest payments and a 
competitive dividend, it would attract and retain a large body of proprietors. During 
1835, the bank became one of the largest in England and Wales, with over 1,200 
proprietors, its membership bolstered further by the reach of its branch network and 
                                                
341
 Id., 112 (Q: 1846-1849). 
 
342
 Thomas Broadbent to the Committee on Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS 
(1837-38) (626) VII at 110 (Q: 1592). 
 
343 One widow, for example, invested the huge sum of £15,000 in the bank. The directors had 
informed her that she was likely to make around £4,000 per year, see F. Stuart Jones, Instant Banking 
in the 1830s: the Founding of the Northern and Central Bank of England, THE BANKERS MAGAZINE 
130, 133 (March, 1971). The bankÕs dividend in 1835 was a respectable 7%, see Report on Joint 
Stock Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1836) (591) IX at 225. A dividend of 7% was in line 
with what most joint stock banks paid to their shareholders. For example, the Huddersfield Banking 
Company paid between 6% and 8 ! % between 1829 and 1835, The Bank of Liverpool 6% every 
year until 1835 when it increased to 7%, and the Commercial Bank 6% at the end of its first year 
(1835). The figures are from Id., 218, 227 and 226.  
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the low price of its shares. With over 1,000 proprietors backing the bank through 
their unlimited liability, the public regarded the bankÕs notes highly, making it easier 
for the bank to lend, which in turn attracted further proprietors as a virtuous cycle 
kicked in. Moreover, the guarantee provided by the bankÕs members also made it 
easier for the Northern to rediscount in the London money market,
344
 supplying the 
bank with further funds to meet the borrowing needs and investment expectations of 
its diverse body of proprietors. There was no arrangement for a circulation account 
with the Bank of England for, in these circumstances, the NorthernÕs directors 




G. The Crisis of 1837 
 
The boom that took hold of Lancashire and beyond gathered momentum in the mid 
1830s spurred on by new joint stock banks like the District and the Northern, cheap 
cotton imports, and the perception of export opportunities to the United States. As 
observed by Chapman, however, Òthe period of abundant credit was very short: in 
Manchester it did not begin until 1830 and ended with the crisis of 1836-7.Ó
346
 As 
                                                
344
 When the London and Westminster Bank agreed in 1836 to open an account for the Northern and 
Central, it did not consider it necessary to investigate the day-to-day management of the Northern 
because the London and WestminsterÕs management Òknew there was 800,000l. paid-up capital, and 
about 1,200 shareholders. We [the London and WestminsterÕs management] had seen the list of their 
shareholders, and knew they were, many of them, persons of property,Ó J. W. Gilbart to the 




 According to Cassels evidence before the 1836 Parliamentary inquiry, the Northern had informal 
discussions with the Bank of England about the possibility of opening a circulation account, see 
Walter Gibson Cassels to the Committee on Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS 
(1836) (591) IX at 103-4 (Q: 1670-1676). These discussions did not lead to an agreement, however, 
the Northern concluding that its own note circulation was more profitable (Id., 104 (Q: 1689).  
 
346
 Chapman, supra note 296, at 60. 
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we have seen, joint stock banks had a number of mechanisms available to generate 
funds for lending. Finding a profitable outlet for this money was more challenging. 
The result was, as one contemporary put it, ÒThat party obtains a privilege to largely 
overdraw, this an exorbitant advance upon slender securities, whilst, with a third, it 
will be agreed to discount his bills of exchange at a very low rate Ð a rate which 




The manufacturers and tradesmen were happy to take advantage of the easy credit 
made available to them by banks like the District and the Northern because they 
needed it to compete with their rivals in the battle for a foothold in overseas markets. 
As the Manchester Gazette pointed out to its readers in 1829, Òyou can sell neither 
cloth nor twist at any price that will cover your expenses É you cannot make 
profits; you cannot save yourself from loss É Your eyes are wondering over the 
map of the world for new markets.Ó
348
 Moreover,  
 
the struggle for new markets was a particularly arduous one in the period 
between 1815 and 1850, a struggle in which expanding manufacturers were 
sooner or later involved. While a capital of £5,000 or £6,000 was adequate to 
build a spinning or weaving mill in the 1830s, £10,000 to £15,000 was 
                                                
347
 Joseph Macardy, quoted in Chapman, supra note 296, at 59. Emphasis in original. Macardy was a 
Manchester stockbroker and promoter of joint stock banks, including the District and the Northern. 
Speaking in 1840, the Bank of EnglandÕs Manchester agent was willing to give Macardy credit for 
helping to establish almost all of the joint stock banks in Manchester, the agent writing to head office, 
ÒMr Macardy is the individual, who in succession, established every joint stock bank in Manchester, 
and who was up to a certain point connected somehow or other with all of them.Ó Yet each time 
Macardy helped to form a bank, before long he had to move on because, as the Bank of EnglandÕs 
agent continued, Òthe truth is, he [Macardy] has always held in utter contempt every director and 
official with whom he has been associated.Ó The quotations are from JONES, supra note 27, at 100.     
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 Quoted in Chapman, supra note 296, at 56. 
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Little wonder manufacturing firms seized upon bank finance. Yet in an environment 
characterized by stiff competition and high costs, there was no guarantee of a profit. 
Textile firms and the banks that supported them could harm their rivals in the race to 
lower prices, increase worker productivity, develop new manufacturing techniques, 
and find alternative sources of credit. Simultaneously, however, each textile firm, 
and its supporting bank, was at the mercy of the aggressive tactics of competing 
firms and financers.      
 
Both the District and the Northern had access to large amounts of money, either 
through a circulation account with the Bank of England or via the London bill 
brokers. They both had branches at the disposal of directors or agents under minimal 
supervision. And they both had proprietors demanding loans, and sometimes other 
proprietors looking for a return on their savings. In this environment, both banks 





1. Shareholders rescue the District 
 
                                                
349
 Chapman, supra note 296, at 56. 
 
350
 The crisis of 1837 is only considered here in so far as it affected the District and the Northern, and 
the latter bankÕs relations with the Bank of England. For a more detailed consideration of this crisis, 
see Ralph W. Hidy, Cushioning a Crisis in the London Money Market, 20 (5) BULLETIN OF THE 
BUSINESS HISTORICAL SOCIETY 131 (1946).  
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In 1838, the Bank of EnglandÕs Manchester agent estimated that the District had 
around £500,000 tied up in bad debts to nine firms.
351
 In fact, most loans on which 
the District was unlikely to receive payment stemmed from the bankÕs relations with 
two manufacturing firms.
352
 One account belonged to the firm of Taylor, Sons, and 
Gibson (ÒTaylorÓ), opened at the Manchester branch in August 1830. Two years 
later, it had become apparent to the DistrictÕs board at Manchester that there was 
Òserious liability connected with the bills then current in this account, many of 
which, to a very large amount, appeared of very doubtful character, and turned out 
upon inquiry, to be mere accommodation paper of little or no value.Ó
353
 More 
precisely, Taylor owed the District £120,764, more than two thirds of which was 






 by having TaylorÕs ÒpaperÓ Ð bills of exchange and 
promissory notes bearing the name of the firm Ð Òwithdrawn from circulation, or, in 
                                                
351
 Chapman, supra note 296, at 60. 
 
352
 The account that follows of the losses suffered by the District draws on the DistrictÕs own 
investigation, later presented to the bankÕs shareholders, and reproduced in the CIRCULAR TO 
BANKERS, 8 Feb 1839; the MANCHESTER TIMES, 3 Feb 1839; the MANCHESTER TIMES, 3 August 
1839; the LIVERPOOL MERCURY, 1 Feb 1839; and the LIVERPOOL MERCURY, 2 August 1839. 
 
353
 CIRCULAR TO BANKERS, 8 Feb. 1839 at 250. 
 
354
 Id., 251, 252. 
 
355 The directors in Manchester had two courses of action to choose between. One option was to force 
Taylor into bankruptcy by denying the firm access to further credit. Although the District would then 
have to write off a portion of what Taylor owed, the loss was capped at just over £120,000, and 
would in all likelihood be mitigated by whatever sum they could claim back via bankruptcy. The 
disadvantage to pursuing this option, however, followed from the debts that Taylor owed to others 
besides the District. Without the support of the District, these debts would go unmet. Knowledge of 
the failure of Taylor would then spread throughout Lancashire and beyond. The demise of Taylor 
carried risks for the District, for, as TaylorÕs bank and source of credit, suspicion as to the extent of 
the losses sustained by the District would spread throughout the commercial community of 
Lancashire. Attention would then shift to whether the District had the resources to withstand a severe 
dent to its standing in the eyes of both its shareholders and the broader commercial community in 
Manchester and Lancashire.  
As this chapter explored earlier, in the early 1830s the District was only gradually beginning 
to establish itself as a bank that might credibly serve the needs of local manufacturers, merchants, and 
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common phrase, Ôtaken up.ÕÓ
356
 By purchasing the bills of exchange drawn by 
Taylor, the District continued to extend credit to the ailing firm while 
simultaneously preventing these debts from ending up in the possession of those 
who might demand payment come maturity. A creditor demanding payment from 
Taylor would expose the inability of the latter to meet its obligations. The District 
wanted to avoid this scenario because it would signal to the commercial community 
of Lancashire and beyond the financial plight of Taylor, raising questions by 
association about the financial strength of the District given its ties to Taylor.    
 
The District extended loans to Taylor that totalled £212,505 by October 1834. Then 
the 1830s cotton boom kicked off and with it TaylorÕs debt, which by December 
1838 stood at £495,472.
357
 It seems conceivable that, after the debts of Taylor 
stabilized around 1834, the District reasoned the best way of making the firm 
profitable was to take advantage of the cotton boom. Rather than reversing the trend 
of losses, the DistrictÕs gamble that the cotton boom would turn TaylorÕs fortunes 
around backfired, with the firmÕs debts multiplying. That the losses sustained by 
Taylor began to mount at an accelerated rate after October 1834 is significant. The 
autumn of 1834 marked the commencement of the DistrictÕs circulation account 
with the Bank of England. The guaranteed and cheap discounts the District could 
                                                                                                                                    
investors. Following the DistrictÕs early struggles in Manchester, potential losses to the amount of 
about 14% of the bankÕs paid-up capital (CIRCULAR TO BANKERS, 8 Feb 1839, at 252), which the 
Manchester directors feared might occasion Ògreat peril to the bankÓ (Id., 250), were best avoided if 
possible. And it seems the directors in control of the Manchester branch thought it was possible, for 
in their opinion the risk of loss Òcould be materially reduced, if not altogether extinguishedÓ (Id., 
250). The directors presumably believed in the long-term profitability of TaylorÕs business: hence 
their decision to increase, rather than withdraw, their support.  
 
356
 CIRCULAR TO BANKERS, 8 Feb. 1839, at 252 quoting the MANCHESTER CHRONICLE. 
 
357
 Id., 251. 
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I cannot say with confidence that any of the partners in Taylor, Son and Gibson were 
shareholders in the District. Probably they knew shareholders in the bank, and 
possibly, they knew the directors who controlled the lending decisions of local 
branches. Branches in places such as Manchester and Stockport, at the heart of 
EnglandÕs textile industry, had worked together in order to secure a Bank of England 
circulation account and the funding that came with it. This cheap and guaranteed 
funding then found its way to those manufacturers who needed extensive external 





Through its relations with firms such as Taylor, the District stacked up losses by 
1837-38 totalling £788,158. In 1836, after the completion of the four calls on its 
proprietors, the banks paid up capital stood at £749,600. A mere handful of accounts 
had wiped out the investment of the bankÕs proprietors. Faced with this precarious 
situation, the DistrictÕs General Board of Directors had three possible responses to 
                                                
358
 Id., 251, 253. 
 
359
 The second account on which the District suffered large losses during the same period belonged to 
the firm of Brown and Powell. This account was opened at the Stockport branch in December 1831, 
and was initially unremarkable. By July 1832, Brown and Powell owed the District £9,952, but this 
was set off against security in the firmÕs machinery valued at £15,500, (CIRCULAR TO BANKERS, 8 
Feb 1839, at 251). By November of 1834, the amount owed by Brown and Powell had increased to 
£25,206. That was a manageable figure, at least when contrasted with the account of Taylor, which in 
the autumn of 1834 was more than five times that amount. Yet between the autumn of 1834 and 
1837, with cheap and accessible credit from the Bank of England at its disposal, the District 
channelled funds in the direction of Brown and Powell in much the same manner as they did with 
Taylor. If the Stockport directors anticipated Brown and Powell profiting from the cotton boom of the 
mid 1830s, they were left disappointed. By August 1837, Brown and PowellÕs account was in debt to 
the sum of £136,133. A year later, the firm owed the District £292,686 (Id., 251).    
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consider. One option was to turn to the Bank of England for assistance. By the mid 
1830s, the DistrictÕs circulation account with the Bank guaranteed them access to 
between £500,000 and £600,000 worth of discounts. Was not the advantage of close 
ties with the Bank of England the availability of credit when need be? The problem 
facing the District, however, was that it had consistently taken up its guaranteed 
discounts with the Bank of England.
360
 No other bank in England and Wales enjoyed 
recourse to £600,000 worth of Bank of England credit, yet the District had already 
pushed this to its limit. If the District wanted further assistance from the Bank, it 
would have to negotiate a higher line of credit.  
 
A second option was to bypass the Bank of England and seek discounts from bill 
brokers in London. Even in the mid 1830s, when the District had benefited from 
large discounts with the Bank, it had nevertheless turned frequently to London bill 
brokers.
361
 As we will see shortly with respect to the Northern, however, during 
times of weak demand and falling prices, discounts were either costly or nonexistent. 
Unlike the terms of their deal with the Bank, the District had no guarantee from the 




The District could only avoid being at the mercy of the Bank of England or London 
bill brokers by drawing on a third response, one that called for the support of the 
                                                
360
 CIRCULAR TO BANKERS, 8 Feb 1839, at 253. 
 
361
 Id., 253. See also supra section C.  
 
362
 The District, like the Northern, negotiated a deal with the London and Westminster Bank to help 
alleviate the danger of the discount market in London freezing up. Both deals guaranteed £100,000 
when needed, plus £50,000 worth of discounts at the prevailing market rate. This funding was for use 
in emergencies, but it was not sufficient to rectify the losses the District had suffered by early 1837. 
The DistrictÕs deal with the London and Westminster commenced on 1 January 1835. Gregory 
reproduces the agreement in GREGORY, supra note 28, at 302-303.  
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bankÕs community of shareholders, and is reminiscent of the community support 
local communities offered to their banker before 1826. As I explained in Chapter II, 
before 1826, when a bank of six partners or less was in trouble, it frequently 
survived owing to the backing it received from the community of which it was a 
part. With the advent of joint stock banking from 1826, the shareholders in the new 
banks became fully liable for their banks debts. Unlimited shareholder liability 
institutionalized the ad hoc community backing by which bankers had frequently 
weathered crisis before 1826. That liability became real for each proprietor in the 
event of the bank failing. Moreover, failure also carried repercussions for the bankÕs 
depositors and borrowers. While proprietors lost out because of their responsibility 
to compensate the bankÕs creditors, depositors and borrowers also suffered, the 
former losing access to money, the latter to credit.    
 
It was, however, possible to delay, or, more optimistically, to avoid such losses 
altogether. As described earlier, the District sought to mediate the path between, on 
the one hand, too many proprietors of insufficient wealth, and, on the other, too few 
proprietors, by offering shares to the public that carried a high nominal value of 
£100, of which only £15 was paid up over four instalments.
363
 The aim was to attract 
sufficient investment without encouraging so-called Òlittle peopleÓ of modest means 
to become proprietors.
364
 Because only £15 had been paid up front for the £100 
shares, the bank still reserved the right to call on funds from its shareholders. 
Whether to demand payment or not was within the discretion of the DistrictÕs 
directors, subject to Article XXXIII of the deed of settlement, which limited calls to 
                                                
363
 Report on Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1836) (591) IX at 240. 
 
364
 The phrase Òlittle peopleÓ belongs to the Somersetshire banker, Vincent Stuckey. See supra note 
295 and the discussion in section E of this chapter. 
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£5 per share per year.
365
 Any calls for a greater sum required the consent of the 
majority of proprietors at a general meeting, and even then, a £20 per share per year 
limit curtailed the discretion of the directors further.  
 
In the autumn of 1836, it would have raised suspicion if the DistrictÕs directors had 
demanded that the bankÕs proprietors contribute £20 per share at a time when 
obtaining funds from London was growing challenging. Asking the proprietors for 
£20 per share meant asking for £1 million in total. Few proprietors would vote for 
such a measure without the bankÕs directors first providing a convincing explanation 
of why the bank needed so much money at short notice. If the bankÕs directors made 
public the extent of the debts owed to the District, the bankÕs solvency would come 
into question. Demanding £5 per share from the proprietors was less likely to 
provoke suspicion. The drawback to this option, however, was the mere £250,000 
that it would raise. By the turn of 1836 into 1837, the District had already taken on 
losses of more than £500,000 due to the state of the accounts of firms such as 
Taylor. The DistrictÕs directors needed a more radical alternative. 
 
Helping the directors find such an alternative was, partly, the fact that the District 
had long since found owners for its 50,000 shares. Not infrequently, other banks had 
retained a portion of their shares upon the establishment of the bank with 
distribution left at the discretion of the directors. The idea was that the directors 
should use these shares to attract proprietors who would bring business and/or 
prestige to the bank. The District followed a similar strategy initially, issuing 30,000 
to establish the bank while the remaining 20,000 were thereafter Òdistributed ... for 
                                                
365
 DEED OF SETTLEMENT OF THE MANCHESTER AND LIVERPOOL DISTRICT BANKING COMPANY 
(1831), Article XXXIII. 
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the benefit of the company.Ó
366
 By the mid 1830s, all of the bankÕs 50,000 shares 
had found buyers. Yet with the onset of the cotton boom alongside the strong 
demand generally for the shares of joint stock banks, those joint stock banks, such 
as, for example, the Northern, with unissued shares found they could sell them at a 
premium. A possible solution for the District, then, was to issue more shares, in the 
knowledge that these new shares would sell at a premium given the strong demand 
for the shares of joint stock banks at that time. The development of this plan 
occupied the DistrictÕs directors during the autumn and winter of 1836 and 1837, 
before the bankÕs precarious financial position became public. 
 
To issue new shares, the DistrictÕs directors needed to get the consent of the bankÕs 
existing proprietors. They could obtain that through Article LXX of the deed of 
settlement, which allowed for the modification of the deed provided two-thirds of 
the shareholders agreed to the change.
367
 Before making their proposal to the 
existing proprietors, however, the directors had concerns to address. The DistrictÕs 
directors risked making the bankÕs shares uncompetitive if they asked the proprietors 
to sanction the creation of, say, 20,000 new shares, each with a nominal value of 
£100, the existing value of the bankÕs shares. Although only £15 paid up over 
instalments, many prospective proprietors would find the unpaid liability of £85 
daunting especially given the availability of more affordable options in the mid 
1830s. The shares of the Northern, for example, were £10 fully paid up, and those of 
the Commercial Bank of England were just £5 fully paid up. Yet the DistrictÕs 
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 See the DistrictÕs prospectus, reproduced in JOSEPH MACARDY, OUTLINES OF BANKS, BANKING 
AND CURRENCY 157 (1840). 
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 DEED OF SETTLEMENT OF THE MANCHESTER AND LIVERPOOL DISTRICT BANKING COMPANY 
(1831), Article LXX. 
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directors did not wish to go to the extreme pursued by the Northern and the 
Commercial of making shares so affordable that even large numbers of Òlittle 
peopleÓ could buy them. Such a move would alter the character of the bank, 
something the DistrictÕs proprietors would most likely veto.  
 
To deal with these concerns, the DistrictÕs directors presented a middle course to the 
bankÕs proprietors. The bank would issue new shares by converting from its present 
arrangement Ð 50,000 shares of £100 each Ð to 100,000 shares at £50 each, £15 paid 
up over instalments. The capital of the bank remained the same at £5 million. But, 
courtesy of the conversion, the bank would double, once the conversion was 
complete and all shares taken up, its working capital from £750,000 to £1.5 million. 
Moreover, each proprietor would face the less daunting though still considerable 
prospect of £35 contingent liability on their £15 paid up £50 shares. The plan 
received the backing from the requisite number of existing proprietors, who 
benefitted from first refusal of the new shares.
368
 By March 1837, the District had 
allotted 30,000 of these shares, £5 paid up on purchase. The District had kept its 
losses under wraps in the spring of 1837 so its new shares sold at a premium, adding 
£2 to the price of each share. Because of this strategy, the District had already added 
£226,000 to its working capital, with double that figure expected once shareholders 
contributed the remaining £10 on each of the 30,000 shares so far allotted. 
Moreover, the bank now had 20,000 additional shares, which the directors could 
dispose of as they saw fit. 
 
2. The Northern at the mercy of the Bank of England 
                                                
368
 See the MANCHESTER TIMES, 6 August 1836. 
 




When the District found recourse to the Bank of England unattractive and to the 
London money market impossible, it weathered the 1837 crisis because it called 
upon the support of its proprietors. In the same crisis, the Northern was not so 
fortunate. Like the District, the Northern saw loses mount during the mid 1830s. By 
the time of its liquidation in early 1837, the debts owed to the bank stood at £1.3 
million. The NorthernÕs proprietors owed the bank much of this debt, as the bankÕs 
manager, T. Evans, admitted before the Parliamentary inquiry of 1837, ÒA great 




Owing to the distance between the branches and the head office in Manchester, the 
directors could do little when an agent running a branch did not obey orders from the 
head office.
370
 Yet even if the NorthernÕs branches had not been so distant from the 
head office, losses may well have resulted regardless. The problem was that the 
bankÕs 10 Manchester directors borrowed from the bank to an extent surpassing the 
branch agents, largely because no one took on the role of monitoring them. The 
Manchester directors channelled loans to their own firms, rediscounting with 
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 Thomas Evans to the Committee on Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1837) 
(531) XIV, at 67 (Q: 1331). When pushed by the committee for specific information, Evans 
acknowledged that out of the 52 accounts at the Manchester branch where the holder owed the bank 
£2,000 or more, 35 belonged to the NorthernÕs shareholders. A similar situation prevailed at 
Liverpool, where, out of the 29 accounts where the holder owed the bank £2,000 or more, 21 
belonged to the bankÕs shareholders, Id., 67, (Q: 1332, 1333).  
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 Henry Moult to the Committee on Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1837) 
(531) XIV, at 39 (Q: 756). At the Leeds branch, the bad debt was £40,000. Under the deed of 
settlement, the agent running the branch provided security, but this only covered between £2,000 and 
£2,500. At Nottingham, the losses totalled £12,000, at Sheffield, between £12,000 and £14,000. The 
security provided by the agent in both cases was only £2,000. See Henry Moult to the Committee on 
Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1837) (531) XIV, at 40 (Q: 768, 769). 
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London bill brokers to raise the money.
371
 Combined, the NorthernÕs directors owed 
their bank £255,000. 
 
To maintain this level of lending to its own proprietors, the Northern needed access 
to cheap credit.
372
 The Bank of England was one potential source of such funding, 
but the Northern, in contrast to the District, was unwilling to meet the BankÕs terms, 
particularly the requirement that it forego issuing its own demand notes. As an 
alternative, the Northern turned to bill rediscounting with London bill brokers, 
which proved to be a cheap source of funding in the mid 1830s.
373
 Borrowing from 
                                                
371
 One director, a picture dealer called Agnew, overdrew on his account to the sum of £23,903, the 
only security for the loans being the bankÕs own shares that Agnew had still to pay for, see Henry 
Moult to the Committee on Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1837) (531) XIV, at 
14-15 (Q: 264-278). Braidley, a manufacturer, had overdrawn the sum of £30,347 by January 1836. 
Only £6,500 of this appeared in the bankÕs public accounts book (the book that the bankÕs clerks had 
access to). A ÒprivateÓ accounts book recorded the rest, accessible only to a handful of directors and 
the bankÕs accountant. BraidleyÕs sole security for these loans was a single long-dated bill of 
exchange drawn on someone who apparently owed him money in London (Id., 15 (Q: 293-298)). The 
biggest liability, described by the 1837 Parliamentary Committee as an Òimmense credit,Ó was owed 
to the bank by a director called Hardie, a Ògeneral agentÓ with ties to banks in Ireland, and totalled 
£70,000 (Id., 16 (Q: 306)). 
 
372
 Before turning to external sources of credit, the Northern had at its disposal the capital of its 
shareholders and the deposits left by savers. Upon its establishment in 1834, the Northern had created 
100,000 shares. By 1836, 71,186 of these had owners. All of the shares were £10 fully paid up over 
four instalments of £2 10s. per share. After the final instalment in March 1835, the bankÕs working 
capital, upon which the bank could make no further calls, stood at £711,160, see Report on Joint 
Stock Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1836) (591) IX at 225. The funds the bank raised 
through receiving deposits, especially from agricultural areas where it established branches to tap into 
pools of savings, supplemented this working capital. By the time of the NorthernÕs collapse, in 
January of 1837, it held £700,000 worth of deposits (CIRCULAR TO BANKERS, 30 Dec. 1836 at 195). 
Moreover, the Northern had the option of making loans through its own note issue, the circulation of 
which stood at £300,000 by January 1837. The problem with both using deposits and creating notes 
to supplement the bankÕs capital was that these sources of funding were liabilities. The account 
holder could withdraw the sums deposited with little or no notice, and the note holder could insist on 
payment in gold coin or Bank of England notes on demand. The Northern had to make sure it had 
access to funding sources independent of its shareholders, depositors, and note holders. The main 
source of such funding was the London money market. 
 
373
 The NorthernÕs Chairman, Henry Moult, claimed in 1837 that, Òdiscounts were very easy in 
1834,Ó Henry Moult to the Committee on Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS 
(1837) (531) XIV, at 43 (Q: 830). In March 1834, the bill brokers, Overend Gurney, charged a 
discount rate of 2 ! % (the Bank of England, by contrast, charged 4 %). Overend GurneyÕs rate did 
not rise above 3 " % during the first half of 1834 and during 1835 it was always within the range of 3 
" % to 4 %. In the second half of 1836, however, it reached 5 %. When the Northern turned to the 
Bank of England for help in December 1836, Overend GurneyÕs rate stood at 5 " % and the Bank of 
EnglandÕs stood at 5%.The figures are from Report on Bank Acts, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS 
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bill brokers brought considerable risks however. Whether or not to supply discounts 
was completely within the control of bill brokers. When bill brokers refused to 
rediscount bills, banks like the Northern could only hope the banks serving as their 
London agents would help them out. The Northern had to be careful here too, 
however. Each London bank served a number of country correspondents. If all of 
these correspondents requested funds at the same time, the London bankers would 




Despite these risks, in the mid 1830s the Northern pushed bill rediscounting to the 
limit. In December 1834, Walter Gibson Cassels, the person soon to be appointed as 
the bankÕs permanent employee in London, complained about the extent of the 
                                                                                                                                    
(1857) (200) X at 463-4 (Q: 4876), which contains Overend GurneyÕs discount rate throughout the 
1830s; and CLAPHAM, supra note 126, Appendix B, at 429, which contains the Bank of EnglandÕs 
discount rate.   
 
374
 During the crisis of 1825-26, banks dependent on funds from London found that when they all 
turned to London at the same time for emergency supplies of gold coin and Bank of England notes, 
the London banks could not keep pace with demand. When the 1836 Parliamentary Committee 
learned that the NorthernÕs emergency lines of funding consisted of Ò[I]n the first place ... a large 
amount of gold coin and Bank of England notes lying at head office [and] in the second place ... very 
great facilities altogether in London, which we could make available at the shortest notice,Ó they 
sensed vulnerability. (The quotation is from Walter Gibson Cassels to the Committee on Joint Stock 
Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1836) (591) IX at108 (Q: 1747)).  
Despite the NorthernÕs claim that it had the Òpower to go to a very considerable extent with 
our [London] bankersÓ (Id., 108 (Q: 1748)), to perhaps £50,000 or £100,000 (Id., 108 (Q: 1749) in an 
emergency, the committee was sceptical. They wondered if the Northern had Ònot heard of periods at 
which bankers in London have been obliged to take care of themselves, and not encumber themselves 
with such engagementsÓ (Id., 108 (Q: 1751)). When the NorthernÕs representative was pushed, he 
admitted that he did not know if the Northern had any legally binding agreement committing their 
London bankers, Barnett, Hoare & Company, and Prescott, Grote & Company, to supply them with 
such aid in an emergency (Id.,109 (Q: 1774, 1775)). In fact, the Northern kept their balance with their 
London bankers Òas bare as we canÓ (Id., 109 (Q: 1763)) during normal times because their London 
bankers did not pay interest on idle balances. Consequently, one committee member, Sir James 
Graham, wondered whether it was likely that their London bankers would show the Northern good 
will should they need it, asking the NorthernÕs representative, ÒAs you studiously keep your London 
bankers, as you term it, bare, do you expect that any moment they would advance 100,000l. for you 
on an emergency?Ó (Id.,109 (Q: 1772)). Due to the absence of interest payments on their credit 
balances at their London bankers, the Northern turned instead to bill rediscounting with London bill 
brokers. The bill brokers also served as a potential source of assistance in an emergency. But, as was 
the case with the bankers, bill brokers were not reliable in an emergency, a fact the NorthernÕs 
representative made clear when pushed by the committee, Òthey [the bill brokers] might refuse to 
discount any of our bills at any momentÓ (Id., 109 (Q: 1784)).  
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bankÕs liabilities falling due that he had to raise the funds to cover, either from their 
London bankers or by rediscounting. The bank needed to make payments to 
depositors, note holders, and on bills of exchange it had accepted that totalled 
£100,000 per week. The bills held by Cassels Ð bills the Northern had discounted 
and held until maturity Ð generated around £21,000 per week. The head office in 
Manchester also remitted funds to London every day, placing at Cassels disposal a 
further £30,000 each week. That left a shortfall of, typically, between £40,000 and 





The problem, then, for the Northern was that it had just enough bills that it could 
rediscount to cover its obligations. Ideally, the bank wanted to work with a larger 
margin, so that when payments fell due it was not desperately trying to raise cash. 
When the bank needed all the cash it could raise, it became dependent on bill 
brokers, who then dictated a higher rate of discount knowing that the Northern had 
no choice but to accept the terms imposed.
376
 As Cassels put the point,  
 
Now the simple fact is, that we can get money if we have bills to offer and do 
not object to the rate demanded, but we are not supplied with bills sufficient 
                                                
375
 WALTER GIBSON CASSELS, A NARRATIVE OF THE DISPUTE BETWEEN THE NORTHERN AND 
CENTRAL BANK OF ENGLAND AND WALTER GIBSON CASSELS (1838), Appendix at 2, letter from 
Cassels in London to the head office in Manchester, 12 December 1834. 
 
376
 Cassels wanted the bank to reduce its liabilities to give it greater independence from bill brokers. 
In his correspondence with head office he stressed that,  
 
We must get more independent to be at all comfortable. On this view I think we must either 
have increased means or as soon as possible diminish the number of branches and lesson the 
amount of advances both at H.O. and branches. In short curtail the business so as to bring it 
into a manageable compass, CASSELS, supra note 375, Appendix at 2, letter from Cassels in 
London to the head office in Manchester, 12 December 1834. Emphasis in original. 
 
                                                                                                                
204 
 
for the demand. The result of this is ... that at times we have not bills to give in 
time to meet our demands, and consequently we cannot drive a bargain such 




Dictating a high rate of discount was one option for bill brokers faced with a bank 
desperate for cash.
378
 They also held another option at their disposal that Cassels was 
conscious of, noting in one of his letters to head office Òbrokers can give up taking 
bills whenever they please and of course we must bear the brunt of it.Ó
379
 In a 
scenario where bill brokers refused to discount, perhaps owing to the curtailment of 
their own funds as investors moved into assets other than bills, banks like the 
Northern looked to their London bankers, as in fact happened in May 1836.
380
 But 
when their line of credit with a London bank ran out, there was no option left for the 
Northern other than to turn to the Bank of England.
381
 
                                                
377
 Id., Appendix at 3, letter from Cassels in London to the head office in Manchester, 4 August 1835. 
 
378
 During 1836, bills of exchange carrying the endorsement of joint stock banks such as the Northern 
became even more expensive to rediscount because of a new policy of the Bank of England to refuse 
discounts on any bill previously rediscounted by a joint stock banks that issued its own demand notes. 
Bill brokers who rediscounted bills offered to them by the Northern, a bank with its own note issue, 
knew that they could not thereafter rediscount these bills with the Bank of England (bill brokers 
might wish to convert bills into cash should those who left funds with them for investment recall 
these funds). The decline in the liquidity of bills carrying the endorsement of a joint stock bank of 
issue made it more expensive for these banks to rediscount. On this particular Bank of England 
strategy, see THOMAS, supra note 10, at 304-305. 
 
379
 CASSELS, supra note 375, Appendix at 9, letter from Cassels in London to the head office in 
Manchester, 23 May 1836. 
 
380
 Id., Appendix at 7-8. In May 1836, the Northern negotiated an agreement with the London and 
Westminster Bank. Through this agreement, the London and Westminster became one of the 
NorthernÕs London agents, agreeing to accept bills of exchange drawn by the Northern of a combined 
value of £100,000, and to provide discounts totalling £50,000. August and September of 1836 proved 
especially challenging for the Northern, and it exhausted the credit provided by the London and 
Westminster almost immediately (see Id., Appendix at 11-24). On the NorthernÕs relationship with 
the London and Westminster, see J. W. Gilbart to the Committee on Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH 
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1837) (531) XIV at 107 (Q: 1933). Chapter IV of this dissertation explores 
joint stock banking in London in the 1830s, including the early years of the London and Westminster.  
 
381
 As section G (1) explained, the District turned to its proprietors for support. This option was not 
available to the Northern. Whereas the District initially issued £100 shares, £15 paid up, giving the 
bank the option of making further calls on its shareholders up to £85 per share, the Northern had 





The Northern first turned to the Bank of England for assistance in early December 
1836, when it asked for £100,000 to cover its obligations falling due that week. The 
Bank of England entered negotiations, partly owing to the unique circumstances 
surrounding the NorthernÕs request for help,
382
 partly also because of the 
consequences that might follow should the Northern collapse. By the autumn of 
1836, the Northern was one of the biggest financial institutions in England with 
approximately 1,200 proprietors, over 40 branches stretching from the north of 
England to south of Birmingham, £300,000 worth of notes in circulation, and around 
£800,000 worth of deposits. If the Northern could now not get credit from LondonÕs 
banks and bill brokers, it risked defaulting on its obligations. Should a bank the size 
of the Northern default, concern would spread amongst those members of the public 
who held the notes of or had deposits with less prestigious banks. To prevent a crisis 
of confidence from undermining EnglandÕs banking system, the Bank of EnglandÕs 
directors sat down to thrash out a deal with those representing the Northern.     
 
                                                                                                                                    
issued shares of £10, fully paid up. Hence, the Northern could not make any further calls on its 
shareholders. Cassels thought this arrangement made the Northern less prone to taking on risky loans 
because Òwhen they [the bankÕs directors] really know they have the full amount of their capital paid 
up, and they can command no more, they proceed the more steadily to make their arrangements, and 
conduct their operations in every respect prudently,Ó Walter Gibson Cassels to the Committee on 
Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1836) (591) IX at102 (Q: 1655).  Through the 
rest of 1836 and into 1837, events proved Cassels wrong. And when the Northern found itself in 
financial difficulties despite its fully paid up capital, the bank was unable to make a call on its 
shareholders. The NorthernÕs Chairman, Henry Moult, was sure that if the Northern had been able to 
make a call on its shareholders, the bank would have survived its difficulties, saying, ÒIf we had not 
had the whole of our capital paid up then, as soon as we felt embarrassment we should immediately 
have made a call, and that call would have been responded to, and relieved us from our difficulty,Ó 
Henry Moult to the Committee on Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1837) (531) 
XIV at 49 (Q: 955).   
 
382
 The Northern turned to the Bank of England for help because, in late November 1836, two of the 
NorthernÕs representatives who had just arrived in London misplaced a parcel containing a large 
number of bills of exchange that they had brought to London to rediscount. Although a Òcab-manÓ 
found the parcel within a day of it going missing, its return did little to alter the NorthernÕs fate. For 
more on the amusing episode of the missing parcel of bills, see the evidence of Benjamin Braidley 
(one of the NorthernÕs directors) to the Committee on Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY 
PAPERS (1837) (531) XIV at 68-84; and the CIRCULAR TO BANKERS, 9 Dec. 1836, at 171-4. 
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The Northern required around £100,000, certainly no more than £200,000. Its 
liabilities were extensive, large enough to force the Bank of England into 
negotiations, though not as large as the Bank had expected. The Northern claimed, 
albeit Òverbally Ð but seriously, deliberately, and advisedly,Ó
383
 that it had only 
£240,000 worth of deposits. The Bank of England was suspicious as before the 
Parliamentary inquiry earlier that year the NorthernÕs deposits had totalled a figure 
closer to £800,000. Its suspicion roused, the Bank presented the Northern with an 
ultimatum: accept a minimum advance of £500,000, or take no advance at all. The 
Northern accepted and further agreed to the Bank of EnglandÕs only major condition 
that the Northern close all of its branches, save the one in Liverpool, by July 1837. 
This seemed to be a good deal for the Northern, especially because its independent 
note issue was left untouched, a point noted by The Circular when it observed, ÒIt is 
remarkable that there was no stipulation for the withdrawal of the notes in 
circulation amounting to some little more than £300,000.Ó The Circular then 
speculated that the Bank was biding its time over the note issue, the newspaperÕs 
position being that Òthis [the note issue] we conclude must eventually follow the 
other arrangements agreed upon; and that the Bank of England will make a similar 
bargain to that made by them with the ... District Bank.Ó
384
 Given that the Northern 
was now dependent on Bank of England credit, it is unlikely that the terms of any 
such circulation account would be anywhere near as favourable as those obtained 
two years earlier by the District. 
 
                                                
383
 THE CIRCULAR TO BANKERS, 30 December 1836, at 194, reproducing a report from the MORNING 
POST, 24 December 1836. The quotation is from the report in the Morning Post.  
 
384
 THE CIRCULAR TO BANKERS, 9 Dec. 1836, at 173. 
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In fact, the issue of the NorthernÕs note circulation was resolved by January 1837, 
though there was to be no circulation account, not even one on terms less generous 
than received by the District. By 1837, the Northern was simply not in a position to 
ask for one. Despite claiming that the £500,000 placed at its disposal by the Bank of 
England was more than sufficient, the Northern had within weeks drawn on the full 
amount. When the Bank of England received the NorthernÕs written accounts, it was 
plain that the NorthernÕs summary of its assets and liabilities submitted verbally at 
the meeting in early December was woefully inaccurate. Instead of £240,000 worth 
of deposits, the true total was £700,000. Instead of £900,000 in advances to 
borrowers, the true total was £1.3 million. The Northern soon needed an additional 
£500,000 worth of credit from the Bank of England. In return, the Bank of England 




The NorthernÕs bargaining position worsened as public knowledge about the extent 
of its plight grew. The property of its proprietors had become a joint stock banksÕ 
key bargaining chip but when it became apparent that the NorthernÕs investments 
might not cover its obligations, creditors turned to the property of the bankÕs 
proprietors. That property could not both compensate the bankÕs creditors and 
continue to support the bankÕs ability to borrow. To state the obvious, joint stock 
banks like the Northern were only able to borrow cheaply provided the property of 
their proprietors remained intact. The moment creditors called upon that property to 
satisfy the debt the bank owed them, the major source of the joint stock bankÕs 
strength was gone.  
 
                                                
385
 The figures are from THE CIRCULAR TO BANKERS, 30 Dec. 1836, at 195-196.  





This chapter set out to understand a feature of the Bank of EnglandÕs circulation 
accounts that is puzzling. These arrangements, whereby the Bank supplied 
provincial banks with cheap credit and Bank of England notes in return for these 
banks giving up their independent note issue, are puzzling when viewed against the 
prevailing economic theory of the time. In order to manage the gold standard, the 
Bank of EnglandÕs directors believed that they needed to exert greater influence over 
the circulation of money and the provision of credit outside of London. By replacing 
the independent note circulation of provincial bankers and by giving the Bank of 
EnglandÕs Òoctopus tentacleÓ branches some influence over local credit markets, the 
Bank saw its circulation accounts as a means towards exerting this influence. Yet the 
cheap credit the Bank of England made available on demand to contracting banks 
forced the Bank to increase its supply of notes and extent further credit to the 
provinces during exactly those moments when theory dictated the Bank should have 
been doing the opposite.  
 
This chapter examined the bargaining power of the joint stock banks of the 1830s to 
address this contradiction. These banks could obtain favourable terms from the Bank 
of England in the mid 1830s because their bargaining position was at that point 
strong. Their ready access to cheap credit from sources other than the Bank of 
England gave them the space to ignore the Bank. Bill brokers willingly lent to 
provincial joint stock banks because guaranteeing the debts of these banks was the 
unlimited liability of a large body of proprietors.  
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Provided joint stock banks like the District and the Northern could maintain the 
perception that their debts were highly credible, they could continue to borrow 
cheaply. The Bank of EnglandÕs difficulties at mediating its often conflicting 
obligations in the 1830s between, on the one hand, managing the gold standard, and, 
on the other, securing a dividend for its shareholders, also weighed in favour of the 
joint stock banks. Responding to the interests of its shareholders, the Bank 
contributed to the general conditions of easy credit that joint stock banks, backed by 
the property of their proprietors, ably reinforced before exploiting. Out of this 
environment, the District bargained for a surprisingly advantageous circulation 
account from the Bank of England.  
 
Banks like the District and the Northern had to walk a fine line to ensure that they 
kept their own internal conflicts under control, less their bargaining position turn 
unfavourable. The greatest difficulty faced by banks like the District and the 
Northern was the pressure from shareholders who expected cheap loans in return for 
guaranteeing through their unlimited liability the bankÕs debts. Both the District and 
the Northern found it difficult to limit their lending, not least to their own 
shareholders. When the extent of the bankÕs liabilities overwhelmed the property of 
its shareholders, joint stock banks no longer stood up to the Bank of England. 
Instead, there was a reversal in the terms of the struggle, with the Bank of England 
dictating terms to the joint stock banks. At least that is what happened to the 
Northern. The District did not find itself at the mercy of the Bank of England in 
1837 because, despite its losses, it was able to call in payments from its proprietors.  
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Helping to resolve the puzzle with which this chapter started is a view of law that 
captures the way organizations such as banks are simultaneously empowered and 
left exposed by the legal regime. Such a view of law requires seeing beyond the 
legal regime as either fettering some interests to benefit others, or as liberating 
interests from these fetters before taking its place on the margins of social and 
economic change. Although the legislation of 1826 did ÒliberalizeÓ banking in the 
sense that it made joint stock banking possible, those interests agitating against the 
Bank of EnglandÕs monopoly were not thereby empowered to do anything or get 
everything they wanted. Similarly, although the Bank of England lost one part of its 
monopoly, it retained much power and influence. The legal regime was not on the 
margins of the bargaining that then followed between the Bank of England and the 
provincial joint stock banks, but instead underpinned the moves the each side could 
make.  
 
The joint stock banks could obtain cheap credit from bill brokers in London partly 
because the proprietors of provincial joint stock banks were liable for all of their 
banks debts. The Bank of England helped to fuel this cheap credit by lending to the 
bill brokers, but did so because it was contractually obliged to meet interest 
payments on the East India CompanyÕs deposits. The Bank had to cover these 
interest payments while also securing a dividend for its shareholders. These 
shareholders were in a privileged position for they could shift their investments from 
the Bank to other securities, such as government bonds, at their discretion. But while 
the Bank of England faced conflicting considerations Ð let us not forget also the 
obligations underpinning the gold standard that lay in the background Ð so too did 
the joint stock banks. Written into their deed of settlement, more often than not, was 
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a provision that allowed the bankÕs proprietors favourable borrowing rights. To 
preserve their credibility, joint stock banks had to make sure they maintained a 
balance between their assets and the liabilities that these borrowing rights sometimes 
resulted in.   
 
Liabilities, obligations, privileges, and rights underpinned all of the moves that the 
joint stock banks and the Bank of England might make, both against each other and 
internally. In particular, contractual commitments Ð contingent liability on bills of 
exchange, interest payments on deposits, circulation accounts, borrowing rights, 
dividends on bonds or shares, to name the most prominent examples Ð pervade the 
story told in this chapter. The same was true of property relations, such as those, to 
take three leading examples, between the Bank of England and its shareholders; 
between the proprietors of joint stock banks; and between joint stock banks and the 
holders of the bills of exchange bearing the endorsement of the bank. To claim, as 
the banking historian Michael Collins has done, that Òthe law was permissive and, 
with the exception of note-issuing, it placed few restrictions on the type of business 
bankers could undertake,Ó
386
 ignores the role played by many of these legal relations 
underpinned by contract and property.     
 
One of this dissertationÕs arguments is that it is important to keep these legal details 
centre stage, rather than to confine them to Òthe broader parameters governing bank 
operationsÓ as Collins and a host of other economic historians tend to do. It is 
important to keep these legal details at the centre of our historical understanding of 
money and banking because the details reveal the creative powers of law. Legal 
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 COLLINS, supra note 13, at 65. 
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creativity could not be stifled in the history of 1830s banking analysed in this 
chapter, partly because the Bank of England and the joint stock banks were 
constantly on the lookout for new ways of getting the better of each other.  A 
nascent central bank lending directly to banks owned by manufacturers; banks 
owned entirely by segments of their local community; ÒdistrictÓ banks controlled by 
local boards, boards which controlled decisions over lending; branch banking that 
allowed regional banks to bypass the centre of finance in London. Before the 1830s, 
central banks, locally owned joint stock banks, district banks, local boards, and 
branch banking were all either unheard of or marginal features of the English and 
Welsh financial landscape. By the end of the 1830s, these features had become both 
undeniable and impossible to imagine outside of their legal regime. Nascent central 
banking in the 1830s required a contract for a circulation account. Banks owned by 
their local community involved combining disparate property holdings through a 
deed of settlement. Lending this property through local boards or through branches 
involved drawing up a contract allowing others to borrow in accordance with this 
deed of settlement and under the supervision of the general board. People designed 
and constructed these innovative moves in the 1830s owing to the legal regime 
provided by property and contract.   
 
According to many contemporaries, however, the legal regime of the 1830s gave too 
much scope for creativity. As shown in this chapter, many condemned the 
innovative use of circulation accounts as counterproductive given the prevailing 
theory behind the gold standard.
387
 Besides targeting its relations with joint stock 
banks, criticism of the Bank of England also targeted the BankÕs discretionary 
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 See supra note 5. 
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control of its note issue.
388
 Although the Bank had to ensure the convertibility of its 
notes into gold coin on demand, determining what constituted a safe ratio of paper 
notes to gold reserves was a decision left to the judgement of the BankÕs directors in 
the 1830s. The BankÕs directors tried to reassure its critics that the Bank expanded 
and contracted its note issue in response to changes in the foreign exchanges.
389
 But 
the BankÕs critics, especially those who came to be grouped as the Currency School, 
produced a stream of pamphlets claiming to show that the Bank was failing to 
adhere to its own self imposed rules. These failures had contributed to the flow of 
too much money when there should have been a contraction. Consequently, as 
argued by Currency School thinkers like Samuel Jones Loyd, the Bank of EnglandÕs 
discretion over its note issue was to blame for the crisis of 1836-37. The remedy 
proposed by the Currency School was the removal the BankÕs discretionary control 
of its note issue. 
 
That is what the famous Bank Act of 1844 achieved, when it was required that all 
Bank of England notes above a fixed fiduciary issue of £14 million be 100% 
convertible into gold coin.
390
 Hence, for every note issued by the Bank of England 
above £14 million, the Bank had to keep a corresponding amount of gold coin in 
reserve.
391
 The Act also ended the BankÕs use of circulation accounts,
392
 yet even if 
there had been no formal end to these accounts, they would have proved less useful 
to the Bank after 1844 owing to the severe curtailment in this same legislation of the 
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 See supra note 262. 
 
389
 See discussion at supra note 262. 
 
390
 7 & 8 Vict. c. 32 (1844) [Bank Charter Act or ÒPeelÕs ActÓ]. 
391
 Id., Section II. 
 
392
 Id., Section XXIII. 
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independent note issue of provincial banks.
393
 The Act of 1844, then, benefited the 
Bank of England by consolidating the centralization of paper money in England and 
Wales, while simultaneously hindering the Bank by removing its ability to create 
paper money free from direct gold backing. Driven by the demand for credit from 
joint stock banks, the London money market continued to grow in the 1840s. Yet, 
deprived of its 1830s discretion, the Bank of England was unable to meet the 
requests for assistance that arrived from bill brokers and bankers during periods 
when an economic boom turned into a crisis. Accompanying the centralization of 




The moves and countermoves between the Bank of England and the first joint stock 
banks featured prominently in the economic landscape of the English and Welsh 
provinces after 1826. These moves and countermoves did not characterize banking 
in London, at least not initially. The legislation permitting provincial joint stock 
banking in 1826 did not apply to a 65-mile circle in and around London. Yet by the 
end of 1833, joint stock banking was possible in London, and for the rest of the 
1830s the moves and countermoves between the Bank of England and joint stock 
banks became a feature of banking in London as well as the provinces. Chapter IV 
takes up the fight for joint stock banking in London and the contests in the 1830s 
between the Bank of England and the first joint stock bank in London, the London 
and Westminster. 
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 The legislation, at Sections X-XIII, only permitted banks issuing notes on 6 May 1844 to continue 
to do so, and only on the condition that (i) the bank did not exceed its average issue as of the twelve 
weeks ending 26 April 1844; and (ii) the bankÕs issue remained continuous (i.e. the bank could not 
resume a lapsed issue). See CLAPHAM, supra note 126, at 183.   






ÒA CURIOUS PICTURE OF LAW AND LEGISLATIONÓ: THE BANK OF 
ENGLAND AND THE FIRST JOINT STOCK BANKS IN LONDON, 1833-1844 
 
In late August 1833, Parliament passed legislation renewing the Bank of EnglandÕs 
Charter. As always, the renewal of the BankÕs Charter provoked heated debate 
between the BankÕs supporters and its opponents. One point of debate concerned the 
scope of the BankÕs monopoly over joint stock banking in and within 65 miles of 
London. Parliament resolved that debate by permitting, via a so-called ÒdeclaratoryÓ 
clause in the legislation of 1833,
394
 the formation of other joint stock banks in and 
around London on the condition that these banks did not issue their own bank notes 
payable on demand. Yet such an outcome would have seemed highly improbable 
only months before and left many contemporaries shocked even after the legislation 
had passed through Parliament.   
 
The Times captured the sense of surprise by observing that the declaratory clause 
had passed through Parliament Ònotwithstanding the old and general impression that 
by the Bank Charter just expired they [other joint stock banks in and around 
London] had been wholly prohibited.Ó
395
 The famous philosopher and economist, 
John Stuart Mill, shared in this sense of surprise, though he also discerned one 
possible explanation for the inclusion of the clause. According to Mill, ÒFor this 
amendment to the Bank Charter [the clause declaring joint stock banking lawful in 
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and near to London] we are indebted to no conviction, to no enlightenment of the 
understandings of our Whig Ministers, nor yet to the wisdom of the House 
overruling their folly. We owe it to a singular discovery.Ó
396
 The Òsingular 
discoveryÓ identified by Mill concerned the traditional interpretation of the Bank of 
EnglandÕs Charter, an interpretation that, as The Times observed, created the 
impression that the Bank of England was the only joint stock bank permitted in or 
within 65 miles of London. The discovery was Òthat this [traditional] interpretation 
of the law was wholly erroneous.Ó
397
 That an alternative interpretation could swiftly 
replace the traditional view of the BankÕs Charter was for Mill Òa curious picture of 
the law and of legislation.Ó
398
 In MillÕs opinion, there could be only one explanation,  
 
that what it is peculiarly and strongly menÕs individual pecuniary interest to 
know, they will know; for of all the innumerable adventurers, or those who 
would gladly have been adventurers, in banking speculations, or who have 
actually founded numerous associations for banking purposes in other parts 
of the kingdom since 1826, if there had been one who had inspected the Act 
[the BankÕs Charter] and given a fee to Sir William Horne and Sir John 
Campbell for telling him its real meaning, he must have learned the very fact 
which those functionaries, as the law authorities of the Crown, have just 
promulgated to a wondering public.
399
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 Id., 591, footnote omitted. Sir William Horne and Sir John Campbell were, respectively, the 
Attorney General and the Solicitor General at the time, and in these capacities offered legal advice to 
the government. We return to their role in the story told in this chapter in a later section. 




The men with a strong Òindividual pecuniary interest to knowÓ that the Bank of 
EnglandÕs monopoly over joint stock banking in and around London was not as clear 
cut as previously thought, went on to create in early 1834 the first joint stock bank in 
the capital besides the Bank of England, the London and Westminster Banking 
Company. Yet they did not initially attempt to challenge the traditional interpretation 
of the BankÕs Charter regarding joint stock banking in London.
400
 In their first 
petition to Parliament of early August 1833 calling for an end to the Bank of 
EnglandÕs monopoly in joint stock banking in London, the promoters of the London 
and Westminster accepted the broad interpretation of the Bank of EnglandÕs 
monopoly that prevented the establishment in London of any bank with more than 
six partners. The argument of the petitioners focused instead on the practical benefits 
joint stock banking would bring.
401
 When those challenging the Bank of EnglandÕs 
monopoly also supplemented their argument by questioning the traditional 
interpretation of the BankÕs Charter,
402
 on making the new interpretation public 
Òthroughout the banking community in the City, it was received with derision. Some 
laughed, some were very angry, calling the innovators bad names, designating them 
                                                
400
 The idea of establishing a joint stock bank in London gained ground at the start of 1833 through 
the efforts of W. R. Douglas, a Scottish merchant with the firm of Douglas, Anderson & Co. He 
consulted the firmÕs solicitor, a Mr. Roy, about the legality of such an endeavour. RoyÕs advice 
reiterated the traditional interpretation: the Bank of EnglandÕs Charter made it illegal for more than 
six partners to form a bank within London or within a sixty-five mile radius around London. See 
GREGORY, supra note 28, at 66-7.  
 
401 
In particular, they emphasized that by  
the association of numerous partners the security and accommodation of the public will be 
materially promoted and advanced Ð the greater Union of Capital and responsibility naturally 
affording the public the fairest prospect of those advantages and facilities, whether in times of 
quiet or panic, which in this large commercial and trading community is of the very deepest 
importance, GREGORY, supra note 28, at 68-9.  
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this petition and the first petition on the practical merits of joint stock banking.  
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as the Winchester thieves.Ó
403
 Moreover, the government too, which like the 
promoters of the London and Westminster was looking to strengthen its bargaining 
position against the Bank of England, initially accepted without debate the 
traditional interpretation of the BankÕs monopoly over joint stock banking in 
London. In the course of its negotiations with the Bank of England over the latterÕs 
Charter renewal during the spring and early summer of 1833, the Bank and the 
government initially settled on a deal that protected the Bank Òagainst the 




Despite the conventional view held even by the BankÕs challengers, the Bank of 
England lost its monopoly over joint stock banking in and within 65 miles of 
London. How did such a dramatic turnabout occur so quickly? Partly, the Bank lost 
this monopoly because the traditional interpretation of the BankÕs Charter lost its 
hold over the government and the BankÕs opponents. This chapter takes on the 
puzzle of how the traditional interpretation collapsed.  
 
John Stuart MillÕs observations provide us with a starting point towards addressing 
this puzzle. MillÕs explanation for the about face was the pressure for change exerted 
by well-funded interest groups hostile towards the BankÕs monopoly.
405
 These 
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 The passage is quoted by GREGORY supra note 28, at 66-7, and comes from an unsigned printed 
paper in the possession of the Westminster Bank, of unknown date, though later than 1875. 
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 GREGORY supra note 28, at 37. Emphasis in original. 
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 The promoters of the London and Westminster raised a capital of £10 million very soon after 
issuing the bankÕs prospectus. See GREGORY supra note 28, at 48. One opponent of the new 
interpretation noted   
 
neither the Bank of England nor the public believed that such was the law (as now declared), 
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interest groups wanted an end to legislative fetters, such as the BankÕs monopoly 
over joint stock banking in London, and to take its place they envisioned a 
ÒliberalizedÓ banking regime suited to the needs of the growing commercial classes 
in London for large, stable banks.
406
 Mill was correct to view the struggles over the 
renewal of the Bank of EnglandÕs Charter as immersed in interest group conflict. 
The government, the Bank of England, the promoters of the London and 
Westminster, and LondonÕs private banks, to take the four of the most prominent 
groups, all had positions to defend or to assert. The Bank of England and LondonÕs 
private banks looked to protect themselves from the competition of joint stock banks 
by arguing that joint stock banks could not meet the needs of LondonÕs commercial 
class.
407
 The promoters of the London and Westminster disagreed, arguing that the 
                                                                                                                                    
namely, the fact that, on the one hand, no such joint-stock banks were ever thought of during 
the joint-stock mania, while, on the other hand, forty-eight hours had not elapsed from the 
moment that it was promulgated, on the authority of the law officers of the Crown, that such 
might be legally established, before a prospectus, involving a capital of 10,000,000l., was 
issued and acted upon, Lord Bexley, HANSARD, HL VOL. 20, COL. 861 (23 August 1833).  
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 For an example of these views, see ANON., HINTS BY WAY OF ENCOURAGING THE FORMATION OF 
A JOINT-STOCK BANKING COMPANY IN LONDON (1834). 
 
407
 See, for example, Samuel Jones Loyd to the Committee on Renewing the Bank of England 
Charter, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1831-32) (722) VI at 232-249. See, in particular, LoydÕs 
answer to Q: 3306 (at 236), where he states with respect to proposed joint stock banks in London,  
 
I think that Joint Stock Banks are deficient in every thing requisite for the conduct of the 
banking business, except extended responsibility; the banking business requires peculiarly 
persons attentive to all its details, constantly, daily and hourly watchful of every transaction, 
much more than mercantile or traiding business. It also requires immediate, prompt decisions 
upon  circumstances when they arise, in many cases a decision that does not admit of delay for 
consultation; it also requires a discretion to be exericsed with reference to the special 
circumstances of each case. Joint Stock banks being of course obliged to act through agents 
and not by a principal, and therefore under the restraint of general rules, cannot be guided by 
so nice a reference to degrees of difference in the character or responsibility of parties; nor 
can they undertake to regulate the assistance to be granted to concerns under temporary 
embarressment by so accutate a reference to the circustances, favourable or unfavourable, of 
each case.  
 
LoydÕs comments echo the remarks of those who opposed joint stock banks in the provinces, 
including Henry Burgess, see discussion at supra note 309. Loyd (later known as Lord Overstone), it 
should be noted, was a partner in a private bank in London. He was also instrumental in bringing 
about the Banking Act of 1844, see supra note 390 and surrounding text. For more on those critical of 
London joint stock banks, see THOMAS, supra note 10, at 120-2. 
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prohibition on the number of partners who could form a bank created instability 




Interest group conflict, alongside a view of law as either prohibiting through fetters, 
or liberalizing through the removal of these fetters, is only a starting point towards 
resolving this chapterÕs puzzle, however. The puzzle that we address in this chapter 
is the rendering of a relatively stable interpretation of the Bank of EnglandÕs Charter 
unstable. The push for banking liberalization by the BankÕs opponents is part of the 
explanation. Yet the push towards that goal does not explain the efforts at 
reinterpreting the BankÕs Charter given that the BankÕs opponents could advocate 
for liberalization by stressing the practical benefits joint stock banks would bring. 
Given the practical benefits associated with liberalized joint stock banking, why did 
the BankÕs opponents also target the established interpretation of the BankÕs 
Charter? One possibility is that doing so was a further strategy complimenting their 
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 The promoters of the London and Westminster claimed that Òthe formation of a Joint-Stock Bank 
of Deposit É is É called for by the distrust which has of late years prevailed as to the security of the 
system upon which Private Banking is conducted,Ó ANON., HINTS BY WAY OF ENCOURAGING THE 
FORMATION OF A JOINT-STOCK BANKING COMPANY IN LONDON 8 (1834). In particular, these private 
banks were vulnerable owing to the tendency of their engagements to assume a level far greater than 
the capital of the bankÕs partners (Id., 11). That left the private banks exposed during moments of 
crisis with the result that Òin every season of distrust, the independent depositors transfer their 
floating balance to the Bank of EnglandÓ (Id., 14). Since 1826, the Bank of England had witnessed an 
increase in the number of private depositors opening accounts (Id., 19. See also CLAPHAM, supra note 
126, at 122). But the Bank of England, as pointed out by those associated with the London and 
Westminster, was not ideal as a safe place to deposit savings because it did not pay interest. Nor was 
the Bank a convenient source of funding for those engaged in business because of its strict rules on 
the eligibility of both customers and bills. For a list of further inconveniences that made the Bank less 
attractive for business, see ANON., HINTS, 19-20. According to the London and Westminster, as 
articulated most clearly by the bankÕs manager, J. W. Gilbart, the banking services offered by London 
private banks and the Bank of England Òwere adapted only for the rich.Ó As Gilbart continued,  
 
An indispensible condition of having an account was that a certain sum should be kept 
unproductive in the [private] bankerÕs hands. Thus the middle class of society who had the 
means of employing the whole of their capital in their respective occupations were altogether 
excluded from the advantages of banking.  To remedy this defect the London and Westminster 
determined to open accounts with persons who had not the means of keeping large balances 
unemployed, but who were willing to pay the Bank a small commission for running their 
accounts, JAMES WILLIAM GILBART, A RECORD OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE LONDON AND 
WESTMINSTER BANK DURING THE FIRST THIRTEEN YEARS OF ITS EXISTENCE 7 (1847). 
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other non-legal arguments. Yet even if reinterpreting the BankÕs Charter did serve as 
a further strategy, I believe its significance extends beyond this. As this chapter 
demonstrates, the reinterpretation of the BankÕs Charter presents a view of law not 
so easily dismissed as Òa curious picture of the law and of legislation,Ó
409
 partly 
because it allows us to move beyond understandings of law limited to categories 
such as prohibition and liberalization. By moving beyond these categories, we can 
begin to see lawÕs role in shaping what we think of as possible. 
 
In the spring and early summer of 1833, joint stock banking in London was 
conceivable as illustrated by the efforts of those in favour of it to articulate to the 
public the practical benefits that would follow from such banking. But owing to the 
BankÕs Charter, most observers thought joint stock banking difficult to realize. The 
BankÕs Charter served to set limits on what LondonÕs commercial and governmental 
elites imagined as practical options. Chapter III made the point that the legal rules 
shape the capacity of people and organizations to get what they want. Later in this 
chapter, I endeavour to reinforce that point further. Before doing so, I demonstrate 
the role played by the legal regime in conditioning, as Robert Gordon puts it, Ònot 
just our power to get what we want but what we think (or think we can get) itself.Ó
410
 
As long as it was widely perceived Ð by the Bank of England, by the proponents of 
the London and Westminster, and most importantly of all, by the government Ð that 
courtesy of its Charter, the Bank of England held a monopoly over joint stock 
banking in and near to London, limits formed around what these players saw as 
possible. The government and especially the Treasury were in many ways the key 
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players because they had influence over Parliament and could change the rules of the 
game under which banking operated. Much then depended on what the Treasury 
thought possible. If the Chancellor of the Exchequer thought that the Bank of 
England had clear, unambiguous monopoly rights over activities conventionally 
understood as Òbanking,Ó limits formed around what the Chancellor considered 
practical options. But if the Chancellor could be persuaded that the scope of the 
Bank of EnglandÕs monopoly was less clear and unambiguous than previously 
thought, partly owing to alternative understandings of what ÒbankingÓ involved, then 
an expanded range of options might open up.     
 
Expanding the range of options that government ministers thought possible 
depended on transforming the clearly unambiguous into murky ambiguity. To 
understand how such a change happens, this chapter builds on the Òindeterminacy 
thesis.Ó As articulated by the legal theorist Mark Tushnet, ÒThe indeterminacy thesis 
claims É that legal propositions will be indeterminate when some socially 
significant group finds it useful to raise legal claims that theretofore seemed 
frivolous; their arguments will become first professionally respectable and then 
reasonably powerful as their social and political power increases.Ó
411
 Hence, a legal 
rule (or claim) is determinate when all those with an understanding of the legal 
system agree on the content and requirements of that legal rule. As a result, any 
alternative understanding of that legal rule appears frivolous while the legal rules in 
play (the rules that lawyers use when making legal arguments) seem to compel 
professionally respectable lawyers to one specific, clear, unambiguous answer. 
Significantly, however, the rules in play are not the only legal rules of potential 
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relevance. In addition, there are background rules, that is, rules not presently used by 
lawyers as they make their legal arguments. The answer to a legal question becomes 
indeterminate when professionally respectable lawyers find a background rule that 
they bring Òinto playÓ and use as a counter-argument, or a counter rule or claim 
against the rule or argument that had previously seemed to compel a single, clear, 
uncontentious answer. ÒThe indeterminacy thesis claims that, with respect to every 
(or nearly every) apparently determinate legal proposition, somewhere in the 
background rules there is at least one which, if put in play, would provide the basis 




To address this chapterÕs puzzle Ð the rendering of a relatively stable interpretation 
of the Bank of EnglandÕs Charter unstable Ð I shall demonstrate in Part A of this 
chapter how one set of respectable lawyers brought a background rule into play that 
acted as a counter-argument to the established, traditional interpretation of the 
BankÕs Charter. The counter-argument used by these lawyers focused on unsettling 
conventional definitions of Òbanking.Ó This argument was sufficiently successful, 
with the result that by the time the BankÕs Charter was renewed this counter-
argument was accepted by government and a majority in Parliament as the correct 
and authentic interpretation of the BankÕs Charter. Hence, the inclusion of the 
declaratory clause in the BankÕs renewed Charter making clear that it was legal to 
establish in London joint stock banks that did not issue their own bank notes.  
 
Parts B and C of this chapter also consider moments when creative arguments 
unsettled established legal interpretations, while, moreover, developing further the 
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type of analysis undertaken in Chapter III. My aim in Chapter III was to move 
beyond seeing the legal regime as either fettering some interests to benefit others, or 
as liberating interests from these fetters before taking its place on the margins of 
social and economic change. As I demonstrated in Chapter III, law was far from 
marginal because it was through the legal regime that the Bank of England and the 
provincial joint stock banks bargained with each other as they pursue their 
objectives.  
 
Similarly, this Chapter is not merely interested in the legislation of 1833 as a 
discrete enactment that liberalized banking before confining law to the margins. 
Rather, like the legislation of 1826, the legislation of 1833 rearranged the terms of 
the conflict between the Bank of England and others who sought to create money 
and credit in the capital, including the London and Westminster. The moves that the 
Bank of England and the London and Westminster might then make against each 
other as they pursued their often conflicting objectives depended on their 
endowments from the legal regime. As Parts B and C of this Chapter explain, in the 
mid 1830s the legal regime hampered as much as it served the London and 
Westminster. The challenges that the London and Westminster faced, in particular 
concerning its ability to sue and be sued and its capacity to accept certain classes of 
bill of exchange, were magnified by the actions of the Bank of England, which 
seized on these legal vulnerabilities in an attempt to curtail the influence of its new 
rival.  
 
A. Banking Re-imagined 




The reinterpretation of the Bank of EnglandÕs Charter that caused a stir in 1833 did 
not appear out of a void.
413
 Chapter III noted the role played by Thomas Joplin in 
advocating for joint stock banks. It was courtesy of JoplinÕs advocacy that there 
appeared in 1822 the first coherent articulation of an alternative interpretation of the 
BankÕs Charter. Joplin observed that although the Bank of England was the only 
bank with more than six partners permitted to issue bank notes payable on demand, 
the BankÕs Charter did not expressly extend this monopoly to include other types of 
banking. Deposit banking, for instance, through which banks borrowed money and 
discounted bills, but did not issue bank notes payable on demand, had escaped the 
terms of the Charter, at least according to JoplinÕs interpretation.
414
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 See THOMAS, supra note 10, at 109-10; and George C. Glyn to the Committee on Renewing the 
Bank of England Charter, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1831-32) (722) VI at 224 (Q: 3132-3), 
where Glyn, a London private banker, states, Òwe have always conceived that such was the law,Ó 
meaning that he and others had long thought that banks of any number of partners could form in 
London provided they did not issue demand notes, though he acknowledged others disagreed with 
this interpretation. Glyn offered his remark in evidence to the inquiry on 3 July 1832. Perhaps Glyn is 
correct that many in the City of London had long held the view that the Bank of EnglandÕs monopoly 
did not extend to deposit banking, but it is difficult to find further evidence supporting such a claim. 
My point is not that there was universal acceptance of the traditional interpretation of the Bank of 
EnglandÕs monopoly in the first half of 1833. On the contrary, by the start of 1833, the traditional 
interpretation was already under stress, as Part A of this chapter describes. Rather, my point is that a 
large and influential portion of public opinion stuck with the traditional interpretation for the first half 
of 1833, including the government, the proponents of the London and Westminster, and influential 
parts of the press, such as the Times and the Circular. In the background, a contrary position emerged 
and grew throughout 1833 until it received official recognition when the Attorney General and the 
Solicitor General defended it, and the government itself adopted it. 
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 The Bank of EnglandÕs Charter was renewed in 1800 (39 & 40 Geo. III c. 28 (1800)), the last 
renewal before the events of 1833. Joplin was working from Section XV of 39 & 40 Geo. III c. 28, 
which read,  
 
to prevent any Doubts that may arise concerning the Privilege and Power given, by former 
Acts of Parliament, to the said Governor and Company [of the Bank of England], of exclusive 
Banking, and also in regard to the erecting any other Bank or Banks by Parliament, or 
restraining other Persons from Banking during the Continuance of the said Privilege, granted 
to the Governor and Company of the Bank of England, as before recited; it is hereby further 
enacted, and declared, That it is the true Intent and Meaning of this Act, that no other Bank 
shall be erected, established, or allowed by Parliament; and that it shall not be lawful for any 
Body Politick or Corporate whatsoever, erected or to be erected, or for any other Persons, 
united or to be united in Covenants or Partnerships, exceeding the Number of Six Persons, in 
that part of Great Britain called England, to borrow, owe, or take up any Sum or Sums of 




The legislation of 1826 failed to resolve the ambiguities surrounding the extent of 
the Bank of EnglandÕs exclusive privileges. That legislation, as Chapter III 
described, permitted note issuing joint stock banks outside of the 65-mile circle 
around London.
415
 Within and around London the prohibition on banks with more 
than six partners issuing bank notes payable on demand remained.
416
 But this 
legislation failed to clarify the point raised by Joplin. Did the terms of the BankÕs 
Charter, reiterated by this new legislation, prevent banks in London with more than 
six partners from issuing notes and from engaging in all other banking activities, 
such as deposit banking? Or, as Joplin claimed, did the terms of the BankÕs Charter, 
                                                                                                                                    
Money on their Bills or Notes payable on Demand, or at any less Time than Six Months from 
the borrowing thereof....  
 
The crucial line picked up by Joplin was the passage stating that banks or other entities of more than 
six persons were not allowed Òto borrow, owe, or take up any Sum or Sums of Money on their Bills 
or Notes payable on Demand.Ó Joplin accepted that this passage granted the Bank of England a 
monopoly over the issue of bank notes, but queried whether the BankÕs monopoly extended to other 
forms of banking.    
When Joplin first published his insights in 1822 Ð that is, before the legislation of 1826 
liberalising joint stock banking outside of London Ð he applied his argument to the whole of England 
and Wales, including London. Indeed, in 1824 Joplin went so far as to publish a prospectus for a joint 
stock banking company he hoped to help establish in London with a capital of £3 million. The 
proposed London bank would not issue notes, but would instead conduct its business in the same 
manner as the existing private banks in London of less than six partners. According to Joplin, ÒThe 
business of London bankers É does not consist in issuing notes, but in holding deposits, discounting 
the bills of others, and acting as agents for the country Banks, which business a Public Bank [i.e. a 
joint stock bank], with trifling limitations, is not prevented from transactingÓ (JOPLIN, supra note 230, 
at 151). As far as Joplin was concerned, this bank was permissible under the Bank of EnglandÕs 
Charter of 1800, Òan alternation to the charter of the Bank of England is not essential to the 
establishment of this companyÓ (Id., 151). Yet, recognizing that his interpretation was not the 
conventional one, Joplin could see the value in altering the BankÕs Charter to clarify the limits to the 
BankÕs monopoly.  
 
415
 7 Geo. IV c. 46 (1826) [Country Bankers Act], Section I. 
416
 Id., Section II. The legislation did not  
enable or authorize any such Corporation or Copartnership exceeding the Number of Six 
Persons, so carrying on the Trade or Business of Bankers É to issue or re-issue in London, or 
at any Place or Places not exceeding the Distance of Sixty-Five Miles from London, any Bill 
or Notes of such Corporations or Copartnerships, which shall be payable to Bearer on 
Demand É ,B. L. ANDERSON AND P. L. COTTRELL, MONEY AND BANKING IN ENGLAND: THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE BANKING SYSTEM, 1694-1914, 253 (1974). Emphasis in original.  
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merely reiterated in 1826, only prohibit banks from issuing bank notes in London, 
thereby allowing all other kinds of banking, including deposit banking? 
 
It is likely, or at least some contemporaries suspected, that the promoters of the 
London and Westminster were familiar with Thomas JoplinÕs insights.
417
 It seems 
plausible that JoplinÕs insights soon influenced government lawyers and ministers 
too. The government minister with responsibility for negotiating the terms of the 
renewed Charter with the Bank of England was the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Lord Althorp. In the spring and early summer of 1833, Althorp accepted the 
traditional interpretation of the BankÕs Charter on the scope of joint stock banking, 
stating in his correspondence with the Bank of England, Ò[T]hat no Bank shall be 
established within the Metropolis, or within twenty-five miles from London, 
consisting of more than six partners.Ó
418
 Yet when Althorp introduced the Bill 
renewing the Bank of EnglandÕs Charter to Parliament some months later, he 
remarked at the end of his speech, ÒJoint Stock banks issuing the paper of the Bank 
of England may be established, of course, within the shorter distance of the 
Metropolis.Ó
419
 Contrary to his earlier statements in his correspondence with the 
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Some, such as the Circular to Bankers, suspected JoplinÕs involvement with the promoters of the 
London and Westminster. According to the Circular, the first petition submitted to Parliament by 
these promoters owed much to Joplin Òor some one of that gentlemenÕs coadjutors in the enterprise of 
raising up a National Bank,Ó see CIRCULAR TO BANKERS, 2
 
August 1833 at 18-19 and GREGORY, 
supra note 28, at 68. Joplin, along with his Òcoadjutors,Ó was at that time in the process of forming 
the National Provincial Bank of England. If Joplin influenced the first petition, it is even more 
probable that he had an impact on the second petition, given that the legal argument contained in the 
second petition was one Joplin had done much to publicize to the extent of proposing a joint stock 
bank of deposit in London as early as 1824.  
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 A Copy of all Correspondence and Minutes of any Conferences between the Government and the 
Directors of the Bank of England ... in BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1833) (352) XXIII at 1, 
Lord Althorp to the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, 1 April 1833. By 15 
April, the distance around London within which the Bank of EnglandÕs monopoly applied was back 
to 65 miles from the 25 miles mentioned by Althorp in his correspondence of 1 April, see Id., at 8.  
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Bank of England, Althorp was now willing to allow joint stock banks to form in 
London provided they carried out their transactions using the notes of the Bank of 
England rather than their own notes. When the Bank of England protested that 
AlthorpÕs new position contravened his earlier agreement with the Bank,
420
 the 
Chancellor responded by claiming that, 
 
The promise which I made in conversation that I would insert a provision in 
the Bank Charter Bill to prevent the establishment of Joint Stock Banks of 
Deposit nearer the Metropolis than Sixty-five miles, was on the supposition 
that such was at present one of the exclusive privileges of the Bank of 
England: I never intended or contemplated the increase of these exclusive 
privileges. I have, therefore, now to state to you, that I think it will be 




Althorp was willing to allow the Bank of England to retain a monopoly over all joint 
stock banking in London, both note issuing and deposit banking, provided such a 
monopoly was compatible with the BankÕs Charter of 1800. The traditional 
interpretation of the Bank of EnglandÕs Charter was that the Bank did possess a 
monopoly over all joint stock banking in London. During the summer of 1833, 
Althorp came to doubt this traditional interpretation, so much so that he even feared 
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According to the Governor of the Bank of England, Òit was expressly stipulated by the Draft of the 
Bill [to renew the Bank of EnglandÕs Charter] É that no Bank having more than Six Partners should 
carry on or transact any Banking business within the Metropolis, or within Sixty-five miles thereof.Ó 
See Copies of all Communications that have passed between the Government and the Bank of 
England, having reference to the Terms on which the Renewal of the Bank Charter is to take place É 
6 July 1833 in BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1833) (728) XXIII at 2.  
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 In GREGORY, supra note 28, at 42; Hansard 10 August 1833: 499; and Copies of all 
Communications that have passed ..., BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1833) (728) XXIII, 6 
August 1833 at 3. 
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a clause in the BankÕs new Charter implying the BankÕs monopoly covered all joint 
stock banking, both note issuing and deposit banking, would increase rather than 
merely confirm the BankÕs privileges.   Reshaping AlthorpÕs sense of the permissible 
boundaries of banking in London was the legal advice he received from the Attorney 




1. Interpreting the Bank of EnglandÕs monopoly narrowly 
 
This section begins by describing the legal arguments formulated by the Attorney 
General and the Solicitor General in support of a revised interpretation of the scope 
of the Bank of EnglandÕs monopoly over joint stock banking in London. Thereafter, 
the section turns to the legal arguments developed by the Bank of EnglandÕs lawyers, 
arguments that sought to defend the traditional interpretation of the scope of the 
BankÕs monopoly. The significance of these legal arguments is that they contain 
contrasting views on how to define Òbanking.Ó The new interpretation of the BankÕs 
Charter exploited the different forms that banks can take. Banks might issue notes 
payable on demand, but they might also or alternatively discount bills of exchange or 
receive interest-bearing deposits. As Joplin had shown, the Bank of EnglandÕs 
Charter of 1800 was not as clear as it might have been. Yet to exploit this ambiguity, 
                                                
422 
The Attorney General for England and Wales is the chief legal advisor to Crown and to the 
government. The Solicitor General serves as the deputy of the Attorney General.  
It seems probable that, by the time the Attorney General and the Solicitor General 
formulated their legal opinion, they would have been familiar with the two petitions presented to 
Parliament on behalf of those campaigning for joint stock deposit banking in London. GregoryÕs 
investigations have failed to reveal any direct correspondence between the solicitors representing 
those campaigning for joint stock banks in London and the government. But it seems highly plausible 
that these campaigners and the legal reinterpretation they advocated sparked a reassessment on the 
part of Lord Althorp and his governmentÕs lawyers as to the extent of the Bank of EnglandÕs 
monopoly.  There is no doubt that Althorp worked closely with the governmentÕs lawyers, see Copies 
of all Communications that have passed ..., BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1833) (728) XXIII, 
communications between Althorp and the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, 8 
and 9 August 1833 at 6.  
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it was necessary to convince ministers like Althorp that resolving this ambiguity 
called for a narrow view of the BankÕs privileges. The strategy adopted by the 
Attorney General and the Solicitor General drew on a background rule that required 
a narrow construal of monopoly powers, and which had hitherto played no role in 
debates on the scope of the BankÕs monopoly. By bringing to the fore this 
background rule, in partnership with a clever redefinition of banking, a legal 
argument was able to reshape AlthorpÕs sense of what was possible in the context of 
banking in London.     
 
The opinion of the governmentÕs lawyers,
423
 William Horne (the Attorney General) 
and John Campbell (the Solicitor General),
424
 starts with the common law definition 
of banking in England and Wales. They then apply this common law definition to the 
statutes defining the scope of the Bank of EnglandÕs powers. What then, according to 
the governmentÕs lawyers, was the definition adopted by the common law with 
respect to banking? Early in their opinion, Horne and Campbell note, ÒWe must 
premise that the common law knows no distinction between joint stock companies 
and any other partnerships.Ó
425
 If legislation prohibited joint stock banking 
                                                
423
 The date of the legal opinion is 19 August 1833. THE TIMES reproduces this opinion in its edition 
of 20 August 1833. A further copy of the opinion is in OPINIONS OF SIR JAMES SCARLETT, SIR 
EDWARD B. SUGDEN AND MR RICHARDS ON THE PRIVILEGE OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND (1833) (last 
two unnumbered pages of the pamphlet). All quotations in the text are from this legal opinion.  
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 Sir William Horne [1774-1860], was a Whig/Liberal politician and a lawyer who served as 
Solicitor General from 1830-1832 and as Attorney General from 1832-1834. Sir John Campbell 
[1779-1861] was a Whig/Liberal politician and a lawyer who served as Solicitor General from 1832-
1834 and as Attorney General in 1834 and again from 1835-1841. Campbell later served in the House 
of Lords (1850-1859) and as Lord Chancellor (1859-1861).   
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 In the same paragraph of their opinion, Horne and Campbell go on to add, Òand that if a joint stock 
deposit bank within 65 miles of London be prohibited, any banking company of more than six 
partners, within the same limits, we conceive, is equally illegal.Ó Read as originally written in THE 
TIMES and as re-produced here, this passage is peculiar for it merely restates itself: that is, if joint 
stock deposit banking in London is illegal then, of course, banks with more than six partners 
operating in London (by definition also joint stock banks) are also illegal. The passage makes sense 
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companies, then, as we will see in a moment, these statutes prohibited all other types 
of banking too, including LondonÕs existing banking partnerships of less than six 
partners. Such an interpretation of the legal position of banking in London was 
surely far too broad. As Horne and Campbell carefully noted, the general impulse of 
the common law was to consider an act permissible provided there was no express 
prohibition by statute.
426
 Moreover, even where a statute, such as the one creating 
and maintaining the Bank of EnglandÕs monopoly, limited the common law right to 
carry on the business of banking, the construal of such statutes ought to be, in 
accordance with the common law, as narrow as possible. Ò[Such] statutes É as they 
are in restraint of trade, they ought, according to an established rule, to be construed 




Against this common law background, Horne and Campbell considered the most 
important statutes that set in place, refined, and upheld the Bank of EnglandÕs 
powers and privileges, starting with the statute of 1694.
428
 This statute laid down the 
                                                                                                                                    
and ties in with the rest of the paragraph (I explain why in the next paragraph) when the word ÒmoreÓ 
is treated as a misprint and replaced by the word Òless.Ó 
 
426
 ÒSuch a [joint-stock deposit] bank is not contrary to the common law, and it can only be 
considered as prohibited by the statutes connected with the monopoly of the Bank of England.Ó See 
Horne and Campbell, supra note 423.  
 
427
 Horne and Campbell do not refer to any past cases in their opinion. When referring to restraint of 
trade doctrine, and the belief that monopolies should be construed narrowly so as not to inhibit lawful 
conduct, they presumably have in mind the case of Mitchell v. Reynolds (1711) 88 E.R. 660. In this 
case, Chief-Justice Parker stated that  
 
Grants, charters, &c. erecting monopolies, are void for two reasons: first, because they are 
against the freedom and birthright of the subject: second, because they are contrary to Magna 
Carta. But it is otherwise where ... the grant or charter is made for the good regulation and 
government of trade; for the public good is ever to be preferred to a private loss. (661).  
 
Chief-Justice Parker later in his opinion added that where the restraint of trade is Ògiven by Act of 
Parliament, the Act must be strictly pursued.Ó (664).  
428
 5 & 6 Will. & Mar.  c.20 (1694) [Bank of England Act or ÒThe Tonnage ActÓ]. 
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rules regulating the Bank of England but said nothing about other banks. Further 
legislation followed in 1697, which increased the capital of the Bank, and declared 
with respect to other banks,  
 
during the continuance of the corporation of the Governor and Company of 
the Bank of England, no other bank or any other corporation or society, 
fellowship, company, or constitution, in the nature of a bank, shall be erected 
or established, permitted, suffered, countenanced or allowed, by act of 




Interpreting this statute narrowly, Horne and Campbell emphasized the importance 
of the last line, claiming that this legislation prohibited the establishment Òby an act 
of parliamentÓ of further banks. That left, however, banks established under common 
law untouched, since such banks did not need an Act of Parliament.   
 
Horne and Campbell then supplemented their argument by contextualizing and 
historicizing the word Òbank.Ó It was worth recalling, they noted, that the word 
ÒbankÓ in the decades around the formation of the Bank of England meant an entity 
established by statute. The equivalent in the late seventeenth century to the London 
private banks of the 1820s and 1830s, which took deposits at interest before lending 
out these deposits to their borrowers, were not known as bankers but as goldsmiths. 
Yet if ÒbankÓ was interpreted broadly, Horne and Campbell observed that, Òno 
banking could have been carried on by any number of persons or by any individuals 
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in London or any part of the kingdom, except by the Bank of England, for the 
enactment is universal, containing no exception as to place or number of persons.Ó 
Under such a broad construction, even London banks of less than six partners ought 
to have been illegal. To avoid such a construction, a narrower interpretation was 
required, and that is precisely what Horne and Campbell claimed the common law 
called for. 
 
Horne and Campbell next dealt with the statutes of 1707 and 1708, which, as 
Chapter II explored, very explicitly prohibited all other banks, besides the Bank of 
England and those with six partners or less, from issuing demand notes.
430
 On Horne 
and CampbellÕs reading, however, this left as before both deposit banking and all 
other banking besides note issuing. This was the legislative position repeated 
throughout the eighteenth century. Legislation of 1800 combined that of 1697 and 
1708 by declaring that Òparliament shall not interfere to legalize any bank which 
would not be lawful by the common law, and that no paper to be used as cash shall 
be issued by any corporation or partnership consisting of more than six persons.Ó
431
 
Again, reading this narrowly, the Attorney General and the Solicitor General stressed 
that it meant Parliament could not publicly charter another bank to compete with the 
Bank of England, and that banks with more than six partners could not issue demand 
notes. But all this legislation said about other forms of banking was that they should 
remain free of restrictions under the common law. If the legislation of 1800 intended 
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 6 Ann. c. 59 (1707) [Bank of England Act], also referred to as 6 Ann. c. 22 (1707), Section 9, 
repeated in 7 Ann. c. 30 (1708) [Bank of England Act], also referred to as 7 Ann. c. 7 (1708), Section 
61.  
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to extend the Bank of EnglandÕs monopoly to include deposit banking, Òwords ought 




Horne and Campbell close their opinion by touching on two additional matters. First, 
they cite the most recent statute regulating banking at the time, the Act of 1826,
433
 
and second, they tackle the question that their opponents frequently asked: if joint 
stock deposit banking had long been permitted, why had a bank with more than six 
partners carrying on the business of banking without issuing demand notes not 
appeared before now? Dealing with the legislation of 1826, Horne and Campbell 
noted its purpose was to relax the legislation of 1708 by allowing banks outside of a 
sixty-five mile radius around London to issue demand notes. What Horne and 
Campbell considered the pre-1826 common law position on banking in London 
therefore remained unaffected,  
 
 The result appears to be, that all banking companies which could exist, and 
be carried on by the authority of the common law, may still lawfully exist and 
carry on any banking business from which they are not expressly prohibited. 
We therefore think they may be established as banks of deposit in London, or 
within 65 miles thereof, or in any part of England.  
 
                                                
432
 Horne and Campbell, supra note 423, even provide an example of what such a clause might have 
looked like,  
 
that it should not be lawful for any corporation or partnership consisting of more than six 
persons to have or receive money for safe custody from any of his MajestyÕs subjects, or to pay 
any money upon any check or order, or to lend or owe any money, although no bill, note, or 
security may be given or taken for the same. 
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 7 Geo. IV c. 46 (1826) [Country Bankers Act]. 
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To account for the absence of deposit banks with more than six partners in London 
given that, according to Horne and Campbell, forming such banks was legal under 
English common law required legal manoeuvring. Horne and Campbell engaged 
with their opponents by pointed to two factors that would have made banking for 
large partnerships difficult regardless of their legality. First, they pointed out that 
such banks did not have permission to accept bills of exchange at a shorter date than 
six months. Second, they explained that such banks, in the absence of Parliamentary 
approval, would have been unable to sue and be sued in the name of one of its 
officers. When joint stock deposit banking did appear on the London banking scene 
after 1833, both of these factors took centre stage, a story taken up later in this 
chapter.   
 
2. Interpreting the Bank of EnglandÕs monopoly broadly 
 
As one legal opinion opened up new options for Althrop, the Bank of EnglandÕs 
lawyers formulated an opposing opinion aimed at closing these options by 
reasserting the traditional interpretation of the Bank of EnglandÕs Charter.
434
 The 
lawyers working for the Bank of England rejected the narrow construal of the Bank 
of EnglandÕs Charter put forward by Horne and Campbell by arguing that the BankÕs 
Òexclusive privilege of bankingÓ should be interpreted broadly. That meant the 
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 This opposing opinion is in OPINIONS OF SIR JAMES SCARLETT, SIR EDWARD B. SUGDEN AND MR 
RICHARDS ON THE PRIVILEGE OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND (1833). Sir James Scarlett [1769-1844] was 
a politician and lawyer. For much of his life he was a Whig, but became a Tory when a Whig 
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Campbell, the Solicitor General in 1832 arguing against the position of the Bank of England.   





 declaring, Òthat the Bank of England, and no other bank or 
any other corporation, etc. in the nature of a bank, should be allowed by Act of 
Parliament within the kingdom,Ó referred to banking in the sense of not only note 
issuing but all banking activities.  
 
The Bank of EnglandÕs lawyers developed their legal argument in support of a broad 
understanding of the BankÕs monopoly powers. They started by emphasizing that the 
impulse behind the statutes of 1707 and 1708
436
 was that the Bank of EnglandÕs 
Òexclusive privilegesÓ courtesy of legislation in 1697 had been Òbroken in upon by 
corporationsÓ that had been dealing as banks contrary to the intent of Parliament by, 
in particular, issuing demand notes. Legislation followed in 1707 and 1708 
preventing all partnerships with more than six partners from issuing demand notes. 
At this point, Horne and Campbell interpreted the legislation of 1707 and 1708 
narrowly by arguing that by preventing larger partnerships from issuing notes, this 
legislation left all other banking activities free of hindrance. That remained true, in 
their view, regardless of the statute of 1697, which they argued only prevented the 
establishment of other banks, besides the Bank of England, by Parliamentary charter.  
 
The BankÕs lawyers produced a different interpretation. The legislation of 1697 in 
their view gave Òexclusive privilegesÓ in England and Wales over all banking by 
joint stock corporations to the Bank of England. These privileges included note 
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 6 Ann. c. 59 (1707) [Bank of England Act], also referred to as 6 Ann. c. 22 (1707), Section 9, 
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issuing as well as all other banking business. When other corporations in the early 
eighteenth century had then interfered with the BankÕs privileges with respect to 
Òborrowing or owing money upon notes and bills at short dates,Ó Parliament moved 
not  
 
to limit or diminish the exclusive privileges of the Bank of England, but more 
effectually, to protect them, by prohibiting not only all professed rival banks 
of deposit, but all corporations or societies which É had evaded the 
[legislation of 1697], by undertaking to deal in that part of the business of the 




As the Bank of EnglandÕs lawyers put the point, ÒThis [the statutes of 1707 and 
1708] was a fence thrown aroundÓ the BankÕs monopoly over note issuing Òbut in no 
manner weakened its original force.Ó
438
 The breadth of the 1697 statute remained in 
place covering not only note issuing, now even further protected by new legislation 
of 1707 and 1708, but also all other forms of banking. To the BankÕs lawyers, the 
BankÕs Òexclusive privilegesÓ referred to banks and banking Òin the most universal 
sense that can be applied to them, embracing as well that part of the business of 
banking which consists of receiving deposits, as that which consists of issuing notes 
or bills for money borrowed.Ó
439
 The statutes of 1707 and 1708 reinforced these 
privileges; legislation throughout the eighteenth century had reiterated them; while 
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the Act of 1826
440
 had modified them, but only to the extent that joint stock banks 
outside of a sixty-five mile radius around London could now undertake banking 
business. Within that sixty-five mile circle, the status quo remained.  
 
3. Whigs and bankers 
 
Evidence suggests that the arguments developed by the Bank of EnglandÕs lawyers 
made Althorp think twice about his course of action.
441
 Yet resort to these arguments 
also illustrates the degree to which the destabilization of the traditional interpretation 
of the BankÕs Charter had already had an effect. In the spring of 1833, the 
government, much of LondonÕs commercial community, and most legal opinion 
recognized as uncontroversial the established interpretation of the Bank of EnglandÕs 
Charter that the Bank of England had a monopoly in all banking business in and near 
to London. Most contemporary opinion regarded as frivolous and/or inaccurate 
suggestions of the type put forward by Joplin that the BankÕs Charter only gave it a 
monopoly over note issuing leaving other forms of banking, such as deposit banking, 
unhindered.
442
 Under the status quo legal regime, the default position that 
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 Before the House of Commons, Althorp admitted, Òthat contrary opinions had been given on this 
subject, of which he had not previously been aware, when he stated that no barrister had given a 




For example, the Circular to Bankers saw no basis to the alternative interpretation of the Bank of 
EnglandÕs Charter, writing  
 
Banks of deposit are banks Ôto borrow, owe, or take up any sum or sums of moneyÕ; and 
whether they undertake to pay them back upon Ôbills or notesÕ, or by virtue of an entry made in 
the books of a bank, is immaterial; the Bank of England was empowered to prohibit the 
formation of all banks with more than six partners in London under its original constitution 
when its charter was first obtained and that power is still in force. See THE CIRCULAR TO 
BANKERS, 3 August 1833, at 20. 
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interpreted the Bank of EnglandÕs monopoly to cover all banking business stood as a 
barrier in the path of those who believed they could benefit from joint stock deposit 
banking in and around London. The Bank of England gained from such an 
understanding because as a publicly chartered company with limited liability for its 
shareholders it stood as a banking giant over dwarfs in both London and across 
England and Wales. London banks of six partners or less also benefitted because 
they complimented the Bank of England free from the threat that joint stock rivals 
would pose to their position.  
 
Those who would later form the London and Westminster Bank threatened this 
status quo. Adding bite to their threat was a legal argument that brought into play a 
background rule previously left untouched by those who had interpreted the legality 
of deposit banking in London. According to the advocacy of Horne and Campbell, 
people should be free to undertake the business of banking unless prohibited from 
doing so, in whole or in part, by statute, and where such a statute existed, such as the 
Bank of EnglandÕs Charter, it merited a narrow interpretation. Yet as Horne and 
Campbell argued, the Bank of EnglandÕs Charter had been interpreted too broadly to 
cover all banking, including note issuing and, in their view incorrectly, deposit 
banking.  
 
The key to the success of those pushing for reform was the conversion of Lord 
Althorp to their side, which was possible partly because the new interpretation of the 
BankÕs Charter opened up new possibilities. Yet the mere existence of this new 
interpretation does not explain AlthorpÕs openness to these new possibilities, since 
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he had two equally plausible interpretations of the Bank of EnglandÕs Charter open 
to him. One interpretation construed the BankÕs Charter narrowly, while the other 
interpretation construed the Charter broadly. So, why did Althorp chose one 
interpretation over the other? To understand AlthorpÕs sympathy for the new over 
the traditional interpretation, the remainder of this section considers the relationship 
between the government and the Bank of England in the early 1830s.  
 
Government ministers played a central role in shaping the boundaries of banking in 
the 1830s, principally by negotiating the terms of the governmentÕs relationship with 
the Bank of England. The details of the compact between the government and the 
Bank of England were not permanent. There was always scope for adjustment over, 
for instance, the terms of what the government borrowed and what the Bank lent, or 
over the details of the BankÕs privileges vis--vis the rest of the banking system. 
These details were especially open to revision in the build up to the renewal of the 
BankÕs Charter, and it is plausible to suggest that the Bank had fixed term Charters, 
rather than a permanent one, to permit precisely this kind of flexibility.
443
 At the 
time of the 1833 Charter renewal, many viewed the Bank of England as Òa locus of 
Old Corruption,Ó
444
 making it vulnerable to the reforms of the Whigs who took 
control of government in 1830 and carried into effect the famous Reform Act of 
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 ALBORN, supra note 250, at 57-8. See also Anthony Howe, From ÔOld CorruptionÕ to ÔNew 
ProbityÕ: the Bank of England and its Directors in the Age of Reform, 1 FINANCIAL HISTORY REVIEW 
23 (1994). Many were conscious of the opportunity the government had to reform the Bank of 
England. See, for example, SAMUEL WELLS, A LEGAL STATEMENT OF THE REAL POSITION OF THE 
GOVERNMENT WITH RELATION TO THE BANK OF ENGLAND (1832), where Wells also details the 
history of the governmentÕs past ÒbargainsÓ with the Bank. 
 





 Nevertheless, the government dared not squeeze the Bank of England too 
hard, primarily because both institutions were dependent on each other. The 
government needed the Bank of England for loans, while the Bank of England relied 
on the government servicing these loans for its profits. Over time, it was possible to 
adjust the precise terms of this relationship of mutual dependence. But the mutual 
advantages arising from the relationship were too valuable to place at risk by 
adjustments that overly undermined either party. 
 
Rather than undermining the Bank of England, its renewed Charter of 1833 brought 
it a range of benefits.
446
 Despite the passage of the Reform Act, the government in 
1832 of which Althorp was a member was not itself radical. It was a Whig 
aristocratic government, Òacquiesced in the existing order,Ó and only inclined 
towards reform Òto reduce discontent, to undermine the extremes, to solidify the 
centre, and thus to promote stability.Ó
447
 While willing to tackle some of the more 
deplorable instances of ÒOld Corruption,Ó the government was too pragmatic to 
consider Òwild and extravagant projectsÓ such as refusing altogether to renew the 
Bank of EnglandÕs Charter. According to one historian of the period, even on 
economic matters, on which most Whig ministers were reluctant to intervene in the 
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 The Reform Act of 1832 extended voting rights to include more categories of persons, made a start 
at encouraging fairer elections by, for example, abolishing Òrotten boroughsÓ (seats with very small 




 3 & 4 Will. IV c. 98 (1833) [Bank of England Act] renewed the Bank of EnglandÕs Charter for a 
further twenty-one years, though the government had the option of reviewing the BankÕs Charter after 
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market and tended towards laissez-faire positions, Ò[t]hey learned quickly to forge 
economic policy from amongst the competing economic and political interests in a 




AlthorpÕs policy towards banking was no different. The governmentÕs own account 
of the Charter renewal set out a defence of the governmentÕs decision not to 
undertake radical reform of the Bank of England, despite the considerable body of 
opinion attacking the BankÕs privileges and monopoly.
449
 Once in place, the Reform 
ActÕs middle class backers, principally shopkeepers, manufacturers, and merchants, 
had had enough of political uncertainty for the disruption it caused to their trades.
450
 
Given the governmentÕs number one objective of restoring and maintaining stability, 




Yet amongst government ministers in 1833, there was a genuine desire to undermine 
the extremes of the old system and deal with abuses where they could.
452
 Moreover, 
Althorp had developed a keen interest in economics through his friendship with 
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 D. LE MARCHANT, THE REFORMED MINISTRY AND THE REFORMED PARLIAMENT 37-41 (1834). 
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 ÒQuiet times are good for all trade but agitated times are the death to a man with a host of armed 
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changes as seem only experiment,Ó MICHAEL BROCK, THE GREAT REFORM ACT 319-20 (1973) 
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 The government argued in 1834,  
 
The immense majority by which the resolution [renewing the Bank of EnglandÕs Charter] was 
carried, the triumph in argument achieved by its supporters, has crushed forever the 
expectations of those who would unsettle all the monetary transactions of the Empire, and has 
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Henry Parnell, a vocal critic of the Bank of EnglandÕs monopoly.
453
 Although 
Althrop was unwilling to follow ParnellÕs radical call for the Bank to lose its 
monopoly over note issuing in London, the legal reinterpretation of the BankÕs 
Charter opened up another possibility to Althorp, one that had seemed closed to him 
in the spring of 1833. Althorp could leave secure and even enhance the position of 
Bank of England whilst also accommodating Òcompeting economic and political 
interests in a manner which seemed consistent with the maintenance of civil 
orderÓ
454
 by adjusting the BankÕs privileges over joint stock banking in London.  
 
A legal argument opened up this option to Althorp by turning a relatively 
determinate understanding of the legal position governing the extent of the BankÕs 
monopoly in London into an indeterminate one. By clarifying this uncertainty, 
Parliament permitted joint stock banks in and near to London.
455
 Yet the extent to 
which government minister such as Althorp could cross the Bank of England 
required careful judgment. AlthropÕs about face in 1833 incensed the Bank of 
EnglandÕs directors.
456
 Perhaps Althorp did not anticipate how much this concession 
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 Id., 105. See also HENRY PARNELL, A PLAIN STATEMENT OF THE POWER OF THE BANK OF 
ENGLAND AND THE USE IT HAS MADE OF IT (1833).  
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 NEWBOUND, supra note 447, at 103. 
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 Legalizing joint stock deposit banking in London was the declaratory clause contained in 3 & 4 
Will. IV c. 98 (1833) [Bank of England Act] Section III. The clause asserted,  
 
That any Body Politic or Corporate, or Society, or Company, or Partnership, although 
consisting of more than six persons, may carry on the trade or business of Banking in London, 
or within sixty-five miles thereof, provided that such Body Politic or Corporate (etc.) É do not 
borrow, owe or take up in England any sum or sums of money on their Bills or Notes payable 
on demand, or at any less time than six months from the borrowing thereof, during the 
continuance of the privileges granted by this Act to the said Governor and Company of the 
Bank of England.  
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 See GREGORY, supra note 28, at 40-44. 
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to the London and WestminsterÕs supporters would infuriate the Bank of England. It 
is possible he felt he had pushed the Bank of England too far, which would at least 
explain AlthropÕs stance in 1834 when the Bank of England clashed with the newly 
formed London and Westminster Bank over whether or not the latter institution 
could have the power to sue and be sued in the name of a public officer. It is to this 
clash and AlthorpÕs decision to side with, on this later occasion, the Bank of England 
that this chapter now turns.  
 
B. Suing and Being Sued in the Name of a Public Officer 
 
The declaratory clause of 1833 was the sole piece of legislation regulating joint 
stock banks in London. While joint stock banks based elsewhere in England and 
Wales had Parliamentary approval (courtesy of the legislation of 1826)
457
 to sue and 
be sued in the name of the public officer of the bank, the same was not true of joint 
stock banks in London because the declaratory clause said only that these banks 
could not issue demand notes.     
 
Without Parliamentary approval to sue and be sued in the name of an officer of the 
company, the London and Westminster had two routes for ensuring the recovery of 
debts owed to the bank and the debts the bank owed to others. The first route was 
through partnership law. Although theoretically an avenue for claiming debts owed, 
the law of partnership turned out to be inadequate for an institution like the London 
and Westminster because it had businesses of only a handful of partners in mind. 
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Listing three or four partners by their several and distinct names on a suit presented 
few problems, but listing the names of hundreds of members carried the risk of the 




Conscious of the inadequacies of partnership law, the London and Westminster 
Bank appointed through its deed of settlement five trustees in whose name the bank 
could sue and be sued. This required that each customer opening an account at the 
bank sign a separate contract drawn up between themselves and the five trustees. 
Through this contract, the trustees guaranteed to the account holder that the London 
and Westminster would honour its debts to him, and the account holder agreed to 
pay to the trustees any balance owed on his account at the London and Westminster. 
In addition, all other debts owed to the London and Westminster, or upon which the 
London and Westminster might owe a debt, such as bonds, mortgages, bills of 
exchange and promissory notes, were in the name of the bankÕs trustees.      
 
The London and Westminster Bank, then, could sue and be sued through its trustees, 
though it was uncommon for joint stock companies to operate in this way. 
Legislation allowed provincial joint stock banks to appoint a public officer in whose 
name the bank could sue and be sued.
459
 Other joint stock companies frequently 
received Royal or Parliamentary sanction allowing them to do likewise. The London 
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 The legal problems faced by joint stock banks are the subject of George FarrenÕs pamphlet HINTS 
BY WAY OF WARNING ON THE LEGAL, PRACTICAL AND MERCANTILE DIFFICULTIES, ATTENDING THE 
FOUNDATION AND MANAGEMENT OF JOINT STOCK BANKS (1833). For responses to Farren, see 
ANON., DIALOGUE BETWEEN A MERCHANT OF LONDON AND MR. GEORGE FARREN (1833); and ANON. 
[ÒCIVISÓ], A REPLY TO THE PAMPHLET OF GEORGE FARREN (1833). Further information on the 
inadequacies of partnership law as affecting joint stock banks is in Appendix II to this dissertation.  
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and Westminster Bank wanted the same,  
 
because it was the generally recognized mode of large associations carrying 
on legal proceedings; and because, never having been denied to such 
associations legally formed, the granting it appeared to them [the bankÕs 
directors] to follow as a necessary consequence of an enactment so clear and 




Furthermore, the London and Westminster feared that its position was Òimperfectly 
understood by the public,Ó
461
 potentially undermining widespread confidence in the 
bank. For all of these reasons, many key figures associated with the bank were 
Òdesirous that the facility of suing and being sued should be given to the Bank in the 
name of its Manager, under Royal or Parliamentary sanction, without varying any 




1.  Interpreting the declaratory clause 
 
Obtaining legislation allowing the London and Westminster to sue and be sued in 
the name of its public officer required building on the success of the year before that 
                                                
460
 Circular issued by London and Westminster to its shareholders, 16 August 1834, in GREGORY, 
supra note 28, at Appendix III, 180-4. 
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 Letter from W. R. K. Douglas (a director of the London and Westminster) to Lord Althorp, 15 
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had seen the inclusion of the declaratory clause in the Bank of EnglandÕs Charter.
463
 
According to the London and Westminster, the declaratory clause limited the Bank 
of EnglandÕs monopoly to note issuing only, and freed up the possibility of 
additional legislation favourable to deposit banking in London.
464
 The Bank of 
EnglandÕs lawyers responded to this interpretation by looking closely at the precise 
terms of the declaratory clause. All that this clause provided for, they stressed, was 
that Òjoint-stock companies for deposit shall and may be established,Ó but otherwise 




Consequently, the controversy centred on whether allowing banks such as the 
London and Westminster to sue and be sued interfered with the Bank of EnglandÕs 
remaining privileges not covered by the declaratory clause. From the perspective of 
the London and Westminster, the declaratory clause made joint stock banking 
possible and empowered Parliament to provide for all that goes with such banking, 
such as the capacity to sue and be sued in the name of a public officer. The Bank of 
EnglandÕs lawyers, by contrast, adopted a narrow understanding of the declaratory 
clause by arguing that Parliament had left other privileges deliberately out of the 
clause,  
 
as well the Law Officers of the Crown as the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
                                                
463
 In February 1834, the bankÕs solicitors prepared a Bill that the bankÕs supports in Parliament 
presented to Parliament on the bankÕs behalf. For more information on this, see GREGORY, supra note 
28, from 122. 
 
464
 For a summary of the London and WestminsterÕs legal arguments on why it should be allowed to 
sue and be sued in the name of a public officer, see CHARLES WORDSWORTH, THE LAW RELATING TO 
JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES, 51-2 (1837). 
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expressly declared, while the declaratory clause was under consideration, that 
it would not entitle parliament to grant any facilities [such as the privilege of 





Such facilities required the consent of the Bank of England because otherwise there 
would be an infringement of the Bank of EnglandÕs remaining and quite extensive 
monopoly privileges.   
 
The lawyers arguing the position of the Bank of England laid particular stress on 
those Acts of Parliament that had in the past declared, Òthat no other bank should be 
erected, established, or allowed by Parliament,Ó and by which the Bank of England 
in 1800 had been Òdeclared to be and remain a corporation, with the privilege of 
exclusive banking, as before recited.Ó
467
 All of these statutes, according to the 
BankÕs lawyers, remained in force following the declaratory clause, subject to a 
single modification that made joint stock deposit banking in London legal. One of 
these exclusive privileges was that as a corporate entity the Bank of England was 
entitled to sue and be sued in its corporate name. The London and Westminster 
desired this advantage too. Yet the declaratory clause said nothing about suing and 
being sued in the name of a public officer. The London and Westminster inferred 
from this silence that Parliament should act in the spirit of the clause, passing 
whatever legislation was necessary to realize fully the benefits of joint stock banking 
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 WORDSWORTH, supra note 464, at 50. 
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in London. The Bank of EnglandÕs lawyers saw the matter differently, arguing that,  
 
it was vain to deny, that by the existing law, there were inconveniences in 
respect to partnerships in banking concerns, but this was one of the exclusive 
privileges conceded to the Bank of England. If, therefore, facilities were given 
to a joint-stock company to carry on the banking business in the way 




According to the Bank of EnglandÕs lawyers, partnership law continued to hinder 
banks such as the London and Westminster because that was the intention of the 
declaratory clause. By leaving untouched matters besides permitting joint stock 
deposit banks in London, this clause had allowed the Bank of England to retain all of 
its remaining privileges. Allowing the London and Westminster to possess one of 
these privileges would be a step in the direction of incorporating another bank in 
London besides the Bank of England, a move legislation, like that of 1800, very 
explicitly ruled out.
469
   
 
2. Honour, good faith, and sanctity of contract   
 
These conflicting interpretations of the declaratory clause left Lord Althorp, still at 
this point Chancellor of the Exchequer, again facing a choice just as he had the year 
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before. Legal arguments once again attempted to sway that choice, only this time the 
legal argument that persuaded Althorp undermined the London and Westminster. 
The lawyers arguing for the Bank of England helped Althorp reach his decision by 
reinforcing the narrow interpretation of the declaratory clause against the London 
and WestminsterÕs broad understanding by drawing on the Òbackground ruleÓ that 
for reasons of Òhonour and good faith,Ó
470
 the parties must respect the terms of the 
contract they had made. Althorp was open to this line of thinking Ð I shall offer a 
theory as to why in a moment Ð and made frequent reference to it when defending 
his opposition to the London and Westminster Bill before Parliament, stressing, 
Òthat he was bound to maintain the bargain which he had entered into with the 
Bank.Ó
471
 The bargain Althorp had in mind was the renewal of the Bank of 
EnglandÕs Charter. Respecting the Charter from the Bank of EnglandÕs perspective 
required the government adhere to all past statutes conferring exclusive privileges 
onto the Bank.  
 
Although the London and Westminster could turn legal arguments based on sanctity 
of contract to its own advantage,
472
 it faced a bigger problem, an exploration of 
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 J. C. Herries, HANSARD, HC VOL. 23, COL. 1313 (26 May 1834). 
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 Lord Althorp, HANSARD, HC VOL. 23, COL. 1318 (26 May 1834). 
 
472
 The London and Westminster argued that the declaratory clause did not contain an express sub-
clause preventing banks of deposit from obtaining legislation allowing them to sue and be sued. The 
London and WestminsterÕs supporters speculated, tongue-in-cheek, about the possibility of a, ÒÉ 
secret clause in the bargain with the Bank É,Ó (Sir William Clay, HANSARD, HC VOL. 23, COL. 1307 
(26 May 1834)). If there was such a sub-clause, they demanded to see it (GREGORY, supra note 28, at 
140 (footnote)). And, at any rate, respecting bargains was a game they could play too. They noted that 
the declaratory clause, Òafter being consented to and becoming the Law of the Land, should be acted 
upon in good faith, according to its plain meaning,Ó ANON., CASE OF THE LONDON AND 
WESTMINSTER BANK 11 (1834). The plain meaning, from the London and WestminsterÕs perspective, 
was that joint stock deposit banking was now legal in London. Was not denying joint stock banks in 
London the facilities they needed to operate effectively a violation of the clause too? 
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which will help us to understand AlthorpÕs unwillingness to help the London and 
Westminster on this occasion. The London and WestminsterÕs problem stemmed 
from the relationship between the Bank and the government. Recall that the 
government and the Bank of England needed each other, for loans and for profits 
respectively. Both parties bargained over the details of their relationship, but 
because of their mutual dependence, neither party wanted to harm the other 
excessively. The problem for the London and Westminster in 1834 was that the 
Bank of England felt undermined by the governmentÕs stance on the Charter renewal 
of the year before. As one MP subtly put it, Òthe Bank had accused the noble Lord 
[Althorp] of not having dealt with perfect fairness towards it.Ó
473
   
 
Although the declaratory clause was now a fact, the government could make that 
fact easier for the Bank of England to live with by refusing any additional support to 
new London joint stock banks. Lord Althorp did that by opposing the London and 
WestminsterÕs Bill before Parliament. To support this position, Althorp and his allies 
made recourse to the argument that parties must honour past contracts. Uncertainty 
over the details of the BankÕs Charter once or twice a generation was acceptable 
provided it allowed some adjustment over the fine print. By contrast, to revise that 
contract only a year later, in a manner that favoured competing joint stock banks in 
London, raised the possibility of the London and Westminster eating into the Bank 
of EnglandÕs business, and reducing the latterÕs profits and attractiveness to its 
shareholders. Moreover, others feared that allowing joint stock banks in London 
additional corporate privileges was only the start, for Ò[i]f the right of suing and 
being sued were conceded to this bank, he [Mr. Herries] saw no reason why the right 
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of issuing their own paper might not follow.Ó
474
   
 
While these perceived threats had the potential to undermine the Bank of England, 
the Bank was quick to stress the risks they carried for the government too. All who 
in Parliament or legal briefs stressed the importance of not violating the contract 
with the Bank rammed home the point that violating the Charter would Òbreak the 
national faith,Ó
475
 and constitute a Òsevere blow to the security of the public credit of 
this country.Ó
476
 Revising the BankÕs Charter again to remove more of its privileges 
would lead to a fall in profits. If profits suffered, the Bank feared that it could no 
longer provide government with the borrowing facilities underpinning the national 
debt. Given that the Reform Act was only two years old, and that the government 
continued to prioritize Òcivil orderÓ and Òmonetary stability,Ó Althrop had no desire 
to jeopardize the governmentÕs ability to borrow. Hence, he backed away from 
further confrontation with the Bank of England under the cover of respecting the 
contract his government had signed with the Bank the year before.
477
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 AlthorpÕs decision to favour the Bank of EnglandÕs position in the dispute over the passage of the 
London and Westminster Bill through Parliament deprived the London and Westminster of the 
governmentÕs support. The London and Westminster persevered regardless, hoping they might gain 
enough support in Parliament even without the backing of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Although 
the London and Westminster rallied support to see their Bill navigate the House of Commons, it was 
before the House of Lords that the government and the Bank of England rallied support to their side.  
In the Lords, despite the combined efforts of the government and the Bank, there was a split 
in opinion to such an extent that the Lord Chancellor concluded that ÒThere were many able lawyers 
who had deliberately arrived at one conclusion, and there were at the same time many gentlemen of 
no inconsiderable eminence in the profession, and whose opinion would have much weight with the 
public out of doors, who had arrived at a conclusion altogether different,Ó Lord Chancellor, HL VOL. 
24, COL. 436-7. See also GREGORY, supra note 28, at 137-138. To settle the dispute, the Lord 
Chancellor called on the judicial division of the House of Lords to ascertain,  
 




The significance of the London and WestminsterÕs efforts at obtaining legislation 
allowing it to sue and be sued in the name of an officer of the company is twofold. 
First, in both the London and WestminsterÕs own efforts at obtaining this legislation, 
and in the response of the Bank of England, creative legal arguments shaped the 
limits of what people thought possible. The difference on this occasion, in contrast 
to the arguments that led to the declaratory clause, was that Althorp found 
persuasive a legal argument closing down possibilities rather than opening them up. 
Second, the London and WestminsterÕs efforts carry significance because of what 
they reveal about lawÕs role in shaping the capacity of people and organizations to 
pursue objectives. Although the declaratory clause of 1833 empowered people to 
form joint stock banks in London, it left such banks once formed vulnerable in other 
respects. One such source of vulnerability was the inadequacy of partnership law.  
                                                                                                                                    
Whether there was anything in the proposed provisions [the London and WestminsterÕs Bill 
before Parliament] which would amount to an infraction of the legal rights of the Bank of 
England under subsisting statutes Ð that was, whether there might be permitted to exist in the 
metropolis a joint-stock banking company of more than six partners, with power of suing or 
being sued in the name of their secretary or one of their partners (Id., 137-138).  
 
On the 20 June 1834, the House of Lords, acting in its judicial capacity passed judgment, 
though as Gregory observes, the proceedings that day amounted to little more than farce. Despite 
being called upon to add clarity to a dispute overwhelmed by divergent legal opinion,  
 
His MajestyÕs Judges after considering the question which has been proposed to them, find it 
proposed in terms which render it doubtful whether it is a question confined to the strict legal 
construction of existing acts of parliament, and they therefore, with great deference and 
respect to your Lordships, request to be excused from giving an answer.  
 
His MajestyÕs Judges did not feel inclined to decide one way or the other, pleading as their 
excuse the wording of the question. They asked for the submission of a new appropriately worded 
question, but that never happened because the Parliamentary session for that year had ended. The 
London and Westminster would have to try again in 1835, though by the time it contemplated doing 
so, other legal challenges had taken centre stage in its battle with the Bank of England.  
With matters stalled before the Lords, the London and Westminster set about making clear 
that even without this legislation the constitution of the bank was structured such that carrying out its 
business was not hindered by the absence of the capacity to sue and be sued in the name of a public 
officer. The bankÕs main means of stressing to both its own shareholders and the broader public that it 
was capable of operating without legislative assistance was to circulate a statement Òto explain the 
exact mode of operating by Trustees,Ó see GREGORY, supra note 28, at Appendix III to Chapter IV. 
The circular appeared in many newspapers, including THE CIRCULAR TO BANKERS, 22 August 1834. 
 




Having lost the fight over the declaratory clause, the Bank of England could still 
exploit the vulnerabilities of the new joint stock banks, or prevent banks like the 
London and Westminster from remedying these vulnerabilities. Crucial to the Bank 
of EnglandÕs efforts at exploiting the vulnerabilities affecting others, was its ability 
to manage its own vulnerabilities. One such source of vulnerability was the BankÕs 
relationship with the government. The BankÕs inability to hold the government to the 
traditional interpretation of the BankÕs Charter had led to legislation in 1833 
allowing joint stock banks in London. By contrast, the BankÕs ability to manage its 
relationship with the government only a year later Ð largely through stressing the 
degree to which the government needed a strong Bank of England Ð prevented 
legislation consolidating the first of LondonÕs joint stock banks.  
 
A further vulnerability hampering the London and Westminster in the mid 1830s 
also stemmed from the wording of the declaratory clause. It is to this further 
vulnerability, and the ways that the Bank of England tried to exploit it to strengthen 
its position against the London and Westminster, that this chapter now turns.   
 
C. Accepting Bills of Exchange Drawn at Less than Six Months 
 
The London and Westminster performed agency or correspondent services for 
provincial banks.
478
 As Chapter II described,
479
 by drawing bills of exchange, 
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country bankers made funds available in London to their customers that London 
bankers agreed to supply. The country banker and his London agent typically had an 
arrangement in place by which the London banker made clear the terms on which he 
was willing to do business on behalf of the country banker, including the volume 
and value of payments he was comfortable meeting at any one time. If the country 
banker stretched the tolerance levels of his London agent by drawing a greater 
number of bills than agreed, the London banker could refuse to accept any more bills 
above the agreed threshold. If all went smoothly, the acceptance of a London banker 
Ð traditionally, a banker with close ties to the Bank of England Ð added credibility to 
the bills created by small and frequently unstable country bankers, giving these bills, 
as a result, a wider circulation.  
 
Soon after its establishment, the London and Westminster forged relations with 
provincial banks across England and Wales, offering these bankers the agency 
services commonly performed by London bankers, including accepting bills of 
exchange. Yet while London bankers had been in the business of accepting bills of 
exchange for their country clients for decades, the London and Westminster, and all 
other joint stock deposit banks formed in London during the 1830s, soon 
encountered an obstacle to their involvement in the business of accepting bills that 
the Bank of England was intent on using against them.  
                                                                                                                                    
trend also marked the banks intake of deposits. In 1834, funds deposited at the bank totalled just over 
£180,000. A decade later, that figure had risen dramatically to over £3.5million. And the bank was 
profitable. In its first year net profits were a modest £3,540; the following year, the bank generated 
over £11,000; in 1836, over £29,000; and, in 1837, over £32,000. Profits continued to increase year 
on year over the next decade so that by 1846 the bankÕs net profit was over £74,000. All figures are 
from JAMES WILLIAM GILBART, A RECORD OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE LONDON AND WESTMINSTER 
BANK 71-2 (1847). 
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 See discussion at supra Chapter II, Part C (1). See also Appendix I to this dissertation. 




According to the Bank of England, the BankÕs Charter prohibited joint stock banks 
of deposit from accepting bills of exchange with less than six months to run until 
maturity. The Bank cited the declaratory clause of 1833, which permitted joint stock 
banks to operate in and near to London on the condition that they Òdo not borrow, 
owe, or take up in England any sum or sums of money on their bills or notes payable 
on demand, or at any less time than six months from the borrowing thereof ....Ó The 
Bank of England argued that the declaratory clause prohibited joint stock banks in 
London from issuing demand notes, and from accepting, by borrowing, owing, or 
taking up, bills with six months or less to run until maturity.  
 
One of the London and WestminsterÕs country correspondents was George Muskett, 
who opened a bank in St Albans around the same time as the founding of the 
London and Westminster. A typical service performed by Muskett for his customers 
was drawing bills of exchange and promissory notes, payable at less than six 
months, on the London and Westminster, which the London and Westminster 
accepted in the name of its trustees.
480
 By September of 1834, the Bank of England 
was aware of this practice and, having taken the advice of its lawyers, was 
convinced of its illegality under the Charter. Having caught wind of the BankÕs 
likely objection to their accepting bills with less than six months until maturity, the 
London and Westminster, following the advice of its own lawyers, declared its 
intention to continue to Òaccept Bills of Exchange and transact all other Agency 
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 Muskett was operating a one-man bank. Consequently, having the London and Westminster add 
their signature to his bills made the bills vastly more credible. This aided his customers because the 
bills were now easier to transfer.  
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business for banks or other persons in the country.Ó
481
 The stage was set for another 
public confrontation between the Bank of England and LondonÕs largest joint stock 
bank, conducted yet again through the arguments of their lawyers. This time though, 
the stage upon which the dispute played out was not Parliament, but the courts, after 
the Bank of England sought an injunction to stop the London and Westminster from 
accepting bills drawn at less than six months.  
 
1. Accepting bills of exchange: Typical deposit banking or quasi note issuing? 
 
The London and Westminster and its lawyers accepted that the declaratory clause in 
the Bank of EnglandÕs renewed Charter reinforced the BankÕs monopoly over the 
note issue in London. But, they stressed, the declaratory clause also Òlegalized 
everything which is incidental to the business of banks of deposit.Ó
 482
 Consequently, 
joint stock deposit banks faced no further restrictions in London besides the note 
issue. The London and Westminster also argued that accepting bills of exchange 
drawn by country bankers was a typical activity performed by banks of deposit, one 
that London private banks had undertaken for decades. Given, therefore, that the 
declaratory clause had confirmed the legality of joint stock deposit banking in 
London, and that a standard service performed by banks of deposit included 
accepting the bills drawn by their country clients, the London and Westminster saw 
no reason why it too, as a legally established joint stock bank of deposit, should not 
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 Bank of England v. Anderson (1837), 2 Keen 328 [48 E.R. 655]. All quotations are from the 
English Law Reports. The quote in the text is at 676. Anderson was a director of the London and 
Westminster and a partner in the firm of Douglas, Anderson and Co. Ð the same Douglas as W. R. 
Douglas who set in motion in early 1833 the drive towards making joint stock banks of deposit 
possible in London. See THE CIRCULAR TO BANKERS, 2 Dec 1836.  
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also accept bills drawn by country bankers.  
 
The Bank of England feared that the London and Westminster had intentions beyond 
operating as a bank of deposit. The London and WestminsterÕs deed of settlement, 
for instance, stressed the bankÕs intention of circulating demand notes at some point 
in the future should Parliament permit them to do so.
483
 In the meantime, the Bank 
of EnglandÕs Charter very clearly prohibited issuing demand notes. To get round this 
unambiguous prohibition, the Bank of England claimed that the London and 
Westminster had accepted short dated bills of exchange.  
 
The problem for the London and Westminster, and the point seized on by the Bank 
of England, was the overlap between accepting bills drawn by provincial bankers 
and issuing short-dated bills as a means of exchange. Both the Bank of England and 
the London and Westminster recognized that the acceptance of a London banker 
added credibility to bills of exchange drawn by country bankers. A promise to pay 
by a one-man bank, such as MuskettÕs bank in St Albans, was less credible than the 
same promise to pay supplemented by an additional promise to pay from a bank with 
more than four hundred proprietors all liable for its debts. In the present case, the 
holder of the bill drawn by Muskett presented it to the London and Westminster for 
acceptance a mere two days later, with payment due twenty-one days after the 
original order. Nineteen days stood between the London and WestminsterÕs 
acceptance and the day on which the bill matured. Consequently, the bill could 
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 See DEED OF SETTLEMENT OF THE LONDON AND WESTMINSTER BANK (1834), Article 96, which 
gave to the bank the power Òto issue notes, payable on demand, within His MajestyÕs dominions, of, 
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circulate for nineteen days with the backing of the shareholders of a large joint stock 
bank.  
 
The Bank of EnglandÕs concern, then, was Òthat bills of exchange, payable at a short 
date, accepted by an opulent joint stock banking company in London, are liable to 
get into extensive circulation.Ó
484
 From the BankÕs perspective, these short-dated 
bills were a devious attempt by a joint stock bank of deposit at bypassing the Bank 
of EnglandÕs Charter that limited the creation of demand notes in London to those of 
the Bank of England.  
 
The London and Westminster did not dispute the claim that the public considered 
credible bills bearing its endorsement because it hoped to draw business away from 
established private banks in London by emphasizing the security provided by its 
large body of proprietors. Nonetheless, the London and Westminster claimed that it 
held no intention of seeing these bills circulate in competition with Bank of England 
notes. According to the London and Westminster, there had been no Òattempt at a 
fraudulent evasion of the exclusive privileges of the Bank of England by the 
introduction of a new species of circulating medium which should come into 
competition with the notes of the Bank of England.Ó
485
 The transaction with Muskett 
was not fraudulent. Rather, Òthe transaction in question was a bona fide acceptance 
of a bill drawn by a customer and given by the acceptors for a bona fide debt due to 
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 Such a bill might then circulate extensively, but there was little 
danger of it competing with the circulation of Bank of England notes. As the London 
and WestminsterÕs lawyers argued,  
 
It would be long before a bill of exchange would be received as a substitute for 
the currency of the country, and passed generally from hand to hand as the 
representative of so much coin. If the bill of exchange is not due, the party 
taking it has to consider the names of the drawers and acceptors, and the rate 
of discount before he can form a judgment of its value. If the bill of exchange 
is overdue, it is subject to all the equities of the persons through whose hands 
it may have passed from the time at which it was payable, and no prudent man 
will readily take a bill of exchange which is overdue. Bills of exchange, 
therefore, even if they were made payable at five days from the date, which is a 
case put in the certificate, are never likely to answer the purposes of the 





Central to the London and WestminsterÕs position then, was the claim that accepting 
bills of exchange drawn by its customer was a distinct activity from circulating 
short-dated bills. The London and Westminster had no intention of violating the 
Bank of EnglandÕs Charter either by issuing demand notes, or putting into 
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circulation bills of exchange that were a close equivalent to demand notes.
488
 ÒThe 
real object and design of the company was to carry on the business of a bank of 
deposit,Ó
489
 including accepting the bills drawn by country banks. Furthermore, 
according to the London and Westminster's lawyers, Òthe onus lies on the other side 
to shew that the accepting of a bill of exchange, drawn by a customer, is not a part of 
the ordinary business of a bank of deposit.Ó
490
   
 
The dispute between the Bank of England and the London and Westminster centred, 
then, on the second half of the declaratory clause that permitted the establishment of 
joint stock banks in London provided they Òdo not borrow, owe or take up in 
England any sum or sums of money on their bills or notes payable on demand, or at 
any less time than six months from the borrowing thereof.Ó The London and 
Westminster claimed that these terms covered only those banks that intended to 
issue bank notes. Other forms of banking, not involving the issue of notes, stood 
outside the prohibitions outlined in the declaratory clause, including those services 
typically performed by deposit banks such as accepting bills of exchange drawn by 
country correspondents. In opposition to this claim, the Bank of England asserted 
that the terms of the clause were broader than that, and not only prevented banks 
other than the Bank of England from issuing demand notes, but also caught banks of 
deposit that crossed the line into quasi note issuing. The London and WestminsterÕs 
task then, was to show that the terms of the second half of the declaratory clause did 
not cover joint stock deposit banks. By contrast, the Bank of England had to 
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demonstrate that the terms of the clause applied to all banks, whether banks of issue 
or of deposit.  
 
2. The meaning of ÒbillsÓ and ÒborrowingÓ 
 
The London and WestminsterÕs lawyers adopted the strategy of focusing on two key 
terms in the second half of the declaratory clause to show that these terms did not 
apply to those activities common to banks of deposit.  First, they identified Òbills.Ó 
The Bank of EnglandÕs position depended on the assumption that ÒbillsÓ as used in 
the declaratory clause referred to bills of exchange given the Bank of EnglandÕs 
claim that short-dated bills of exchange accepted by large joint stock deposit banks 
circulated as an alternative currency to Bank of England notes. To counter this 
assumption, the London and WestminsterÕs lawyers argued that ÒbillsÓ in the 
declaratory clause did not refer to bills of exchange, and did so by bringing to the 
fore the history of the Bank of EnglandÕs Charter.  
 
From its creation in 1694, the Bank of England issued two types of paper notes. The 
first were cash notes, not bearing interest and payable on demand. The second were 
known as Òsealed bills,Ó which bore interest and could be transferred by 
endorsement.
491
 In its early years, the Bank of England encountered difficulties and 
these two forms of paper money both circulated at a discount. To reinforce the 
position of the Bank of England, in 1697 Parliament assured the Bank that it would 
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R. D. Richards, The Evolution of Paper Money in England, 41(3) THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF 
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not establish a rival bank without the BankÕs consent, and in 1708 the Bank had its 
note issue bolstered by a clause prohibiting banks of more than six partners from 
issuing notes payable on demand. It was courtesy of this second piece of legislation 
that the language of the second half of the declaratory clause first appeared. 
According to the London and WestminsterÕs lawyers, that language referred to paper 
money in the sense of both demand notes and Òbills.Ó Given the history of the Bank 
of England up until 1708, however, the London and WestminsterÕs lawyers stressed 
that while notes referred to cash notes payable on demand, bills referred to sealed 




By the 1830s the Bank of England had long since ceased to issue sealed bills, 
limiting itself to interest free notes payable on demand. But the language of 1708 
had persisted through to the 1830s. Consequently, when the Bank of England 
examined the declaratory clause and saw the words Òbills and notes,Ó it read into that 
language bills of exchange and demand notes. The point made by the London and 
WestminsterÕs lawyers was that ÒbillsÓ in the statutes regulating the Bank of 
England did not refer to bills of exchange, but to an antiquated form of paper money 
no longer in use by the 1830s. The Bank of EnglandÕs understanding that these 
statutes did refer to bills of exchange drew a perfectly legitimate practice of deposit 
banking Ð accepting bills drawn by country bankers Ð under the rubric of legislation 
designed with a quite different type of banking in mind, one centred on the issue of 
bank notes.   
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The second term homed in on by the London and WestminsterÕs lawyers was 
Òborrowing.Ó As part of the Bank of EnglandÕs argument, its lawyers claimed that 
accepting bills of exchange, an act not explicitly mentioned in the declaratory clause, 
amounted to the same thing as the act of borrowing, owing or taking up. The Bank 
of EnglandÕs lawyers had in mind, I think, the classic example of LondonÕs 
seventeenth century goldsmiths, who would borrow, owe or take up gold coin from 
their depositors, and, in return, issue a receipt equivalent in value to the sums 
borrowed. These deposit receipts then circulated as a substitute for coins. Accepting 
bills of exchange resembled the practice of the goldsmiths because the acceptor only 
added their signature to the bill provided the drawer had deposited adequate funds to 
cover the debt when it fell due. Depositing such funds involved the acceptor, the 
London and Westminster, building up a reserve, by borrowing, owing or taking up 
funds from the drawer, such as Muskett in St Albans. This reserve looked similar to 
the deposits left with goldsmiths, and the acceptorÕs signature on the bill of 




The London and Westminster rejected the claim that Òbills of exchange were 
accepted for monies borrowed by the company.Ó
494
 Conceivably, any deposit of 
funds by their country correspondent need not precede the acceptance because the 
London and Westminster could accept bills in the expectation that the country 
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 To be clear, the analogy to the operations of the goldsmiths was not an explicit part of the 
argument pursued by the Bank of EnglandÕs lawyers. I refer to the analogy because it sheds light on 
the thinking underpinning the Bank of EnglandÕs position. Bills of exchange accepted by London 
joint stock banks of deposit resemble demand notes, like the receipts of goldsmiths. The resemblance 
stemmed from the fact that the operations necessary to create the deposit receipt of a goldsmith were 
similar to the requirements necessary to create a bill of exchange bearing the signature of a joint stock 
bank.     
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banker would ensure the delivery of funds to the London and Westminster before the 
bills fell due. Furthermore, recall that the declaratory clause required Òsums of 
moneyÓ to be borrowed, etc, Òon their bills or notesÓ (my emphasis). The London 
and WestminsterÕs lawyers argued that although the London and Westminster 
accepted these bills, it did not issue them, for ÒThe acceptors are not the issuers of a 
bill of exchange.Ó
495
 It was the drawer, in this instance Muskett in St Albans, who 
created the bill and determined its maturity date. By contrast,  
 
The drawee [the party presented with the bill for acceptance, here the London 
and Westminster], of a bill of exchange has no interest in or control over it, if 
he does not accept it, and, if he retains it in his possession, an action of trover 




Because the bill did not belong to the drawee (the London and Westminster), it was 
inaccurate to claim that the London and Westminster had borrowed sums of money 
on their bills or notes. If they had borrowed money at all, something they also 
disputed, they had done so on bills belonging to Muskett of St Albans. 
 
Given that accepting a bill of exchange did not necessarily involve borrowing 
money, and that the London and Westminster did not create the bills it accepted, 
how was it possible that the London and Westminster fell afoul of legislation 
requiring Òa borrowingÓ as the basis for the issue of demand notes? To put the point 
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another way, goldsmiths borrowed money and issued receipts. By contrast, the 
London joint stock banks made their credit available to others and accepted bills of 
exchanged issued by others. Moreover, while goldsmiths created the type of demand 
note that Parliament wanted to limit to the Bank of England, the London joint stock 
banks, by contrast, depended on others creating the bills in question, bills not 
payable on demand but at a future date. Hence, the London and Westminster and its 
lawyers concluded that the second half of the declaratory clause was inapplicable to 
its activities as a bank of deposit.  
 
3. Preserving the Bank of EnglandÕs privileges 
 
The London and WestminsterÕs interpretation of the declaratory clause was highly 
plausible. The word ÒbillsÓ probably did mean sealed bills in 1694 and 1708, and it 
was by no means clear that Òto borrow, owe or take upÓ was equivalent to accepting 
a bill of exchange drawn by someone else. Yet, although the declaratory clause was 
supposed to clarify, it did the opposite, a point not lost on Thomas Joplin, a keen 
contemporary follower of the case. As Joplin observed,  
 
 [e]ven the most scrupulous declarations of law are frequently of ambiguous 
interpretation; but when the law is an ambiguity itself, saying one thing, and 
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 THOMAS JOPLIN, ARTICLES ON BANKING AND CURRENCY FROM ÔTHE ECONOMISTÕ NEWSPAPER, 29 
(1838). Emphasis in original.  
 




Such ambiguity gave the Bank of England cause for optimism. ÒBillsÓ to most 
observers referred to bills of exchange, and by their very nature, banks of deposit 
such as the London and Westminster borrowed money while adding their signature 
to bills of exchange that tended to circulate. In short, the court had legal ground for 
going either way. 
 
In the event, the Bank of EnglandÕs perspective found favour with both the Master 
of the Rolls and the Court of Common Pleas.
498
 To the judges sitting in these courts, 
the matter of what ÒbillsÓ had referred to in 1694 or 1708 mattered less than what 
Parliament had subsequently intended. Consequently, Lord Chief Justice Tindel 
asked rhetorically, ÒSuppose this stature [of 1833] had stood alone, would anyone, at 
this time of day, hesitate in construing it to intend bills of exchange and promissory 
notes?Ó
499
 Then there was the issue of whether the London and Westminster was 
ÒborrowingÓ on the bills of exchange it accepted. The court answered that it was, 
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As noted earlier, the Bank of England sought an injunction requiring the London and Westminster 
to refrain from accepting bills of exchange with less than six months to run until maturity. As an 
injunction is an equitable remedy, the Court of Chancery heard the case. The Lord Chancellor heard 
cases brought before Chancery, assisted by a team of clerks including the Master of the Rolls. The 
Master of the Rolls frequently heard cases on his own as happened here. (The Judicature Act of 1873 
abolished the Court of Chancery and fused together the administration of equity and the common law. 
This Act also moved the Master of the Rolls to the newly formed Court of Appeal). The Court of 
Chancery decided cases by referring to equitable principles. Should a purely legal question Ð such as 
the interpretation of a statute Ð come before it, the court of equity turned to a court of law for an 
opinion (the exception was if the case before the court of equity was urgent; in this circumstance, the 
court of equity resolved the question of law itself). In the case between the Bank of England and the 
London and Westminster, both parties agreed that the resolution of their dispute was not urgent (Bank 
of England v. Anderson at 668). Consequently, the Master of the Rolls referred the matter of 
interpreting the various statutes regulating the Bank of England to the Court of Common Pleas (the 
Court of Common Pleas was a common law court that heard disputes between subjects not involving 
the Sovereign). After the Court of Common Pleas gave its opinion on statutory interpretation (see 
Bank of England v. Anderson (1837) 3 Bing (N. C.) 590 [132 E.R. 538], 668-676), the case returned 
to the Master of the Rolls in Chancery for a final judgment on whether an injunction should be 
granted.    
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 É it appears to us É that the acceptance of a bill under the circumstances 
stated in the case, is to be considered a borrowing in point of law. By taking 
the acceptance, the customer consents that his money will remain in his 
bankerÕs hands until the bill becomes due; he has no power or right, after 
receiving the acceptance, to change his mind, cancel the acceptance, and 
compel the banker to pay his money on demand. The drawing and accepting 
the bill forms a contract between the drawer and acceptor, which can only be 
rescinded by the mutual consent of both; for what would be the condition of 
the banker, who may have lent the money of his customer on the face of the 
forbearance given, if the law were otherwise? The relative position, therefore, 
of the customer and the banker seems undistinguishable, as to its legal 
consequences, in any material respect, from that of lender and borrower.500 
 
In the courts view, ÒbillsÓ referred to bills of exchange and accepting a bill of 
exchange constituted a Òborrowing.Ó But was the bill of exchange issued by the 
London and Westminster? The declaratory clause prohibited London bankers from 
borrowing, owing or taking up Òon their bills or notesÓ (my emphasis). If the bill of 
exchange here was primarily the liability of the drawer, Muskett, then it did not 
belong to the London and Westminster.  The court reached a different conclusion, 
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 Id., 674. The court goes on to add,  
 
Whenever the drawer of a bill of exchange [and the drawee ordered to make a payment by the 
drawer] accepts it, he becomes a debtor to the holder of the bill to the amount of the sum 
specified in the bill; and the holder gives credit to the acceptor to that amount until the 
maturity of the bill. The relation of debtor and creditor, thus created by the acceptance of the 
bill, appears to be considered by the Legislature as equivalent to an actual borrowing of the 
money owed on the one hand, and credited on the other, Bank of England v. Anderson, supra 
note 482, at 674.  
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however, by deciding that since the London and Westminster bore primary 
responsibility for the payment of the debt owed on the bill,  
 
 É we are of the opinion that, if the bankers are to be held borrowers, and the 
acceptance of the bill drawn upon them is the security they give for the debt, 
they do, in common parlance, borrow on their bills when they borrow on their 
acceptances. The acceptor is as much a party to the bill as soon as he 
becomes a party to the bill as the drawer; indeed, he is the person primarily 





In the opinion of the court, the London and Westminster borrowed from the public 
those funds left as deposits, which it used to accept bills of exchange with maturity 
dates of less than six months on which it bore primary liable. Furthermore, these 
bills, with the backing of a highly credible institution like the London and 
Westminster, were likely to circulate extensively in the London area. The fear of a 
competing note circulation had led the Bank of England to take action against the 
London and Westminster, a fear the court considered justified. In the opinion of 
Lord Chief Justice Tindel, if the London and WestminsterÕs case was successful, 
Òbills of short date might be issued to any amount by bankers in London, and thus a 
paper circulation be created which would enable other large bodies to enter into 
competition with the Bank of England.Ó
502
 If that happened, the court feared for the 
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The courts accepted the Bank of EnglandÕs contention that the London and 
Westminster intended to have bills carrying its acceptance enter into competition 
with the BankÕs own notes. Since the London and Westminster could not issue 
demand notes, an alternative involved having a bank outside of London, or a private 
bank of six partners of less in or near to London, such as MuskettÕs bank in St 
Albans, draw bills on the London and Westminster, which the London and 
Westminster would then accept. In so doing, the London and Westminster became 
primarily liable for the debt owed, giving these bills the backing of an institution 
more credible than any other bank not backed, directly or indirectly, by the 
government. 
 
Nonetheless, the London and Westminster did not issue demand notes, but rather 
added its name to bills of exchange payable at some future date, not issued in the 
first instance by the London and Westminster, but by a client it controlled to only a 
limited degree.
503
 As the London and WestminsterÕs lawyers pointed out, promises 
to pay backed by the London and Westminster were, though credible, hardly equal 
to the notes of the Bank of England. 
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correspondents. I touch on this later in this conclusion.  
                                                                                                                
271 
 
Why then did the Bank of England invest so much energy in stopping the London 
and Westminster from accepting bills drawn by country bankers? The same question 
is also relevant to the Bank of EnglandÕs opposition to the London and 
WestminsterÕs attempt to obtain legislation allowing it to sue and be sued in the 
name of a public officer. Appreciating the Bank of EnglandÕs hostility to the London 
and Westminster requires considering the BankÕs wider objectives in the 1830s. 
 
As I discussed in Chapter III, the Bank of England attempted to assert greater 
control over the note issue in the 1830s through its circulation accounts to meet its 
obligations under the gold standard. As we explored in Chapter III, agreeing to a 
circulation account with the Bank of England guaranteed the contracting bank access 
to the Bank of EnglandÕs notes, boosting the amount of credit available to the 
provincial bank. Yet at times provincial banks found other sources of credit besides 
the BankÕs branches. The presence of the London and Westminster, and other 
similar London joint stock banks, presented one such alternative source of credit.  
 
The prestige, resources, and inducements offered by the London and Westminster,
 
504
 convinced a large number of provincial joint stock banks to seek out its 
services.
505
 By attempting to undermine the capacity of the London and Westminster 
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 For examples of the inducements offered by the London and Westminster as a means of 
convincing provincial banks to use the London and Westminster as their London agent, see 
GREGORY, supra note 28, at 236. The principal inducement was shares in the London and 
Westminster.   
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we [the London and Westminster] should come under engagement to discount for them at any 
time Bills to the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pounds (£100,000) at the current rate of 
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to sue and be sued and accept bills of exchange, the Bank of England hoped to 
curtail the London and WestminsterÕs ability to supply credit to provincial banks. 
Offering such support required that the London and Westminster accept bills of 
exchange drawn on it by country bankers who might question the wisdom of 
continuing to do so given the restrictions on the bills London joint stock banks could 
accept. Furthermore, should the relations between the London and Westminster and 
any of its correspondent banks turn sour, the Bank of England hoped to render 
hazardous any attempts at recovering these debts unless the parties to the action 
complied with all of the formalities of partnership law.   
 
                                                                                                                                    
the day, and that we should moreover waive charging Commission on Transfers of money 
from ourselves to their other London agents.  
 
With the Manchester and Liverpool District Bank, the London and Westminster agreed to, in April 
1838, £20,000-£40,000 worth of bills allowed under discount at one time, at 2 " %, undercutting the 
BankÕs branch rate for those with a circulation account, though the amount under discount was 
considerably less. This deal replaced the London and WestminsterÕs earlier arrangement with the 
District, see supra note 362. Further deals followed with the Royal Bank of Ireland and with the 
National Bank of Scotland (GREGORY, supra note 28, at 241-2), amongst others. 
The terms of the agreements reached with country correspondents came under strain during 
moments of falling demand and lower prices. At such times, merchants, manufacturers, and bankers 
had difficulty meeting their obligations. When crisis followed, like the one in 1837, the London and 
WestminsterÕs correspondent banks made use of the advances and discounts available to them, in the 
same manner as the Bank of EnglandÕs client banks utilized their line of credit with the Bank. During 
these moments, the London and WestminsterÕs country correspondents pushed the terms of their deal 
with the London and Westminster to its limit.  
In January 1837, for example, the East of England Bank sought £10,000 at very short notice 
despite having previously promised to give notice of more than one day. From the spring of 1837 
through until 1840, the Herefordshire Banking Company consistently exceeded the limits of its 
agreement with the London and Westminster. In the case of the North and South Wales Bank, the 
original agreement with the London and Westminster came under strain during the period 1837-39. In 
November 1839, the two banks arranged new terms, the London and Westminster allowing the North 
and South Wales Bank to borrow to the extent of £110,000. In return, the North and South Wales 
Bank agreed to (i) lodge with the London and Westminster all of the securities it held, including bills 
of exchange drawn on Liverpool trade and title deeds to the bankÕs new premises; (ii) close its branch 
in Liverpool, and, from January 1840, confine its business exclusively to Wales; and (iii) guarantee 
the repayment of its debt to the London and Westminster by paying £50,000 by March 1840, the 
remainder by June (the directors of the North and South Wales Bank pledged £20,000 each towards 
meeting the first instalment). The London and Westminster had especially fraught relations with two 
banks that also caused the Bank of England difficulties, the Northern and Central Bank of England 
and the Leamington Bank. We considered the tangled web involving the Northern and Central and 
the Bank of England in Chapter III, see supra section G (2), Chapter III.  
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The Bank of England, then, found obstacles to throw in the path of the London and 
Westminster by exploiting those points where the legal regime left the London and 
Westminster vulnerable. Yet, though inconvenienced, the London and Westminster 
conjured up responses. What turned out to be a key battleground between these two 
institutions was the matter of interpreting the only, and very short, legislative 
provision explicitly regulating joint stock banks in London, the declaratory clause in 
the Bank of EnglandÕs renewed Charter of 1833. From the London and 
WestminsterÕs perspective, this clause made possible joint stock banking in London 
and required the future elaboration of an adequate legal framework to facilitate the 
activities of these banks. In opposition to this broad reading of the declaratory 
clause, the Bank of England, and both the government and the courts after 1833, 
responded with a narrow interpretation.  
 
According to this narrow interpretation, the London and Westminster was wrong to 
presume that, by passing the declaratory clause, Parliament had intended to remove 
every inconvenience impeding joint stock banks in London. These new banks had to 
coexist alongside what remained of the Bank of EnglandÕs monopoly. As part of that 
monopoly, as those who argued in favour of a narrow interpretation emphasized, the 
Bank of England was the only London bank that could sue and be sued in the name 
of its public officer. Furthermore, joint stock banks in London could not accept bills 
with maturity dates of less than six months, ostensibly to protect the BankÕs 
monopoly over demand notes in London. Both Parliament and the courts sided with 
the Bank of EnglandÕs interpretation of the declaratory clause, leaving the first joint 
stock banks in London with the mere shell of a legal framework through which to 
operate.  




That, at least, was what the Bank of England hoped. As a response to the Bank of 
EnglandÕs hostility, the London and Westminster improvised creative legal solutions 
to its problems through refusing to see the legal regime in either/or terms. Accepting 
the risks brought by partnership law was one response open to the London and 
Westminster after its defeat in Parliament, while after its defeat before the courts, it 
would have been easy for the London and Westminster to curtail the credit available 
in London to provincial joint stock banks without exploring any further options. 
Instead of accepting these limitations, the London and Westminster found ways of 
bypassing them by grasping the openness of the legal regime to further possibilities. 
We touched on the alternative to legislation that allowed the London and 
Westminster to bypass the inadequacies of partnership law when we described the 
appointment of five trustees in whose name the bank could sue and be sued under 
the authority of the separate contracts drawn up between the trustees and all of the 
London and WestminsterÕs customers. If amending partnership law through an Act 
of Parliament to meet the needs of a joint stock banking company was impossible, 
the London and Westminster found the flexibility it required through trustees.  
 
Furthermore, the London and Westminster continued to make credit available in 
London to its customers because it sidestepped some of the formalities involved in 
accepting bills of exchange. When a bill of exchange was drawn by a provincial 
banker (the drawer) ordering the London banker (the drawee) to pay some third 
party at a future date, the conventional practice involved the drawee  (the London 
banker) adding their signature to the face of the bill shortly thereafter. By endorsing 
the bill, the drawee became the acceptor, and guaranteed payment to the holder of 
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the bill at maturity. Traditionally, the acceptance of a London banker enhanced the 
billÕs creditability because they had access to the Bank of England. The more 
credible the bill, the more likely it was to circulate extensively, making it easier for 
each holder to discount the bill should they need to do so.  
 
Although the London and Westminster did not hold an account at the Bank of 
England, its large body of wealthy shareholders made bills carrying its endorsement 
credible. The ruling by the courts prohibiting joint stock banks in London from 
accepting certain classes of bill compromised the capacity of the London and 
Westminster to add its endorsement to bills of exchange. Thomas Joplin, ever the 
promoter of joint stock banking, attempted to cushion the blow. He pointed out that 
the acceptance of London banks, whether private or joint stock was not quite so 
paramount post-1826 because, as this dissertation described in Chapter III, 
provincial joint stock banks had the backing of a large body of shareholders.
506
 Yet 
Joplin also acknowledged the role that a London joint stock bank could continue to 
play by,
 
instead of accepting the bill by signing it, having the drawer write on the bill 
something like the following: ÒTwenty-one days after date pay (without acceptance) 
to [the payee], or order, Seventy Pounds Sterling, value received.Ó Distinguishing 
this bill from a conventional bill of exchange were the words Òwithout acceptance,Ó 
which allowed the drawee (the London joint stock bank) to not accept the bill so as 
to avoid falling foul of the prohibition against London joint stock banks accepting 
bills with less than six months until maturity. But the London bank was still named 
on the bill as the drawee, that is, as the party due to make the payment upon 
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The drawback to this strategy stemmed from the power of the drawee to refuse to 
make the payment at maturity since, because he had not formally accepted the bill, 
the courts would not hold him liable.  For this reason, the bill was technically less 
secure, which placed greater importance on the London and WestminsterÕs intention 
to meet the debt at maturity even though it had not formally accepted the bill.  The 
formality of acceptance added extra confirmation to the arrangement in place 
between the drawer (the provincial bank) and the drawee (the London joint stock 
bank). In the absence of this confirmation, the drawee had extra scope to get out of 
their obligations. But given their existing arrangement with the provincial bank, it 
was highly unlikely that the London joint stock bank would want to jeopardize such 
relations by making use of their extra privilege.  
 
Moreover, the holder could still discount bills drawn Òwithout acceptanceÓ because, 
though not formally accepted by a London joint stock bank, they contained the name 
of one as the place where payment was due. The only doubt for parties 
contemplating endorsing such a bill was whether the drawer of the bill had the 
authority to draw on the London joint stock bank named on the bill. Easing this 
doubt in the absence of a formal acceptance from a London joint stock bank were 
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 Writing Òwithout acceptanceÓ on the bill was one option. Another was to have a private individual 
accept the bills on behalf of the bank. The London and WestminsterÕs rival, the London Joint Stock 
Bank, pursued this second option by having its manager accept bills of exchange drawn on the bank. 
The London Joint Stock Bank then provided its manager with the money to pay the bills at maturity. 
This second option failed to survive scrutiny from the courts because, in Bank of England v Booth, 
(1837) 2 Keen 485 [48 E.R. 278], the court determined that this scheme was merely a means of 
getting bills of exchange accepted indirectly when there was a prohibition against doing so directly. 
See also THOMAS, supra note 10, at 242-3.  
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endorsements by provincial joint stock banks backed by hundreds, sometimes 
thousands, of shareholders. The country correspondents of, say, the London and 
Westminster were not obscure merchants, but included some of the largest and most 
prestigious provincial joint stock banks. Few would doubt the word of a joint stock 
bank when it drew bills saying it had credit at the London and Westminster, with or 




The London and WestminsterÕs use of informality and trustees helped the bank 
overcome the vulnerabilities that the law of negotiable instruments and the law of 
partnership exposed it to, and that the Bank of England attempted to exploit. That 
the London and Westminster found ways of responding to these vulnerabilities and 
the BankÕs efforts at exploiting them demonstrates the capacity for creativity that 
law holds. LawÕs contribution, then, to 1830s banking in London was not merely in 
the form of a discrete piece of legislation removing a fetter protecting the Bank of 
England from competition. Rather, law played a prominent role for through it the 
London and Westminster and the Bank of England pursued their often competing 
objectives, and shaped not only the form taken by banking in London, but also the 
relations between London banks and their provincial clients.  
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 Those discounting bills of exchange still had to exercise caution, however, given the scope for 
fraud in a system where adding bogus names to bills was a common practice. The London and 
Westminster was a victim of one such fraudulent scheme in the autumn of 1837. Bills of exchange 
drawn by the ÒSheerness and Queensborough BankÓ and the ÒFlintshire District Banking CompanyÓ 
named the London and Westminster Bank as the place of payment in London. Various provincial 
joint stock banks in the Birmingham area, including the Birmingham Banking Company and the 
Commercial Bank of England, discounted the bills. TheÒSheerness and Queensborough BankÓ and 
the ÒFlintshire District Banking CompanyÓ did not exist, however. Those behind the fraudulent 
scheme added plausible sounding joint stock banks, and a credible London agent, to the bills to add 
credibility to their scheme. For an account of this episode, see THE CIRCULAR TO BANKERS, 20 
October 1837, at 125-6.  
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At the outset of this chapter, we explored the creative use of legal arguments to help 
address a puzzle. In early 1837, the Bank of EnglandÕs Charter was widely 
understood to prohibit other banks in London with more than six partners, yet within 
a relatively short space of time this widely accepted understanding of the BankÕs 
Charter lost its hold over the government. This transformation was partly possible 
through the use lawyers made of an unconventional but plausible legal interpretation 
of the BankÕs Charter that unsettled a hitherto largely undisputed interpretation. 
Through this reinterpretation, government ministers re-imagined the limits of the 
possible in the context of banking in London. When the London and Westminster 
became a reality in early 1834, its greatest strength was its realization that, despite 
all the obstacles the legal regime placed in its way, that same legal regime contained 



















This dissertation challenges histories of money and banking covering the late 
eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century that adopt a functionalist 
perspective. Functionalist accounts of money and banking during this period assume 
an economy with needs, where either law helped to fulfil these needs through 
permissive legislation, or it fettered the fulfilment of them through restrictive 
legislation. Either way, from a functionalist perspective, lawÕs contribution to 
economic change was marginal. This dissertation has challenged such a functionalist 
perspective by exposing functionalismÕs inability to solve three puzzles about money 
and banking during this period. Solving these puzzles exposes functionalismÕs 
inadequacies because the solutions to all three puzzles bring centre state the role of 
law.   
 
The first puzzle concerns the role played by both country bankersÕ notes and bills of 
exchange as currency in the late eighteenth and first quarter of the nineteenth 
century. That they did so is puzzling because for a currency to circulate it typically 
requires public backing, usually from the state, yet these local currencies had no 
such state backing. Instead, small banking partnerships issued country bankersÕ 
notes and endorsed bills of exchange. From a functionalist perspective, notes and 
bills with the backing of a small partnership of bankers were a response to restrictive 
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legislation that prohibited backs from having more than six partners, and to the 
inability of the government and the Bank of England to supply sufficient quantities 
of, respectively, Royal Mint coin and Bank of England notes. But a functionalist 
approach does not explain the credibility of these alternative currencies given the 
absence of state backing.  
 
The mistake made by functionalist approaches is to view law and the economy as 
two separate domains, with the former either facilitating or fettering the latter. This 
dissertation has adopted a different perspective, one that captures the legal 
foundations of economic life. The role of law in relation to these local currencies did 
not end with restrictive legislation on the size of banks. Through the rules on, for 
instance, negotiable instruments or principal-agent relations, law was a constant 
presence in the background. Yet the most striking contribution of the legal regime to 
the circulation of notes and bills came to the fore during periods of economic crisis.  
 
During these periods, people preferred to hold promises to pay backed by the 
government. Consequently, there was a tendency for the holders of notes or bills to 
enforce the bankerÕs promise to pay by having the note or bill converted into 
government stamped coin. Yet if everyone attempted to convert notes and bills at the 
same time, the banker lacked access to enough gold coin to meet this demand. The 
bankerÕs notes risked becoming the mere ÒragsÓ of a Òcountry merchant.Ó If 
communities wanted to avoid the collapse of their local banker and the means of 
exchange he provided, they had to find ways of acting collectively to support the 
bankerÕs credit.  




As Chapter II explored, communities across England and Wales did find ways of 
collectively supporting the credit of their local banker, and their doing so helps to 
address the puzzle affecting both notes and bills as currency. These local currencies 
flourished without the direct backing of the state partly because during times of 
economic crisis these notes and bills received public backing not from the state, but 
from the people of the towns and regions where the notes and bills circulated. This 
collective backing took various forms including collective forbearance, community 
guarantees, and local authority backed paper money. All of these forms of collective 
support drew on law ranging from note holders opting not to enforce their formal 
legal right, through to the unique and highly institutionalized response in Liverpool 
where the cityÕs Corporation issued its own paper currency. Moreover, regardless of 
its form this support had to be collective. A currency cannot prosper if all it has for 
support are self-reliant, autonomous individuals. For a currency to prosper, it needs 
the support of communities willing to find ways of acting collectively together. 
Through their flexible and creative deployment of the legal regime, communities 
across England and Wales in the period 1790-1825 found the means to support the 
notes issued and the bills endorsed by their bankers.   
 
Although many made the pledge to back their local banker, contemporaries were 
aware of the risks brought by both country bankersÕ notes and bills of exchange as 
currency. The nature of the risk varied with oneÕs perspective. Those who 
guaranteed a country bankerÕs notes risked ending up liable for all of the promises to 
pay written on the bankerÕs notes without gaining in return any direct control over 
the banker. Joint stock banking was a response to this risk for, in return for 
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guaranteeing on a permanent basis all of the bankÕs debts through their unlimited 
liability, the bankÕs shareholders got a say in the running of the bank. Yet from the 
point of view of those with responsibility for maintaining the gold standard, the 
guarantees underpinning alternative currencies were a side issue. To maintain the 
gold standard in the 1830s, the key issue involved ensuring the convertibility of 
paper money into gold coin on demand. The task of fulfilling this obligation fell to 
the directors of the Bank of England who were convinced, from the late 1820s 
onwards, that the independent note issue of country bankers placed the gold standard 
at risk.  
 
The emergence from the late 1820s of, one the one hand, the Bank of EnglandÕs goal 
of maintaining the gold standard through stretching its Òoctopus tentacleÓ branches, 
alongside, on the other, the new joint stock banks backed by the unlimited liability 
of their shareholders, led to the second puzzle explored in this dissertation. The 
Bank of England set about ending both the circulation of country bankersÕ notes and 
bills of exchange as currency by offering provincial bankers cheap credit on the 
condition that these bankers agreed to give up their note issue. This bargain, 
however, presents a puzzle for through it the Bank of England replaced one means 
of credit expansion with an alternative source of cheap credit in the form of 
discounts at the Bank of EnglandÕs branches. While functionalists might explain the 
rise of joint stock banking as a response to interest group pressure, such an 
explanation does not explain why the Bank of England offered its rivals cheap credit 
despite the danger posed by this cheap credit to the BankÕs obligations under the 
gold standard. To explain this second puzzle, we again must turn to the role played 
by law during this period. 




The Bank of EnglandÕs push for a single form of paper money across England and 
Wales was fraught with tension because of the powerful bargaining position of the 
new provincial joint stock banks. Their bargaining position was strong because these 
banks could maintain an independent note issue and access cheap credit thanks to 
the availability of funds in the London money market. Rediscounting bills of 
exchange with London bill brokers was cheap for provincial joint stock banks partly 
because conflicting obligations caught the Bank of England between its shareholders 
and the gold standard, and partly because bill brokers regarded debts guaranteed by 
provincial joint stock banks as highly credible.  
 
Collective action reminiscent of the collective support orchestrated by local 
communities in support of their banker up until 1825 made credible the 
endorsements on bills of exchange provided by provincial joint stock banks. Those 
who guaranteed the debt of provincial joint stock banks after 1825 differed from 
those providing the earlier collective guarantees considered in Chapter II because, in 
the case of joint stock banks, the guarantee was permanent while before 1825 such a 
guarantee had been temporary. Yet whether permanent or temporary, the 
orchestration of this collective support was a legal enterprise. Before 1825, local 
communities called upon collective forbearance, community guarantees, and local 
authority note issues. After 1826, and with the advent of joint stock banking, the 
orchestration of this collective support took place through the deed of settlement that 
constituted and regulated these new banks.  As Chapter III explored with reference 
to the Manchester and Liverpool District Bank and the Northern and Central Bank of 
England, the details in the deed of settlement could and, in 1836-37, did have 
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significant repercussions.  
 
In Chapter II and Chapter III, law served as a tool that enabled people to construct 
institutions, often creatively, for the pursuit of collective projects. In Chapter III, 
joint stock banks facilitated this collective action, backed by the unlimited liability 
of their shareholders. This backing made the debts of a joint stock bank credible and 
enabled the bank to discount cheaply in the London money market. If the Bank of 
England wanted to compete with London bill brokers for the discounts of provincial 
joint stock banks, it had to offer a competitive discount rate. Given its obligations 
under the gold standard, the Bank of England felt compelled to entice provincial 
banks to give up their notes. The result was that one means of credit expansion 
replaced another, and the gold standard remained vulnerable.   
 
Joint stock banks succeeded in gaining advantages from the Bank of England 
because they managed to coordinate otherwise disparate individuals towards a 
collective goal. The way that these banks did so brings to the fore lawÕs role in 
constructing institutions for the pursuit of collective action. It also brings another 
view of law centre stage. The Bank of England and the provincial joint stock banks, 
whether in cooperation or in conflict, constantly looked for strategic moves that 
might give one side an advantage over the other. Their respective endowments from 
the legal regime shaped how well each side was able to pursue its own objectives 
while guarding against the countermoves of the other side.  
 
The Bank of England had to manage its obligations arising from its relations with its 
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shareholders and the government, while also maintaining its obligations under the 
gold standard. Sometimes these obligations clashed creating opportunities for those 
hostile to the Bank of England. Yet joint stock banks had obligations of their own to 
their depositors, borrowers, and ordinary shareholders. Provincial joint stock banks 
had to manage the potential for conflict between these groups since failing to do so 
left opportunities for those hostile to joint stock banks.  
 
Managing the tensions between their conflicting obligations brought to the fore the 
deed of settlement that governed each joint stock bank. Just as communities before 
1826 assisted their banker during a crisis in a range of ways, so too joint stock banks 
after 1826 drew on the permanent support of their local community through  a deed 
of settlement that, while similar to other such documents, also provided a unique 
distribution of rights, obligations, privileges, and powers between all with a stake in 
the bank. As Chapter III explored, the District, through the powers conferred on its 
directors by its deed of settlement, was able to survive the crisis of 1836-37 without 
finding itself at the mercy of the Bank of England. The Northern, partly owing to its 
own deed of settlement that left the bank unable to call on further assistance from its 
shareholders, was not so fortunate. 
 
Like Chapter III, Chapter IV surveyed law from the perspective of the strategic 
moves and countermoves between rivals. Yet Chapter IV also considered a third 
view of law, one that helped to solve the third puzzle explored in this dissertation. 
Before 1833, few doubted that legislation barred joint stock banks from operating in 
and around London. Yet by the end of 1833, a clause inserted in the renewed Charter 
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of the Bank of England allowed people to form such banks in and around London. 
Functionalist accounts acknowledge this ÒliberalizingÓ legislation, but these 
accounts cannot explain why an alternative interpretation of the BankÕs Charter 
displaced the traditional interpretation so suddenly. To account for this 
transformation, Chapter IV explored lawÕs role in constructing arguments that had 
the potential to reshape the boundaries of what people thought possible.  
 
This dissertation, then, has explored the different forms taken by law as it 
contributed towards the creation of money during the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century in England and Wales. At times, law created institutions for the 
pursuit of collective action. At other times, law provided people and organizations 
with the rights, powers, and privileges for the pursuit of their strategies. While, on 
occasions, law constructed the arguments shaping perceptions of what people 
thought possible.   
 
All three of these forms taken by law contribute towards resolving puzzles that 
functionalist accounts of the history of money and banking fail to explain 
adequately. Explaining the consolidation of national paper money needs more than 
an account of restrictive legislation giving way to liberalizing legislation. English 
and Welsh paper money was once regional rather than national because local 
communities found ways of collectively backing their local banker. Restrictive 
legislation is a minor part of that story. Similarly, liberalizing legislation is a 
relatively minor part of the story about the shift to national paper money. A bigger 
part of the story is the continuing importance of local communitiesÕ findings ways to 
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back collectively their local banks. Because of the support that joint stock banks 
enjoyed, the Bank of England could not mould the monetary system to its will, but 
had to contend with joint stock banks in London and elsewhere just as skilful as the 
Bank at manoeuvring within the legal regime to obtain advantages and limit 
vulnerabilities.  
 
As this dissertation has shown, law defines and constructs economic phenomena like 
money and banking. Often, law does so creatively. Collective forbearance, 
community guarantees, local authority paper money, high denomination joint stock 
bank shares, fully paid up low denomination joint stock bank shares, circulation 
accounts, share conversions, ÒdistrictÓ banks, local boards, branch banking, a bill of 
exchange Òwithout acceptance,Ó banking in the name of trustees. All of these 
innovations serve as testimony confirming lawÕs creativity.   
 
Such creativity is important because it captures the range of institutional options 
available to those who constructed the money and banking of the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century in England and Wales. They had options, notwithstanding 
functionalist accounts suggesting historical change driven by economic needs and 
interest group imperatives. And the available choices varied more than opting 
between the state or the market.  
 
The state was not absent in the story told in this dissertation. It stamped Royal Mint 
coins, and staffed the courts that enforced contracts and property rights, while the 
government fought wars overseas and battled domestically with Parliament over 
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taxation, Parliamentary reform, and the return to the gold standard. Moreover, the 
Bank of England was an institution of the state despite its attempts, aided by many 
historians, to present itself as a ÒprivateÓ bank no different from any other bank.  
 
The state and the government did not dominate the story told in this dissertation, yet 
the term ÒmarketÓ does not capture adequately the alternative. Exchange, where 
people buy and sell, was a big part of the story told in the previous chapters: in 
Chapter II, communities bought and sold their country bankersÕ notes; in Chapter III, 
shareholders bought credit sold by joint stock banks; in Chapter IV, provincial 
bankers bought credit from London joint stock banks; while throughout these 
chapters, people bought and sold bills of exchange. Yet fully understanding these 
exchanges required investigating the construction of each market to identify the 
institutions that added credibility to, for example, country bankersÕ notes, bills 
endorsed by joint stock banks, and bills accepted by London joint stock banks. The 
construction of these institutions was a legal enterprise, with questions of public 
authority always in the background. It was also an enterprise with no fixed form 















A. Bills of Exchange, Bill Discounting, and Bill Rediscounting 
 
To understand bill rediscounting, it is first important to understand the relations 
behind a bill of exchange, and then to appreciate the role performed by bankers as 
bill discounters.  
 
A bill of exchange is an order by one merchant instructing another merchant to pay a 
third party in typically 90 days time. For example, imagine that A owes a debt to B 
and C owes a debt to A. To cancel these debts, A (the drawer) writes or draws a bill 
ordering C (the drawee) to pay B (the payee) a certain sum at a future date. When 
the party to whom the bill is addressed (the drawee, C in this example), signs the bill 
they become the acceptor and confirm that they will pay B when the bill matures. If 
B receives payment from C when the bill matures, CÕs debt to A is cancelled, as is 




Prior to the billÕs maturity date, the third party (the payee, B in this example) holds a 
bill of exchange that will produce cash in 90 days time. But what if the holder of the 
bill wants cash upfront? To accommodate those who want cash for bills, bankers use 
their capital and the deposits entrusted to them to discount bills of exchange. By so 
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doing, they provide the holder of the bill with money up front, minus a discount that 
secures, all going well, the banker a profit on the transaction. Upon discounting the 
bill with a banker, the holder of the bill signs his name to the back of the bill. By 
doing so, he becomes an endorser of the bill. Should the acceptor or the drawer of 
the bill fail to pay the debt owed on the bill, liability shifts to the endorser.  The 
banker discounting the bill becomes an endorsee, and becomes an endorser liable for 
the debt on the bill should he later resell the bill. More often than not, having 
discounted a bill, the banks of six partners or less that featured in Chapter II, 
retained the bill until it matured. Upon maturity, the banker presented the bill to the 
acceptor for payment. 
 
The practice of joint stock banks considered in Chapter III of this dissertation 
differed subtly but significantly from that of banks of six partners or less. In general, 
joint stock banks from manufacturing regions did not hold the bills they discounted 
until maturity. Instead, such joint stock banks turned these bills into money before 
they matured. London bill brokers, who specialized in finding buyers for those 
selling bills, assisted the joint stock banks with the task of raising this money. By 





B. Rediscounting at the Bank of EnglandÕs Branches 
 
In the 1830s, rediscounting in the London money market was one option available to 
provincial joint stock banks wishing to raise finance beyond their paid up capital and 
the funds left by depositors. Another option was to rediscount at their local Bank of 
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England branch. Despite the attractions of a Òcirculation account,Ó rediscounting at 
the Bank of England was not always attractive to provincial joint stock banks owing 
to the Bank of EnglandÕs rules on the type of bills eligible for discount at its 
branches.  
 
In general, the rules formulated by the head office in Threadneedle Street for the 
conduct of the Bank of EnglandÕs branches favoured the ÒrespectableÓ or affluent 
customers of each region, and sanctioned only those bills of exchange that met the 
BankÕs strict test of Òlegitimacy.Ó Those of sufficient standing who passed the 
BankÕs test of eligibility often started with an Òopen account.Ó These accounts 
placed a maximum on the number of the account holders own bills that the branch 
would discount at one time. Over this maximum, the bills brought into the branch for 




The rationale behind the preference for bills that had come into the discounterÕs 
possession during the normal course of trade over bills drawn by the 
customer/discounter himself was twofold. First, the Bank of EnglandÕs directors and 
branch agents reasoned that customers who offered the Bank only their own drafts 
for discount Òand never offers business bills, not drawn by himself, it may without 
hesitation be assumed that he is leaning on the bank for capital.Ó
512
 The Bank of 
England and its branches preferred general trade bills over the customers own bills 
because the former served as evidence that the discounter had engaged in buying and 
selling goods with others as opposed to relying on accommodation paper, that is, 
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bills not supporting an underlying sale of goods in transit. Second, the Bank and its 
branches preferred bills arising from the normal course of trade because by 
discounting such bills the Bank hoped Òto check in a limited degree their circulation 
as money.Ó
513
   
 
The BankÕs agenda with respect to bill discounting, then, was, on the one hand, to 
encourage the circulation of its own notes over both country bankersÕ notes and bills 
as currency, and, on the other, to limit the creation of so-called accommodation 
paper, which the BankÕs directors regarded as inherently speculative. To be eligible 
for discount, bills should be the product of Òbona fide transactionsÓ that Òreally 
represented the Trade of the district.Ó Consequently, ÒDiscounts are effected by the 
Bank not to enable manufacturers to hold but to dispose of their goods Ð to give 
facilities to actual traders and not to encourage the increase of manufacturers which 




To assist the Bank in achieving its goal of curtailing the flow of accommodation 
paper, the head office tightly controlled the type of bills eligible, limiting its 
discounts to those bills judged Òfirst class,Ó bearing ÒrespectableÓ London known 
and approved names. Based on information provided by branch agents, head office 
investigated the reputation of the drawee and the acceptor. The Bank of England 
seldom discounted bills drawn by one branch of a firm on another (i.e. Òpig on pork 
billsÓ). It was difficult for large partnerships or joint stock companies to get bills 
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discounted if there were doubts about the authority of the person accepting them. 
Moreover, the Bank and its branches refused to discount bills with longer than three 
months to run before maturity.
515
 The Branch Bank Committee sitting in London 
made decisions over which bills to discount, and tended to look with suspicion on 
any bills bearing only one name ÒknownÓ in London.  
 
As an example of the Bank of EnglandÕs approach to bill discounting, consider its 
relationship with the Bank of Manchester in the early 1830s.
516
 According to the 
Bank of ManchesterÕs representatives, the relationship turned sour because of the 
Bank of EnglandÕs Òminute examination of the quality of billsÓ
517
 and rejection of 
even those widely considered Òof the first quality É drawn upon first-rate houses in 
London.Ó
518
 In particular, a major problem stemmed from the ignorance of the 
BankÕs branch agent, who often did not know the parties named on the bills 
presented to him for discount. Consequently, the representatives of the Bank of 
Manchester had to explain Òso much about the private affairs of the drawers and 
acceptors of those bills, that it became an irksome duty.Ó
519
 To relieve this Òirksome 
duty,Ó the practice of the Bank of Manchester was   
 
on the day prior to wanting discounts, to send a considerable number of bills 
into the Branch, in order that the agent might select such as he approved, and 
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return the remainder, and thus prevent the continued explanations as to the 




The Bank of Manchester then replaced the rejected bills with paper that it hoped was 
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Joint Stock Banks under Partnership Law 
 
A regime of unlimited liability made the proprietors of joint stock banks formed 
under the Act of 1826 liable for all of the bankÕs debts.
521
 J. W. Gilbart, who later 
managed the London and Westminster, played a prominent role in explaining the 
workings of unlimited liability, doing so in an early pamphlet through the following 
example, or, as Gilbart put it, Òextreme case.Ó Imagine a wealthy individual who 
buys five shares in a bank with a stock of 10,000 shares. Then imagine that the 
bankÕs entire paid up capital, whatever that might be, is lost and the bank finds itself 
£20,000 in debt. In such a scenario, the creditors of the bank could sue its public 
officer.
522
 Obtaining judgment against him, the creditors could then demand from 
the bankÕs shareholders the payment of the debt by, in the language of the 1826 Act, 
Ò[issuing] execution against any person or persons who was or were a member or 
members of such corporation or copartnership at the time when the contract or 
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The wealthy shareholder in this example only owns five shares, and the proportion 
of the debt he owes is £10. Nevertheless, under the terms of the Act of 1826, the 
creditors could issue execution on him for the full amount of the debt, something 
they were likely to do if we assume this shareholderÕs wealth to be a widely known 
fact. Consequently, on behalf of the creditors, the sheriffÕs officers had authority to 
seize goods, and other property belonging to this shareholder, until they had raised 
the sum of £20,000. 
 
Dealing with what the bank owed to its creditors using the 1826 Act of Parliament 
ensured the fulfilment of the bankÕs obligations. Left open, however, was the 
possibility that the burden might fall disproportionately on some shareholders more 
than others, and as the above example testifies, it was conceivable that the full extent 
of the loss might be borne by a single shareholder alone. It was here (at least in 
theory; for the reality, see below) that the deed of settlement kicked in through a 
clause stipulating that no shareholder was responsible for the debts of the bank to a 
larger sum than a figure proportionate to their shareholding.
524
 By virtue of this 
clause, the shareholders guaranteed each other against the full extent of the debts of 
the bank falling on one, or only a few, of their number. With respect to the above 
example, although the wealthy shareholder was still obliged to pay the bankÕs 
creditors, he had recourse, in theory, to his own remedy under the deed of settlement 
against the other shareholders. As soon as he obtained judgment, he could issue 
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execution against the property of the other shareholders until he had his £20,000 




Despite GilbartÕs best efforts at reassuring those thinking of investing in the shares 
of a joint stock bank, the likely reality was that enforcing the clause in the deed of 
settlement on the proportionate allocation of the bankÕs losses faced problems 
courtesy of English partnership law. Under English partnership law, the general rule 
was that one partner could not bring an action against another partner or partners in 
respect of a partnership transaction.
526
 An action like the one described by Gilbart, 
where a shareholder attempted to recover the share of the debt owed by the other 
partners, was likely to fail because it involved bringing such an action against the 
other partners in respect of a partnership transaction. Moreover, if the action was 
against the public officer of the bank, a further problem was that the 1826 Act Ð that 
allowed joint stock banks to sue and be sued in the name of a public officer Ð only 
referred to actions by and against the bank, not actions between shareholders.
527
 
Even if the action was against an individual shareholder rather than the company as 
a whole, that shareholder could claim they were not liable except in conjunction with 
all of the other shareholders.
528
 The plaintiff was then back to claiming against either 
the public officer (difficult given the likely inapplicability of the 1826 Act), or their 
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fellow shareholders (difficult given the general rule against such claims). The only 
option left for a shareholder bearing a disproportionate share of the bankÕs debt was 
a bill in equity. Yet a bill in equity required listing all of the shareholders as 
plaintiffs or defendants.
529
 Omitting the name of only one shareholder (joint stock 
banks had hundreds, sometimes thousands, of shareholders) would allow the 
defendant to enter a plea of abatement and the case would collapse.  
 
Despite the likely difficulties over ensuring the proportionate distribution of loss 
between the shareholders in joint stock banks, no such disputes appeared before the 
courts. Yet those disputes between shareholders that led to public controversy or that 
ended up before the courts in the late 1830s, posed problems owing to the same 
defects in partnership law. These disputes involved shareholders who were at the 
same time customers of their bank, such as a depositor or borrower. In a scenario 
where a shareholder in a joint stock bank deposited money with the bank, and where 
the bank then refused to return the deposit when asked to do so, it was difficult for 
the shareholder to reclaim their money. If the shareholder/depositor brought an 
action before the law courts, they came up against the rule preventing one partner 
from bringing an action against the other partners in respect of a partnership 
transaction. Moreover, they could not bring the action against the public officer of 
the bank owing to the likely inapplicability of the 1826 Act. If the 
shareholder/depositor brought a bill before a court of equity, they confronted the 
                                                
529
 For an explanation of the rationale behind this rule, see GOW, supra note 526, at 94-95. See also 
THOMAS, supra note 10, at 238-240; and Peirce Mahony to the Committee on Joint Stock Banks, 
BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (1837) (531) XIV at 230-267.  
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A similar problem confronted joint stock banks that lent money to their own 
shareholders Ð a common practice in the mid 1830s, as chapter III explores. While 
partnership law left shareholders who deposited money in their own bank 
vulnerable, in the case of those shareholders who borrowed from their own bank, 
partnership law this time left the bank vulnerable.
531
 If the shareholder refused to 
repay the borrowed money, it was difficult for the bank to bring an action before the 
law courts because doing so involved the bankÕs partners bringing an action against 
another partner in respect of a partnership transaction, an action made even harder 
given the likely inapplicability of the 1826 Act.  If the bank then turned to the courts 
of equity, they faced the procedural complexities noted above. Exactly these 
dilemmas faced the Northern and Central in 1837, whose shareholders, mostly the 
bankÕs directors, owed the bank more than £400,000.
532
 The Northern and CentralÕs 
solicitor sought legal advice on the question of whether the bank was likely to 
succeed in an action against its own shareholders, but was told, ÒIt appears very 
doubtful whether a person indebted to a joint-stock banking company, and who may 
happen to be a shareholder, can be sued at law for the debt which he may owe to the 
                                                
530
 Legislation in 1838 (1 & 2 Vict. c. 96) remedied this problem. The Act allowed the members of a 
joint stock bank to sue the bankÕs public officer in the same way as individuals who were not 
shareholders could bring an action against the public officer.  See arguments of the defendants in 
Seddon v Connell, 10 SIM. 57 [59 E.R. 534] 538. 
 
531
 The problems facing joint stock banks attempting to claim debts owed by their shareholders were 
also dealt with by the same legislation in 1838 (1 & 2 Vict. c. 96).  
 
532
 Thomas Broadbent to the Committee on Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS 
(1837-38) (626) VII at 109 (Q: 1576). 
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bank, in consequence of his being a partner.Ó
533
 Soon after, the courts confirmed this 
interpretation in a case involving the Agricultural and Commercial Bank of Ireland, 
which collapsed at around the same time as the Northern and Central.
534
 Proceeding 
before a court of equity was not a realistic alternative, however, in part owing to the 
problems noted by the Northern and CentralÕs solicitor in 1838,  
 
every time a shareholder sells his shares, the new party must be made a party 
[to the bill in equity] by a supplemental bill; and in like manner, in the event 
of a shareholder becoming bankrupt, his assignees would have to be made 
parties; or if a party died, his executors would have to be made parties, by 





Settling a debt between shareholders, or between the bank and a shareholder, or 
between a shareholder and the bank, faced a number of obstacles in the 1830s. 
Despite these obstacles, the shares of joint stock banks were popular, and frequently 
sold at a premium.
536
 Moreover, none of the above problems affected the bankÕs 
creditors who did not own shares in the bank 
                                                
533
 Copy Opinion of Attorney-general [J. Campbell], Sir Frederick Pollock, and Sir William W. Follet 
reproduced by William Seddon to the Committee on Joint Stock Banks, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY 
PAPERS (1837-38) (626) VII at 3 (Q: 36).  
 
534
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